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Abstract
This thesis addresses the fundamental problem of whether and how the
church's tradition can be understood as revelatory given its patriarchal nature
and its implication in relations of power It is therefore concerned with how
feminist Catholics are to be accountable to tradition.
In addressing this problem the thesis follows three basic movements. The first
juxtaposes contemporary discourses that are concerned with revelation, on the
one hand, and rupture, on the other. However, by an investigation of the
apophatic tradition in theology and its relation to the cataphatic, it suggests
that this juxtaposition is both necessary to theology and that it has a long
theological pedigree. Therefore the second movement, in seeking mediating
paths with which to respond to this rupture in knowledge, proposes a dual
mediation that maintains an unreconcilable tensiveness between a path of
transformative interpretation and a path which continues to probe that which
is unsaid. The third movement looks at how this is expressed in the theology of
tradition and the church. By highlighting the distinction between tradition as
the whole life of the church and the Tradition which is ultimately Other, it
points to a fundamental tension between that which is witnessed to in
discourse and is therefore implicated in relations of power and that which,
while witnessed to, is ultimately uncapturable but nevertheless accompanies
all discourse.
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In this context, the thesis concludes, the church is both the privileged witness
to the Other, but its witness is a wounded witness. While it is in the church that
we encounter the Tradition, the challenge that we face is to find ways to allow
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Recent discourse around gender and ordination
This teaching [that the Church has no authority whatsoever to
confer priestly ordination on women] requires definitive assent,
since, founded on the written Word of God, and from the
beginning constantly preserved and applied in the Tradition of
the Church, it has been set forth infallibly by the ordinary and
universal Magisterium (cf. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic
Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium 25, 2). Thus, in the
present circumstances, the Roman Pontiff, exercising his proper
office of confirming the brethren (cf. Lk 22:32), has handed on this
same teaching by a formal declaration, explicitly stating what is to
be held always, everywhere, and by all, as belonging to the
deposit of the faith.
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
28 October 1995.
That tradition is a problem for Catholic feminists is perhaps nowhere more
clearly seen than in recent discourse around the issue of the non-ordainability
of women to the ministerial priesthood. The ordination of women is not the
specific focus of this thesis; indeed the desirability of ordaining women within
the present context of a clericalised church has become questionable for many
feminists.' However, for the church to proclaim that women are intrinsically
unordainable, and are therefore incapable of imaging God in Christ as fully as
1 For an analysis of the divisions that emerged at the Womens'
Ordination Conference in November 1995 between those in favour of
continuing to struggle for the ordination of women and those (led by Elisabeth
Schussler Fiorenza) propagating the idea of a discipleship of equals see, The
Tablet, 9 December 1995:1595. For a discussion of the issue within an Anglican
context, see Ross (1994).
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men are, as an infallible part of the Catholic faith, is cause for grave concern.
In focusing on questions of gender and ordination I am deliberately selecting
this as one among other issues' in order to highlight the problematic of the
authority of tradition in the midst of a context of a contested ecclesia. Therefore
in this chapter I begin by outlining the developments in the debate around the
ordination of women which has resulted in the Responsum ad Dubium quoted
above. I then consider responses to these and the ambiguities around the
theology of the magisteriurn. I end by highlighting the problematic that this
raises with regard to the tradition of the church and the theology of revelation,
which is the real focus of this thesis.
Inter Insigniores to Ordinatio Sacerdotalis:
from the iconic argument to the argument from tradition alone
Discussion of the ordination of women in a Catholic context is a recent
discussion, although it has clearly been linked to movements in other churches,
in particular, the Anglican communion.' While Pope John XXIII in Pacem in
Terns (41) and the bishops of the Second Vatican Council in Gaudium et Spes (9,
60) identified movements for the liberation of women as a sign of the times to
which the church should pay attention, it was only in the late 1960s and early
Other issues that have been highlighted recently are those
involving Catholic moral teaching in the areas of sexual ethics. The encyclicals
of Pope John PaulII Veritatis Spendor in 1993 and Evangelium Vitae in 1995have
sought to reaffirm Catholic moral teaching on matters such as contraception,
abortion, divorce and remarriage, and homosexuality, on the grounds that they
are based on revealed truth. .
3 Indeed the first papal statement that we have is that of Pope Paul
VI in his letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury. See page 6 below.
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1970s that the statement of canon law that "only a baptised man can validly
receive ordination" came to be questioned."
In 1968 the World Congress of the Lay apostolate asked for a study on the role
of women in the sacramental order of the church. This was followed by
requests from the national synods of Holland in 1969, Austria in 1974, and the
synods of three Swiss dioceses in 1975, that this question be studied. (Field-
Bibb 1991:179) In the U.5.A. the Leadership Conference of Women Religious
(LCWR) adopted a resolution in 1974 calling for all ministries in the church to
be open to women and men as the Spirit calls them. This was followed by the
launch in 1975 of the Women's Ordination Conference whose stated aim was to
work for the ordination of women in the Catholic Church. (Iadarola 1985:468)
It was in this context that the Pontifical Biblical Commission was asked to
study the role of women in the Bible with particular reference to the question of
priesthood, while the International Theological Commission looked at women's
ministries on the basis of baptism in the context of the universal priesthood.
(Field-Bibb 1991:179)
The report of the Pontifical Biblical Commission
In addressing the scriptural grounds for ordaining or not ordaining women the
commission noted that the New Testament texts do not say much about either
women or priesthood. In speaking of women it stresses feminine symbolism
associated with wives and mothers as well as Marian symbolism which leads
4 This is not to negate previous "hidden traditions" (see Byrne
1994:50ff) which speak either of ordained women in the Church or of women's
desire for ordination. What is at stake, however, is that the last thirty years
have seen its emergence as a public discourse in the Church.
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into an understanding of the feminine nature of the church. (1978:227ff) It
notes, moreover, the normatively hierarchical nature of the church, which is
derived from the twelve patriarchs. (1978:232)
The fundamental question posed by the commission was what normative value
should be accorded to the "masculine nature of the hierarchical order" and
whether this necessarily excluded women from the sacramental economy.
(1978:233) In considering this they noted that in the Old Testament women
could have sacrifices offered, could participate in worship and were
prophetesses and intercessors. In the New Testament they followed and served
Jesus, were exemplary disciples, witnesses and announcers of the resurrection.
They helped spread the gospel and were collaborators of Paul. They number
nine or ten of the twenty-seven people mentioned in Romans 16 and a female
diakonos is mentioned with [unia or [unio being placed in the rank of apostles.
(1978:231f)
In its plenary session the commission agreed unanimously that
It does not seem that the New Testament by itself alone will
permit us to settle in a clear way and once and for all the problem
of the accession of women to the presbyterate. (1978:234)
Of its seventeen members, five believe that there were sufficient grounds for
excluding women from ordination, while twelve wondered if:
the church hierarchy/entrusted with the sacramental economy,
would be able to entrust the ministries of eucharist and
reconciliation to women in the light of circumstances, without
going against Christ's original intention. (1978:234f)
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Inter insigniores
This was not to be. The response of the hierarchy, in the form of Pope Paul VI
and the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, clearly felt that to
ordain women would be to go against Christ's original intention, which, it
argued, had been faithfully preserved in the church. In correspondence of
November 1975Paul VI informed the Archbishop of Canterbury that
it is not admissible to ordain women to the priesthood for very
fundamental reasons. These reasons include: the example
recorded in the Sacred Scriptures of Christ choosing his Apostles
only from among men; the constant practice of the Church, which
has imitated Christ in choosing only men; and her living teaching
authority which has consistently held that the exclusion of
women from the priesthood is in accordance with God's plan for
his Church. (Quoted in 05:1)
This statement was expanded on by the "Declaration on the Admission of
Women to the Ministerial Priesthood" (Inter Insigniores) which was issued by
the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith at the request of the
pope, and which argued that exclusion of women from the ministerial
priesthood in no way detracted from women's equality with men.
In considering the reasons given by Inter Insigniores for excluding women from
the ministerial priesthood, we can divide the arguments into two categories,
namely, those that derive from tradition, and those which give theological
importance to the maleness of Jesus of Nazareth.
Argument from tradition
Inter Insigniores states that "The Catholic Church has never felt that priestly or
episcopal ordination can be validly conferred on women". (II:l) While a few
6
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heretical sects of the early centuries ordained women, it has been unanimously
held by the fathers of the church, the medieval scholastics and the churches of
the east that only men can be ordained.
This belief and practice derives from the attitude of Jesus himself, who, while
free from social convention in his attitudes to women, "did not call any woman
to become part of the Twelve." (II:2) This example was preserved by the
apostolic community who "remained faithful to the teaching of Jesus towards
women" but did not include women in "the official and public proclamation of
.the message, since this proclamation belongs exclusively to the apostolic
mission." (II:3)
It is thus tradition - including that of Jesus, the apostles and the church
throughout its history -- that precludes the possibility of women being
ordained. This tradition has
a normative character: in the fact of conferring priestly ordination
only on men, it is a question of an unbroken tradition throughout
the history of the Church, universal in the East and in the West,
and alert to repress abuses iminediately. This norm, based on
Christ's example, has been and still is observed because it is
believed to conform to God's plan for his Church. (II:4)
Argument from the maleness ofJesus
Having argued that tradition precludes the ordination of women, Inter
Insigniores proceeds to show the fittingness of a male priesthood on the
grounds of the natural resemblance between Jesus and men." The priest
This appears to be following Thomas Aquinas' use of the
category of convenientia which is an intermediary category between necessity
and contingency. (See ST 3a, q.I, a.I) Thus, according to such thinking, the
maleness of the priest is not absolutely necessary but is rather appropriate and
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represents Christ in his ministry, and in the celebration of the eucharist he
acts not only through the effective power conferred on him by
Christ, but in persona Christi, taking the role of Christ, to the point
of being his very image, when he pronounces the words of
consecration. (II:5)
In order for the priest to be able to effectively image Christ, the Declaration
argues, the priest must be male. While Christ is the firstborn of all humanity,
male and female,
Nevertheless, the Incarnation of the Word took place according to
the male sex: this is indeed a question of fact, and this fact, while
not implying any alleged natural superiority of men over women,
cannot be dissociated from the economy of salvation. (II:5)
It is, moreover, in the context of the nuptial mystery of Christ and the church
that this fittingness is seen. Christ is the bridegroom and the church is the
bride. As such he must necessarily be male. While it can be said that the priest
also represents the church, this is a secondary role which does not lessen the
need for him to be male. (II:5)
The ''feminine''
Lurking behind these arguments we can discern assumptions about what is
properly "feminine" and the difference which this makes to women's roles in
the church.
In excluding women from the ministerial priesthood Inter Insigniores is at pains
to point out that this exclusion should in no way be understood as
fitting. Hence we see that this argument can really only be used to support the
more fundamental argument which is that from tradition.
8
undermining the fundamental equality of all the baptised when it comes to
"the universal calling to divine filiation, which is the same for all." (II:6)
However, equality does not imply identity, nor does it undermine
differentiated roles.
This stress on what is properly "feminine" was developed in responses to Inter
Insigniores in L'Osservatore Romano. In criticising the feminist movement for
undermining "the meaning of things" such as femininity, the family and
society, Raimondo Spiazzi, for example, argued that:
if the ministerial priesthood reflects the image of Christ, the head
and bridegroom, the Christian woman is called to reflect in
herself and reveal the identity of the bride-Church, the supreme
figure and type of which is a woman whose name is Mary ...
(Field-Bibb 1991:186)
Hans Urs von Balthasar likewise argued that
natural sexual difference is charged, as difference, with a
supernatural emphasis, of which it is not itself aware, so that
outside of Christian Revelation it is possible to arrive at various
deformations. (Field-Bibb 1991:187)
The establishment of this ideological "feminine" as an ontological category has
been reinforced by recent papal teaching on Mary" as well as teaching
specifically on "women". Pope John Paul Il's encyclical Mulieris Dignitatem ("On
the Dignity and Vocation of Women on the Occasion of the Marian Year")
6 See, for example, Pope John Paul Ifs encyclical Redemptoris Mater
(liOn the Blessed Virgin Mary in the Pilgrim Church") which argues that "the
figure of Mary of Nazareth sheds light on womanhood as such ... In the light
of Mary, the Church sees in the face of women the reflection of a beauty which
mirrors the loftiest sentiments of which the human heart is capable..." (46) For
a feminist analysis of the way in which Marian teaching defines women
according to a "patriarchal feminine" see my Masters thesis (Walker 1991:ch1).
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reinforced the teaching of Inter Insigniores (26), identified women's involvement
in sin and redemption with Eve and Mary respectively (9-11), and defined
women's roles in the church according to motherhood and virginity both of
which, paradoxically, draw their inspiration from Mary. (17-22)
Even when papal pronouncements have argued for the protection of the
human rights of women, the appropriateness of women's involvement at all
levels in society, and have apologised for the way women have been treated in
the history of the church, they have still spoken in terms of "feminine genius".
Thus Pope John Paul's Letter to Women in preparation for the Beijingconference
in 1995argues that the exclusion of women from the ministerial priesthood "is
in no way prejudicial to women ... but is rather an expression of what is
specific to being male and female." This is entrenched by contrasting "the
'Marian' principle" with which women are identified with "the apostolic
Petrine principle" with which men are identified. (11)
Ordinatio Sacerdotalis
That Inter Insigniores was not received as definitive teaching by many in the
church is evidenced by the need felt by Pope John Paul II to reinforce its
teaching with the publication of Ordinatio Sacerdotalis in 1994. This Apostolic
Letter "On Reserving Priestly Ministry to Men Alone" reaffirmed the teaching
of Inter Insigniores that the church "does not consider herself authorized to
admit women to priestly ordination". (2) In response to those who considered
the matter as still open to debate, or as having a merely disciplinary force, the
pope argued that:
Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be removed regarding a
matter of great importance, a matter which pertains to the
Church's divine constitution itself, in virtue of my ministry of
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confirming the brethren (cf. Lk22:32) I declare that the Church
has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on
women and that this judgment is to be definitively held by all the
Church's faithful. (4)
In restating the arguments of Inter Insigniores, it is significant to note that
Ordinatio Sacerdotalis focuses on the arguments from tradition (which broadly
include the practice of Jesus and the apostles) rather than on the arguments
about the appropriateness of male priests in the light of the maleness of [esus,"
Thus it relies exclusively on the authority of tradition.
The Responsum ad Dubium
This is highlighted by the Responsum ad Dubium, issued by the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1995 and quoted at the beginning of this
chapter. This statement claims that the teaching contained in Ordinatio
Sacerdotalis is founded on "the written Word of God", has been "constantly
preserved and applied in the.Tradition of the Church" and "set forth infallibly
by the ordinary and universal Magisterium", and is therefore to be understood
as belonging to the deposit of faith.
Tradition, magisterium and infallibility
The publication of the Responsum ad Dubium, and in particular its invocation of
the category of infallibility, was clearly designed as an attempt to put an end to
the debate by appealing to the authority of scripture, tradition and
7 I am grateful to Paul O'Leary OP for first drawing my attention to
this shift. He suggests, moreover, that the omission of the iconic argument in
Ordinatio Sacerdotalis may be a result of a growing realisation of its theological
inadequacies.
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magisterium. However, by appealing to the infallibility of the ordinary and
universal magisterium in this matter, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith effectively opened the way for the contestation of its understanding of
the realities of scripture, tradition and magisterium, particularly in regard to
their teaching on women.
The infallibility of the ordinary and universal magisterium
In claiming that this doctrine belongs to the "deposit of faith" the Congregation
of the Doctrine of the Faith is not claiming that this is a newly-defined
statement.of the extraordinary magisterium, such as the ex-cathedra papal
pronouncements of the Immaculate Conception and Assumption of Mary, or
the solemn declarations of an Ecumenical Council. What is involved is rather
the defining of beliefs that have always been held, even if they have not been
solemnly expressed. Thus what is infallible is not the declaration of any Roman
Congregation, or even of the pope himself (unless he specifically claimed to be
speaking excathedra which he did not), but the ordinary magisterium of the
church which contains, it is claimed, the doctrine itself.
What is at stake, however, is whether this doctrine is in fact part of the "deposit
of faith", that is, whether it is to be understood as divinely revealed, and,
indeed, what that means. The Responsum ad Dubium claims that it is to be
understood as divinely revealed because it is based on the written word of
God, constantly preserved in the tradition of the church, and set forth by the
magisterium of the church. Let us consider these briefly.
Scripture
The appeal to scripture that is made by Inter Insigniores, Ordinatio Sacerdotalis
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and the Responsum ad Dubium is, at best, a tenuous one. We have already noted
that when Paul VI consulted the Pontifical Biblical Commission on this matter
the commission members agreed unanimously that the New Testament alone
could not settle the issue. This is hardly surprising given that the New
Testament had not developed a doctrine of priesthood in the sense that we
understand it today. In the words of Nicholas Lash:
the biblical "foundations" of the present Pope's teaching in his
apostolic letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, in so far as they exist at all,
are too fragile to bear the weight he seeks to put upon them.
(1995:1544)
This is not to deny the patriarchal nature of scripture, however. The
commission itself noted the patriarchal nature of the hierarchy established in
the New Testament. (1978:232) The decisive question, however, is the weight
that this should be given in the present practice of the church.
Tradition
The appeal to the constant tradition of the church is, apparently, more
convincing. Avery Dulles argues persuasively that "Tradition says no".
(1995:1572) The male nature of the priesthood was, after all, taught by the
church fathers, the eastern churches and the medieval scholastics such as
Thomas Aquinas.
For most of the time the maleness of the priesthood was simply assumed. But,
when it was explicitly taught this was always in the context of the assumed
inferiority of women. In the words of Thomas Aquinas:
since it is not possible in the female sex to signify eminence of
degree, for a woman is in the state of subjection, it follows that
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she cannot receive the sacrament of Order. (STSupp, q.xxxix, Le)
In similar fashion Thomas argued that women cannot have authority as
teachers in the church, principally because women must be subjected to men.
(ST:2a2ce.177,2)
Recent papal teaching on the non-ordainability of women has been adamant
that this doctrine is not to be understood as involving ideas of the inferiority of
women. However, Lash says:
It follows that, if we set aside (as the present Pope has indicated
he would wish to do) arguments based on the inferiority of
women, there simply is no traditional teaching on the matter. The
question, as now raised, is a new question. (Lash 1985:1544)
Magisterium
Moreover, in asserting that a doctrine has been infallibly taught by the
ordinary and universal magisterium, it is not enough to show that it has been a
longstanding tradition in the church. Francis Sullivan has pointed out that:
the history of Catholic doctrine provides some examples of
propositions that, up to a certain point in time, seemed to be the
unanimous teaching of the whole episcopate and yet, as a result
of a further development of doctrine, are no longer the teaching
of the Church. (1995:1646)
Sullivan cites the example of the Council of Florence in 1442which expressed
the common belief of the bishops of the time that Jews and pagans would go to
hell if they did not become Christians before they died. This clearly does not
reflect the current teaching of the Catholic Church. Other examples are the
morality of slavery and the duty of Catholic rulers to prevent the propagation
of Protestantism in their territories. (1995:1646)
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Thus in order to discern what belongs to authentic magisterial teaching,
Sullivan argues that:
What has to be clearly established is that the tradition has
remained constant, and that even today the universal body of
Catholic bishops is teaching the same doctrine as definitively to
be held. (1995:1646)
In addition he argues that papal teaching and Canon Law also require the
"constant consensus of Catholic theologians" and the "common adherence of
Christ's faithful" in order for a doctrine to be seen as revealed truth. (1995:1646)
Thus we find ourselves in a context in which there is no evidence that the
bishops (much less the theologians and the laity) were consulted about this
teaching. Moreover, the arguments traditionally used to justify the exclusion of
women from ordination are no longer considered acceptable, even by the pope
and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Hence Sullivan argues that
The question that remains in my mind is whether it is a clearly
established fact that the bishops of the Catholic Church are as
convinced by those reasons as Pope John Paul evidently is, and
tha t, in exercising their proper role as judges and teachers of the
faith, they have been unanimous in teaching that the exclusion of
women is a divinely revealed truth to which all Catholicsare
obliged to give a definitive assent of faith. Unless this is
manifestly the case, I do not see how it can be certain that this
doctrine is taught infallibly by the ordinary and universal
magisterium. (1995:1646)
Contested reality
Thus we see that the debate around the ordination or non-ordination of
women touches on broader issues than simply whether or not women should
be ordained. Instead this question leads us to a debate around the authority of
15
scripture, our church tradition and the church's magisterium and opens the
way for the contestation of these categories.
It is clear that scripture, the church's tradition and its magisterium are
patriarchal realities. The issue, however, is the extent to which this patriarchal
nature can be seen as normative. This is especially so once the magisterium
itself has disavowed the legitimacy of arguingon the basis of the inferiority of
women.
Conclusion
In tracing the development of the current debate around the non-ordainability
of women to the ministerial priesthood, we have seen that the arguments for
this position hinge around the authority of tradition and its role as bearer of
divine revelation.
While the arguments of the official Roman declarations fall short of
establishing what they set out to establish, namely, that we can argue for the
non-ordainability of women on the basis of tradition, they nevertheless
highlight the problematic of tradition. It has been the "constant and universal
Tradition of the Church'" (05:4) that women cannot be ordained just as it has
been the teaching of the church that women are inferior to men. If these
assumptions are no longer acceptable to us, how are we to relate to the
tradition as bearer of divine revelation?
8 What is at stake, of course, is whether this is indeed the Church's
Tradition (with a capital "T"), and hence part of the deposit of faith as John
Paul would have us believe, or whether it is part of a more general and fallible




Towards a viable foundational theology
This thesis arises out of two distinct commitments.
I am a Christian, a Catholic, someone who has been baptised into a church
community. This community lives on tradition. That which has been "handed
on to us" (Lk 1:2),which is the very revelation of God in Christ, is the Wisdom
which instructs, nourishes and sustains my Christian faith. Such revelation
necessarily calls for "the obedience of faith". (DV: 5; cf Rom 16:26)
YetI am also a feminist. As such I am deeply conscious that the church is a
profoundly human institution that has been gravely impacted by the
patriarchal, androcentric and sexist assumptions of the historical contexts
which influenced its growth, and by the sinfulness of its own members. Thus
while the church is the bearer of divine revelation, the means by which it
witnesses to this revelation are profoundly historical, human, and therefore
partial, realities that must necessarily be problematic for women and other
marginalised groups.
The previous chapter has highlighted, from one particular area of the
contemporary church's discourse, the problem which tradition poses for
feminist theology. That it was necessary for the papacy and the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith to issue three separate statements on the issue (the
last invoking the weapon of infallibility in a way it had never been invoked
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before) clearly points to a teaching that was not only not well received but
actively contested. And, by appealing to the divinely revealed nature of
Christian tradition, Pope John Paul II and the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith have effectively placed questions of revelation and tradition on the
theological agenda.
The fundamental question which this thesis addresses is not "Can women be
ordained?" but "Can patriarchal' tradition be revelatory?" Thus it both takes a
step back from the official discourse of the previous chapter to ask questions
about whose discourse this is, and whose tradition we are speaking about.
And, while acknowledging the partial and decidedly ideological nature of
tradition, it asks the properly theological question of how we are to view this
tradition. How is tradition to be understood as revelatory? And how are we as
feminist Catholics to be accountable to Christian tradition in a way that is
faithful to both the tradition itself and to our feminist commitments?
In this short chapter, which serves as an introduction to my thesis as a whole, I
outline both some key elements of my understanding of theology, and of the
challenge that feminism poses to theology. I then outline how I shall attempt to
1 I am aware of the inadequacy of the use of the term "patriarchal"
which is usually understood as referring to a male power and property
structure in which men are dominant to the detriment of women. (King
1989:22) Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza has pointed out that power relations
function at multiple and sometimes contradictory levels and has proposed the
use of the term "kyriarchy" which refers to "a complex social pyramid of
graduated dominations and subordinations". (1994:14) While I accept Schiissler
Fiorenza's analysis and the need for a term which can take the complexity of
multiple levels of oppression into account, I have become increasingly
uncomfortable with the Christological connotations of kyriarchy. This is
obviously related to the appropriateness of the use of the term and imagery of
"Lord" in reference to Jesus Christ. For a discussion of this, see Ross (1994:126f)
and Collins (1995:xxxviii). Given the lack of an acceptable term, I continue to
use "patriarchal" although aware of the need to broaden its meaning.
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develop a foundational theology that can take seriously both the fundamental
authority of tradition for the theological task and the necessarily partial nature
of our ecclesial reality.
The task of theology
As reflection on Christian faith, theology is a second order discipline that has
soughtto categorise and clarify the faith of believers. It is, however, necessarily
related to religious experience -- both individual and corporate -- and can
bring a critical awareness to the faith of believers.
Theology as relation to divine reality
Christian faith is necessarily in relation to something outside of itself and the
theological task for the Christian is fundamentally bound up with the
encounter with divine reality. The fathers of the church knew nothing of our
distinction between "theology" and "spirituality". For them, as expressed in the
words of Evagrius of Pontus, ''The theologian is one who prays and one who
prays is a theologian." (Nichols 1991:26) Such an emphasis continues to be
essential for the eastern churches for whom
all theology is mystical, inasmuch as it shows forth the divine
mystery: the data of revelation ... The eastern tradition has never
made a sharp distinction between mysticism and theology;
between personal experience of the divine mysteries and the




While such an emphasis continued in the monastic theology of the medieval
west/ the dominant mode of theologising by the late middle ages had become
the scholastic one. By shifting the focus of learning to "the schools," which were
to become the forerunners of modem universities, scholasticism enabled the
objectification of theology, with a key role being given to human reason, and
its detachment from the individual theologian's journey to God. "Spirituality"
became the application of theological truths to personal prayer and life, rather
than the necessary matrix out of which theology emerged.' Such a movement
prepared the ground for the enlightenment's glorification of rationality and
mistrust of tradition and authority. The reactionary response of much Catholic
theology.' while strenuously opposed to modernity, remained within a
.positivistic frame of mind, viewing theological truth as somehow separate
from the individual believer. It is only in last couple of centuries that we see
the emergence of a more historical understanding which implicates the
theologian her or himself in the theological task.5
See Leclercq (1961).
3 It is instructive to note that in the middle of the fifteenth century
Denys the Carthusian wrote a work in which he included a list of what he
termed "mystical theologians". Turner has pointed out that those theologians
included in his list correspond, almost exactly, with any list that one might
draw up of systematic theologians up to the fourteenth century. After the
fourteenth century the lists diverge however and
hardly anyone who would be agreed to be of significance in the
history of Western Christian theology figures at all in a list of
'mystics' and hardly any mystics make a significant contribution
to the development of mainstream theology. (1995:214f)
For a discussion of the neoscholastic reaction to both rationalism
and idealism, see Francis Schiissler Fiorenza. (1992:263)
5 The last few decades have also seen the growth of "spirituality"
both as a religious (and, some would argue, secular) phenomenon and as an
academic discipline. McGinn distinguishes between those who view
spirituality in theological terms, often preferring the term "spiritual theology",
20
Thus it is my assumption, together with the Fathers of the church, the eastern
churches, and the monastic tradition in the west, that to do theology
necessarily implies personal commitment to the journey into God.
Theology as ecclesial act
Such a commitment is not simply an individual act however. Christian faith is
necessarily ecclesial and communitarian. Lumen Gentium tells us that God has
willed to make women and men holy and to save them, not as
individuals without any bond between them, but rather to make
them into a people who might acknowledge him and serve him
in holiness ... Christ ... called a people together made up of Jews
and Gentiles which would be one, not according to the flesh, but
in the Spirit, and it would be the new people of God. (LG:9)
Such an identity has theological implications. The "faith seeking
understanding:" is an ecclesial faith that both shapes and limits the work of the
individual theologian. Francis Sullivan expresses this when he says:
In the case of the Catholic theologian, this faith will be Christian,
ecclesial, and Catholic. It is Christian in that it accepts Christ as
the definitive word of God for humanity. It is ecclesial in that it is
a faith that we have not found by ourselves, but have received
from the church ... If our faith is Catholic, we engage in the
science of theology from within the Catholic tradition. This
and those who view it as an anthropological phenomenon. He also introduces
a third category which emphasises its context in a community's history.
(1993:4ff) As will become more apparent in chapter five, while we can view
spirituality - like religion -- as a human phenomenon, my concern is not with
spirituality as a phenomenon or with the application of theological truths in
the life of Christian believers, but rather with the integral role which it plays in
the theological task as a whole.
6 This widely-used definition of theology was first employed by
Anselm of Canterbury in the twelfth century. (Proslogion, 1)
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means that we do theology as committed participants in the faith,
life and worship of the Catholic tradition. (1996:5f)
Theology as critical impulse
It should be apparent that such a commitment could be - and all-too-often is --
invoked to appeal for conformity and curtail the freedom of the theologian.
Therefore such a commitment needs to be balanced by the an understanding of
the critical nature of theology.
As a call to, and offer of, life, the Christian gospel necessarily involves a
judgement of sinful situations. Jesus clearly saw himself as situated within the
prophetic tradition of the [udaism and was prepared to denounce as contrary
to God 's will all situations of oppression and human suffering. He was
particularly critical of those religious institutions and beliefs that prevented
people from experiencing the gratuitous love of God.
Throughout the history of the church prophetic movements have arisen which
have denounced sin and oppression and called the church back to the
authenticity of the gospel. Likewise, when theology has become static and has
ceased to give life, new movements have arisen that have served to better-
illuminate the truth of the gospel.
This obviously calls for careful discernment. Theology is ever in need of
renewal, but at what pointdoes renewal cease to be Christian and Catholic?
And who determines what is authentic?
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Feminism as a challenge to the church
A central theological challenge in recent decades has come from the feminist
movement. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s we have seen the development
of a distinctively feminist theology in which women's experience is seen as
central to theological work. While this movement initially emerged in North
America," and to a lesser extent in western Europe," since then we have seen the
development of theologies arising from the experiences of women in Africa,"
7 See, for example, Mary Daly's The Church and the Second Sex
(1968); Rosemary Radford Ruether's Religion and Sexism (1974), New Woman,
New Earth (1975) and Sexism and God-Talk (1983b); Carol Christ and [udith
Plaskow's (ed). Womanspirit Rising. A Feminist Reader in Religion (1979); Sally
McFague's Metaphorical Theology (1982); Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza's In
Memory of Her (1983), Bread Not Stone (1984) and lesus. Miriam's Child, Sophia's
Prophet (1994); and Elizabeth [ohnson's She Who Is (1992). For womanist
theology arising out of an African American context see [acquelyn Grant's
White Woman's Christ and Black Woman's Jesus (1989) and Delores Williams'
Sisters in the Wilderness . The Challenge ofWomanist God-Talk (1993).
8 See Kari Elizabeth Borressen's Subordination and Equivalence: The
Nature and Role of Women in Augustine and Aquinas (1968); Sara Maitland's A
Map of the New Country: Women and Christianity (1983); Elisabeth Moltmann-
Wendel's A Land Flowing with Milk and Honey. Perspectives on Feminist Theology
(1986); Ann Loades' Searching for Lost Coins . Explorations in Christianityand
Feminism (1987); Ursula King 's Women and Spirituality (1989); Uta Ranke-
Heinemann's Eunuchs for Heaven. The Catholic Church and Sexuality (1990);
Monica Furlong's A Dangerous Delight. Women and Power in the Church (1991);
and Mary Grey's Redeeming the Dream (1989) and The Wisdom of Fools (1993).
9 See Denise Ackermann, Jonathan Draper and Emma Mashinini's
(ed). Women Hold Up Half the Sky. Women in the Church in Southern Africa (1991);
Mercy Amba Oduyoye and Musimbi Kanyoro's The Will to Arise: Women,
tradition and the church in Africa (1992); Mercy Amba Oduyoye's Daughters of
Anowa. African women and patriarchy (1995); and Christina Landmann's (ed).
Digging Up Our Foremothers. Stories of Women in Africa (1996) .
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Asia'?and Latin America. ' !' 12
Feminist theology can be understood as a form of theological reflection that
takes as its starting point a commitment to the liberation of women from all
forms of oppression. It seeks to show how theology has been impoverished by
the exclusion of women's experiences and voices and also how the retrieval of
such voices will make a difference to our theology. While there have been
many different approaches within feminist theology, the last three decades
have seen an explosion in the production of knowledge in all the theological
disciplines from an explicitly feminist perspective.
Within this new context we find differing responses to the authoritative role of
tradition. For some, the Christian tradition is viewed as irredeemably sexist
and an evil which feminists must actively distance themselves from. Mary Daly
expressed this view when she said that
A logical consequence of the liberation of women will be a loss of
plausibility of Christological formulas which reflect and
encourage idolatry in relation to the person of Jesus. (1973:69)
1 0 See Chung Hyun Kyung's Struggle to be the Sun Again. Introducing
Asian Women 's Theology (1990) and Hisako Kinukawa's Women andlesus in
Mark. A Japanese Feminist Perspective (1994).
11 See EIsa Tamez's (ed). Through Her Eyes . Women's Theology from
Latin America (1989) and Maria Pilar Aquino's Our Cryfor Life. Feminist Theology
from Latin America (1993).
1 2 For feminist theology in the third world generally, see Virginia
Fabella and Mercy Amba Oduyoye's (ed). With Passion and Compassion . Third
World Women Doing Theology (1988); Letty Russell, Kwok Pui-lan, Ada Maria
Isasi-Diaz and Katie Geneva Cannon's (ed). Inheriting Our Mothers' Gardens.
Feminist Theology in Third World Perspective (1988); and Ursula King's (ed).
Feminist Theology from the Third World. A Reader (1994).
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Others, while remaining within the Christian tradition, seek to relocate the
locus of authority. For Rosemary Radford Ruether it is particular traditions that
become authoritative. She identifies a particular strand of prophetic-liberating
traditions which run through biblical faith and which can be appropriated by
feminists . (1983b:22f)
For others, such as Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, the locus of authority lies not
with the text or tradition itself, which is, after all, a patriarchal product, but
rather toa community of women which is in solidarity with the excluded
victims of history. (1984:3ff)
The question remains for me, however, how one is to view Christian tradition
itself . To undermine its authority as bearer of revelation is to effectively
undermine doctrines of ecclesiology and revelation themselves. While it may
be that this is a necessary consequence of a critical and feminist theology, this
thesis will argue that it is possible to develop a credible theology of tradition
that takes seriously both the authoritative nature of this tradition and its partial
and ideological nature.
The way forward
This argument will be expressed in three sections.
Part I will look at both shifts in the theology of revelation towards a
hermeneutical understanding of theology found in chapter three, but also at the
rupture of the other that threatens this understanding which is found in
chapter four. This rupture is not anything new however but is fundamental to
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the theological task as I argue in chapter five.
Part Il will look at two mediating responses to this rupture. The first, found in
chapter six, builds on the hermeneutical work of Gadamer and Ricoeur and is
expressed in Sandra Schneiders' work on revelation. The second, found in
chapter seven, looks at Kristeva's work which is more concerned with
epistemology, and at Mary Grey's work on revelation, and probes that which is
excluded from the dominant discourses. I argue that both of these responses
are necessary and that they stand in a tensed relationship to one another which
is akin to the cataphatic-apophatic dynamic in theology.
Part III moves to the properly theological moment in the thesis by asking how,
given this process, we are to understand tradition and the church's witness to
it. In chapter eight I distinguish between tradition as the whole life of the
church, and the Tradition which is ultimately Other and uncapturable in
discourse. Such a Tradition is nevertheless witnessed to, and in chapter nine I
show the necessarily wounded nature of the church's witness to the Tradition.
Out of this interaction I conclude by arguing that we can only encounter the
Tradition through the church's witness to it, but that while such a witness is
privileged it is also wounded. Hence the challenge becomes one of finding





Introduction to Part I
Having introduced the problem that this thesis is addressing, we see that it is
not simply concerned with the practice of the church, but with the underlying
theology that sustains the church's life. The challenge that we face is one of
developing an adequate and viable foundational theology that can enable a
transformative church life and praxis. In this I am aware of the need to operate
out of a dual loyalty -- to the received tradition of the church on the one hand,
and to those excluded from the formulation of this tradition on the other hand.
In the first part of this thesis I seek to outline something of the current state of
contemporary discourse as it affects our theological task. As will become
apparent in the course of Part I, there have been key philosophical and cultural
movements in the last centuries, and especially our own, that seriously
challenge the integrity of traditional theological approaches.
This is not simply an abstract challenge. What is at stake is the means by which
we are able to communicate the Christian gospel with the greatest degree of
authenticity arid integrity. By probing the possibility of any speech about
revelation and of the power dynamics inherent in all discourse, I seek to show
both the challenges that these present to the theological task, and to seek ways
of doing theology with a greater degree of integrity.
I therefore introduce and juxtapose two movements in this section.
The first, which emerges from chapter three, is broadly hermeneutical.
Recognising the limitations of previous metaphysical systems and
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epistemologies, it focuses on received texts and traditions and their
actualization in the present. Such a movement therefore engages the discourse
of revelation and focuses on the possibility of revelation becoming present to
us today.
If this movement is concerned with presence, then the second movement,
which we see in chapter four, is about absence. By probing that which has been
excluded from discourse, it points to the irreducible alterity of the Other and
shows the inability of our language to express this Other, who must always
remain excluded. Such an Other is a rupturing absent presence that
nevertheless accompanies all discourse.
While these two movements are in many respects mutually antithetical, in
chapter five I argue that the rupture represented by the discourse of alterity in
chapter four is not as new as it appears and is in fact at the heart of the
theological task. By a reading of the Christian apophatic tradition, I propose
that alterity is in fact at the heart of Christian theology and needs to serve as
the critical moment in all theology.
Thus I suggest that revelation and rupture are the two key ingredients that a
viable foundational theology needs to engage. That they are not easy
companions is clear; however, to dismiss or downplay either of them would, I




Truth, history and divine disclosure:
Revelation in a contested ecclesia
Feminism challenges profoundly the understanding of revelation
in the Roman Catholic tradition. It raises fundamental questions
about the relationship of revelation and human experience, the
centrality of Jesus Christ, the identity and structure of the church,
the normativity and authentic interpretation of Scripture and the
apostolic tradition. On the one hand, in what sense can the
Catholic church (or even the larger Christian Church) claim to be
faithful to the life and mission of Jesus when it is so
fundamentally distorted by patriarchal structures and sexist
attitudes and practices? On the other hand, at what point are
Christian feminists no longer identifiably Christian in belief,
ritual, or practice?
Mary Catherine Hilkert (1993:76)
It should be clear by now that revelation is a key category in the work that I am
attempting. If the patriarchal nature of the church is claimed to be divinely
revealed and part of authoritative tradition, then such categories become the
contested terrain which feminist and other forms of contextual theologies need
to engage.
Any speech about revelation is fraught with problems. Claude Geffre has
pointed out that revelation is a transcendental theological category that both
precedes and contains every single theological datum. It cannot be proved by
sheer rational argument, but "is the basic presupposition from which we start,
and without which any truth that theology deals with collapses ." (1974:15)
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A discussion of revelation, then, is closely interwoven with a discussion of
options in foundational theology and with questions of theological method. It
is closely linked to questions of truth, knowledge and interpretation. Given
that many of the traditional philosophical and epistemological presuppositions
that accompanied traditional theologies of revelation appear to be no longer
credible/ we face new challenges in speaking credibly about revelation, and
indeed about theology itself. As Sandra Schneiders says,
The question of revelation, including its possibility and actuality,
its extent, its nature, and its mode, is the most foundational
question in theology. The answer (whether explicit or implicit)
given to this question determines not only the shape and content
of a particular theology but the very possibility of elaborating
theology at all. (1991b:44f)
In this chapter I seek to give a historical overview of Christian ideas on
revelation, focusing in particular on recent shifts towards a hermeneutical
understanding of theology which itself will become problematised in the
following chapter.
Shifts in the theology of revelation
In looking at the historical development of the doctrine of revelation we see
that for much of the history of Christianity (and before it the history of Israel)
the giveness of revelation was simply assumed. Avery Dulles has pointed out
1 Geffre speaks about a shift from knowledge to interpretation,
highlighting the greater understanding that we have of the historical, and
therefore contingent, character of all truth. Since Heidegger contemporary
philosophy has abandoned its claim to absolute knowledge, recognising
instead the provisional and relative nature of all knowledge. Thus we cannot
do theology on the basis of metaphysical thought. (1987:11ff)
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that the idea of revelation was pervasive throughout the Bible and the theology
of the early Christian centuries but because it was taken for granted there was
no need to prove its existence or define the concept. (1983:3f)
We should note that for the biblical authors revelation was experienced as
historically mediated. (Schneiders 1991b:97) While the bible does not set out to
discuss or prove the fact of revelation, it testifies to it by presenting an
interpretation of history in which the action of God is a key interpretive
category.
For the early Christian community, the self-disclosure of God was brought to
fulfilment in the person of Jesus Christ. Gerald O'Collins writes that:
This saving revelation, which reached its definitive climax with
the resurrection of the crucified Jesus and the coming of the Holy
Spirit, constitutes the basic religious reality for Christians and the
primary object of their faith. This revelation forms the absolutely
fundamental principle and foundation for theology in all its
particular sectors. (1993:41)
Given that the first Christian generations were "still under the impact of the
great epiphany of God in Christ" it is understandable, argues Rene Latourelle,
"that the theme of revelation is in the foreground of all Christian awareness in
the first three centuries." (1968:145) For the Fathers of the church, the good
news of salvation is that the Unknowable has been shown to humanity. This is
seen as being in accordance with God's eternal plan of salvation which they
understood as having gone through various stages of which the summit is
Christ. (Latourelle 1968:147)
In their desire to communicate this mystery with the rest of the Graeco-Roman
world the apologists took up the idea of Logos, a common religious and
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philosophical concept in the second century. They developed a theology of the
logos, of his life in the Trinity and of his manifestation i~ the law and the
gospel. (Latourelle 1968:145)
However revelation was not only seen as that which was proposed for belief.
As a divine word revelation was accompanied by grace. At the same time as
the word is proclaimed, the Spirit was seen as being at work within the person
to ensure that the word was heard and bore fruit. Augustine, Origen and Cyril
of Alexandria, in particular, insisted on the importance of this second
dimension of revelation. (Latourelle 1968:150) In the words of Augustine:
See here now, brethren, see a mighty mystery. The sound of our
words strikes the ears, the Master is within. Do not suppose that
any man learns ought from man. We can admonish by the sound
of our voice; if there be not One within that shall teach, vain is the
noise we make. (Ep. 10. tr. 3,13)
In the Middle Ages this emphasis on revelation a~ interior illumination
influenced Bonaventure who identified revelation with the illuminative action
of God or with the subjective illumination that results from God's actions. It is
with Thomas Aquinas that a more cognitive approach"emerges. For Thomas,
revelation is that saving act by which God furnishes us with the truths
necessary for our salvation. (McBrien:213) He tells us that
the formal objective of faith is the first truth as this is made
known in Scripture and in Church teaching. (ST, 2a2re, q.5, a.3)
Although Thomas insists, like Augustine and Bonaventure, on the necessity of
interior illumination from God, and acknowledged different types of
revelation, he is interested primarily in prophetic revelation which he sees as
an essentially cognitive act. (Latourelle 1968:171)
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In the sixteenth century theories of revelation came to the fore in response to
the humanist movement on the one hand and the reformation controversies on
the other? As both Protestants and Catholics appealed to revelation to justify
their confessional positions new questions arose and theologians were at pains
to define both the sources of revelation and their definitions of revelation.
(Latourelle:1968:181)
In this period we find an emerging Protestant view that the Word of God is
available in scripture alone. The bible was seen as self-interpreting and no
other norm of revelation was required.In reaction the Council of Trent insisted
that the gospel was contained
in written books and in unwritten traditions which were received
by the apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or else have
come down to us, handed on as it were from the apostles
themselves at the inspiration of the Holy Spirit ... which have
been preserved in unbroken sequence in the catholic church.
(Session 4, First decree)
Trent also opposed the Protestant emphasis on faith as trusting, insisting rather
that faith comes when people "are moved freely towards God and believe to be
true what has been divinely revealed and promised". (Session 6, Decree on
Justification) For Trent, the "gospel" is the source of "the whole truth of
salvation and rule of conduct" and "this truth and rule are contained in the
written books and in unwritten traditions". (Session 4, first decree) Although
Trent spoke of "the gospel" as the (single) source of revelation, a so-called
"two-source" theory of revelation emerged which viewed scripture and
tradition as distinct sources of revealed truth. As O'Collins has pointed out,
2 Melchior Cano and Dominic Banez emphasised the illumination
of the individual subject rather than the unveiling of the unseen object, while




this privileged a "propositional" view of revelation which saw revelation as the
passing on of otherwise hidden truths. (1993:49)
In the new rationalistic period resulting from the enlightenment with its
emphasis on the foundations of knowledge, Catholic theology reacted with a
new and more rigid form of scholasticism. Theologians such as Suarez and de
Lugo stressed the objective character of revelation which saw it as-some static
reality which one received from others. (McBrien 1980:215)
In this new form of scholasticism a split developed not only between the
different theological disciplines, with dogmatic and speculative theology being
seen as separate entities (a process that had begun in the late middle ages) but
between history and meaning, as scholasticism became cut off from its biblical
roots. Geffre has argued that historical positivism and theological rationalism
both have the same origin, namely a misunderstanding of the past based on a
lack of hermeneutical insight, which he traces to Kant's distinction between
knowledge of the facts and the search for meaning. (1987:16)
With increasing attacks on the idea of revelation from both empiricism and
idealismsome theologians attempted to engage this new spirit," However the
dominant Catholic model remained a dogmatic one. This was reinforced by the
First Vatican Council which spoke of God "revealing himself and the eternal
McBrien contrasts semi-rationalists such as Georg Hermes (d.
1831), Anton Giinther (d. 1863) and [acob Frohschammer (d. 1893) who, while
accepting the truth of revelation nevertheless held that reason could
independently establish the truths of revelation, with the Catholic fideism of
Louis Bautain (d. 1867) and the traditionalism of Louis de Bonald (d. 1840),
Felicite de Lammenais (d. 1854) and Augustine Bonnetty (d. 1879). More
mainstream attempts to engage the new spirit can be seen in certain Jesuits at
the Roman College such as Giovanni Perrone (d. 1876) and [ohannes Franzelin
(d. 1886), Tiibingen's [ohanes M5hler (d. 1838), England's John Henry Newman
(d. 1890) and the German Matthias Scheeben (d. 1888). (1980:216)
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laws of his will to the human race" (DF:2). It is worth noting however that Dei
Filius (the Council's document on faith) spoke of the radical inadequacy of our
present knowledge of the revealed mysteries of God. (DF:4) It also situated
revelation within an eschatological context which links the revealed mysteries
to our own "ultimate end" . (DF:3)
Vatican 11 and contemporary theology
With DeiVerbum, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, as well as
its other documents, the Second Vatican Council, while affirming previous
statements on revelation, offered a significantly different perspective.
DeiVerbum placed its discussion on revelation within the context of salvation
history and saw it as the self-communication of God to humanity. This divine
self-disclosure does not simply disclose knowledge about God but makes God
present in person. Moreover it is a disclosure that is salvific in intent so that the
"economy of revelation" is synonymous with the "history of salvation".
(O'Collins 1993:54) As such it is Christocentric and
The most intimate truth thus revealed about God and human
salvation shines forth for us in Christ, who is himself both the
mediator and sum total of revelation. (DV:2)
O'Collins has described DeiVerbum as profoundly biblical in its language and
mentality. (1993:51) Not only does it draw on scriptural themes but it states
that the study of scripture should be the very soul of sacred theology (DV:24)
and that
The church has always venerated the divine scriptures as it has
venerated the Body of the Lord, in that it never ceases, above all
in the sacred liturgy, to partake of the bread of life and to offer it
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to the faithful from the one table of the word of God and the
Body of Christ. (DV:21)
For Dei Verbum scripture and tradition form a unity "flowing from the same
divine well-spring" (DV:9) and "make up a single sacred deposit of the word of
God". (DV:10) While it is the task of the church to interpret this word of God,
the magisterium of the church is not to be understood as above the word of
God but rather as its servant. (DV:10)
While Dei Verbum is Vatican Il's principal document on revelation, O'Collins
has pointed out that we should not neglect the council's other documents as
they also contain new and important points. (1993:63) Here we may briefly
note the following.
5acrosanctum Concilium, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, speaks of
Christ's revelatory presence in the liturgy. It states
Christ is always present in his church, especially in liturgical
celebrations. He is present in the sacrifice of the Mass both in the
person of his minister ... and most of all in the eucharistic species.
By his power he is present in the sacraments so that when
anybody baptizes it is really Christ himself who baptizes. He is
present in his word since it is he himself who speaks when the
holy scriptures are read in church. Lastly, he is present when the
church prays and sings, for he has promised "where two or three
are gathered together in my name there am I in the midst of
them" (Mt. 18:20). (5C:7)
Revelation involves the revealing of the kingdom of God. For Lumen Gentium,
the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,
This kingdom shines out before humanity in the words, the
works and the presence of Christ ... principally the kingdom is
revealed in the person of Christ himself. (LG:5)
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This revelation of the kingdom is continued in the church which, "longs for the
completed kingdom and, with all its strength, hopes and desires to be united
in glory with its king". (LG:5)
Thus Lumen Gentium defines the church in terms of its revelatory mission and
shows how revelation is mediated not only through the bishops' authoritative
teaching but also through persons of heroic sanctity. (O'Collins 1993:69)
Revelation may also be found, according to Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, "in the events, the needs and
the desires" of our time in which we can discern "the true sign of God's
presence and purpose". (GS:ll) ,
In noting some of these ways in which revelation occurs we can see that for the
second Vatican council revelation refers to both a past and a present reality.
This is echoed by recent statements by Pope Jo~Paul Il, notably his encyclical
on revelation, Dives in Misericordia. This is seen in his conclusion when he
writes:
In the name of Jesus Christ crucified and risen, in the spirit of his
messianic mission, enduring in the history of humanity, weraise
ourvoices in prayer that the Love which is in the Father may once
again be revealed at this stage of history, and that, through the
work of the Son and Holy Spirit, it may be shown to be present to
our modern world ... (DM:15)
Commenting on this O'Collins states:
Both in the documents of the Second Vatican Council and in
important postconciliar statements, revelation is understood to
have been a complete, and unrepeatable self-communication of
God through Jesus Christ. Almost in the same breath, however,
this official church teaching also calls revelation a present reality
38
which is repeatedly actualized here and now. (1993:89)
While these two sets of affirmations appear mutually exclusive, O'Collins
argues that present revelation actualizes the event of divine self-manifestation
but does not add to the content of what was revealed in Christ. (1993:91) Thus
he speaks of them as foundational and dependent revelation. (1993:93f)
From proposition to relation
The key move that we see in the last century is from a propositional view of
revelation to a relational one. It can be argued that propositional theories
developed against the backdrop of and in reaction to the enlightenment's
search for clear and certain foundations for knowledge. Likewise relational
theories can be seen in relation to existentialist theologies of the Word of God
and political theologies of history."
Our present context has seen the problemetisation of both traditional
metaphysics and the experiential and positivistic concerns of modernity.
Epistemology, whether scholastic or Cartesian, which sought to provide an
absolutely secure foundation for all knowledge, has been challenged by both
the Kantian strictures against applying knowledge of the observable world to
the noumenal world, and by the discovery of the central role of language and
history in all knowledge.
This has had serious implications for the theology of revelation. Linguistic
philosophers such as Wittgenstein and later the structuralists and
4 For a discussion of existentialist and political theologies and their
relationship to their context, see Geffre (1974) chapter four.
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poststructuralists have shown us the radical historicity of all language.
Language is both necessary for all knowledge and necessarily structures
knowledge. Language is a human construct that is influenced by situation,
time, class, gender and a host of other factors of social location. Language is,
therefore, linked to our human experience and necessarily limited.
In addition, our understanding of history has undergone a radical change since
the nineteenth century. Heidegger has shown us the historicity of the human
existent and the resultant inadequacy of the positivist subject-object paradigm
of human understanding. (Schneiders 1991b:67) This has been pursued by
Gadamer with his notion of "effective historical consciousness". As Schneiders
emphasises:
We are never "outside" history but always participants in it. And
we do not participate as stable or fixed essences but as ever-
changing historical entities. (1991b:67)
While such moves have undermined traditional metaphysics with its stress on
an ahistorical being "in itself" and epistemology as the knowledge of that
being, they have also undermined the supposedly scientific models of
enlightenment knowledge, and its resultant logical positivism, which
demanded an objective and demonstrable verification for knowledge. The
work of Thomas Kuhn (1970) has shown that even scientific knowledge is
fundamentally perpectival in that we cannot step outside of history to some
neutral or objective vantage point. Commenting on this, Stephen Toulmin
writes
By insisting on the radical character of scientific change, Kuhn
completed the historicization of human thought that had begun
in the eighteenth century, and so finally undercut older views
about the "immutable" order of nature and human knowledge.
(1991:233)
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In this context Richard Rorty has spoken of a shift from epistemology to
hermeneutics that is taking place in philosophy, and of which he is an
advocate. Rorty has sought to undermine the epistemological tradition by
attacking the idea of the "mind" which he sees as a post-Cartesian invention
which has become tyrannous in its demand for foundational immediacy and
which expects reality to be
unveiled to us, not as in a glass darkly, but with some
unimaginable sort of immediacy which would make discourse
and description superfluous. (1980:375)
In contrast to this idea of knowledge as a "mirror of nature" Rorty proposes a
hermeneutical model which sees conversation rather than construction as the
only legitimate course for philosophers. (1980:315ff) Such a model is not
another philosophical project with its own programmes and agendas but rather
the hope that "the cultural space left open by the demise of epistemology will
not be filled". (1980:315) It is modest in its claims for what philosophy can
achieve in its search for knowledge, and as such recognises the radical
temporality of knowledge and its boundedness to the cultural contexts that
produce it. (Thiel1994:27) For Rorty wisdom is the ability to sustain a cultural
conversation over and against the fundamentalist desire for closure. Thus he
prefers images of listening to those of seeing.
Moreover, if we accept that knowledge is radically linguistic and historical--
that there is no "given" text that is not also created -- then it should be readily
apparent that it is also ideological. The impact of the so-called masters of
suspicion -- Marx, Nietzsche and Freud -- have left us with a legacy of critical
questioning of distortions behind received texts that has been taken up by both
contemporary ideology critics and poststructuralists. Although arguing from
different contexts, they point to a dynamic of power and exclusion that is at the
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heart of all knowledge that will be discussed further in chapter four.
Thus we find ourselves in a situation where it is hardly possible to accept
either that the traditional sources of revelation (the tradition of the church in
which scripture has a particular priority) actually contain the "Word of God" as
,
we are to receive it or even that they witness to the self-disclosure of God to
humanity without acknowledging that the ways in which such divine
disclosure have been understood and communicated have been deeply
structured by the historical and linguistic human situation which more often
than not has been that of those at the centre of power.
However it should also be apparent that we cannot either look for nor create
some pure knowledge outside of history and language. In this context, Geffre
argues, we must go beyond both theological objectivism and theological
existentialism. While the first leads to false objectifications of God in
metaphysical thought, the second risks reducing the mystery of God to its
meaning for humanity. (1974:37) He suggests that:
The crisis in metaphysical language could at least have the
advantage of making us more attentive to what is entrusted to us
in revelation and lead us to a re-reading of the theological and
dogmatic tradition "by seeking to unveil what has often been
obscured through the interpenetration of the metaphysical and
Christian elements. (1974:39)
This brings us back to the point that Christian theology has always taught but
one gets the impression not often taken seriously, namely, that we cannot speak
about God in the same way that we speak about anything else as an object, and
that the moment we do, what we are speaking about is not God. As Augustine
writes:
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So what are we to say, brothers, about God? For if you have fully
grasped what you want to say, it isn't God. If you have been able
to comprehend it, you have comprehended something else
instead of God . If you think you have been able to comprehend,
your thoughts have deceived you. So he isn't this, if this is what
you have understood; but if he is this, then you haven't
understood it. So what is it you want to say, seeing you haven't
been able to understand it? (Sermon 52, 16)
Or, in the words of Thomas Aquinas:
we cannot grasp what God is, but only what He is not .., (SCG I,
30)
Commenting on this emphasis in Thomas, Geffre has said:
if there was in fact in Aquinas "the seed of the possibility of going
beyond metaphysics," [Welte] that is, a very clear realisation of
how much of the divine Ipsum Esse lay beyond conceptualization,
this remained in the background: the later development of
Thomist thought was affected by the increasing tendency to
conceptualization. (1974:57)
However in our present context this apophatic emphasis could be an important
theological resource. It could also help us to remember that the object of
theology, as Geffre has pointed out, is not God but rather the texts of the
Christian tradition. He says:
It is certain that once we accept the Kantian critique of
knowledge, it becomes difficult to consider the object of theology
as the knowledge of God and the object of revelation as "a body
of doctrinal truths communicated by God." Its object in the strict
sense of the word is a text, that of the Bible and its successive
interpretations in tradition -- a text to be known and therefore to
.be interpreted. (1974:44)
All we have is the text, or discourse which is the term David Tracy prefers as it
foregrounds both that much discourse is non-written and the social locations
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from which it arises. (1994:133ff) Whether we speak of text or discourse, what I
am referring to is all the ways in which meaning is passed on to us in a
particular tradition -- different types of written text, art, ritual, symbol etc.
Such a hermeneutical approach accepts the hermeneutical circle implicit in all
knowledge. In this context revelation is both highlighted -- the texts of our
tradition are, after all, all that we have -- and understood in a different light to
theologies of revelation that were dependant on traditional metaphysics.
Aware of the historical and contingent character of all our understanding of
truth, Geffre makes the following statements:
(1) We are more acutely aware nowadays of the fact that the
Word of God cannot be literally identified either with Scripture
or with dogmatic pronouncements. Scripture and dogma both
bear partial witness to the fullness of the Gospel, which belongs
to the eschatological order.
(2) Revelation is not a communication from on high of knowledge
that has been settled once and for all time. It points both to God's
action in history and to the interpretive expression of that
activity. To put this in a different way, what we call Scripture is
already an interpretation and the response of faith also forms part
of the content of revelation.
(3) Revelation only reaches its fulfilment and becomes fully
significant and contemporary in the faith that receives it. That is
why, as the Word of God, given in a human word or in a trace of
God in human history, it does not depend on a scientific method
based on historical criticism. In its cognitive aspect, faith is
always an interpretive knowledge that is marked by the historical
conditions of a particular period. (1987:11f)
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Hermeneutics and beyond
Such a hermeneutical understanding of theology is, I believe, of value in
searching for a viable theology of tradition. However, it is not without its own
critics. Ceffre shows that the work of Derrida, in particular, has placed
hermeneutics "on trial" seeing his work of "grammatology" as a radical protest
against all theology based on hermeneutics. Derrida writes that
The encounter between hermeneutics and grammatology has
necessarily to take the form of a struggle to the death, a
confrontation that straightaway excludes any possibility of
reconciliation or mediation. (Geffre 1987:29)
In this Derrida is part of a deconstructionist discourse that emphasises rupture
and the breakdown of language which is part of a broader breakdown of all
forms of metaphysical thinking. It resists hermeneutics because it sees in it an
extension of metaphysics with its concerns with being, presence and identity.
The challenges posed by such a rupture will be considered in the following
chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the idea of revelation has grown out of the faith of
community and its encounter with God. As a reality that is always expressed
in human discourse it is necessarily historical. We cannot therefore speak of
revelation without an awareness of the broader context of human discourse.
This chapter has argued for a hermeneutical understanding of revelation in
which tradition is seen as both historical and in need of continual
interpretation. However, this is only one position within contemporary
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discourse. In the following chapter we will see that such a hermeneutical
approach is also problematised.
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Chapter Four
Power, discourse and alterity:
the destabilisation of theological knowledge
"May you live in interesting times," says an ancient Chinese
curse. Unfortunately, our choice is not when to live, but only
how. This is not a time when Western culture needs one last burst
of overweening, indeed hubristic, self-confidence masking self-
absorbtion and newfound insecurity. At this time we all need to
face the strong claims on our attention made by other cultures
and by the other, subjugated, forgotten and marginalized
traditions in Western culture itself. We also need to face the
ambiguous othemess within our own psyches and traditions ...
There is no escape from the insight that modernity most feared:
there is no innocent tradition (including modernity), no innocent
classic (including the Scriptures) and no innocent reading
(including this one).
David Tracy (1991:95,97)
In 1965Michael Theunissen declared that "Few issues have exercised as
powerful a hold over the thought of this century as that of 'the Other'."
(Bernstein 1992:295) Since then what Richard Bernstein refers to as "the tangled
network of questions" relating to "the Other" have been further foregrounded
and are, Bemstein argues, "at the very centre of philosophy and the full range
of the cultural disciplines." (1992:296)
The purpose of this chapter is to outline this "tangled network of questions"
posed by "the Other" as they impact on the development of a theology of
tradition. It is difficult to imagine how one can do theology in a credible way
in our contemporary world without engaging the fundamental challenges that
"the Other" poses. Alterity effects a rupture that presents a sharp challenge to
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all forms of ontological thinking, whether this is the being-in-itself of scholastic
theology or the historically mediated being of more explicitly hermeneutical
theology. While the previous chapter favoured a shift to a theological method
that understands itself as hermeneutical, Geffre has pointed out that this too is
placed "on trial" (1987:21ff) by questions of otherness. While the following
chapters will argue that the hermeneutical approach is still important, this
needs to be seen against the backdrop effected by the rupture of "the Other".
This chapter focuses on questions of alterity raised by contemporary
philosophical discourses while the following chapter examines the question
from the perspective of traditional Christian language about God.
In charting the territory of otherness in contemporary discourse it seems that
there are two distinct clusters of concern, both of which raise the question of
otherness though in different ways, and both of which present a challenge.to
theology, and especially to a theology of tradition. Firstly, there are the forms
of critical theory associated with the work of the Frankfurt school' and
developed by feminists such as Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza. Secondly, and
perhaps more fundamentally, there is the cluster of discourses associated with
poststructuralist rereadings of Nietzsche and Freud which emerged from the
post-1968 French context associated with the work of Lacan,? Derrida.'
1 See Raymond Geuss' The Idea of Critical Theory. Habermas and the
Frankfurt School (1981); Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt's (ed) The Essential
Frankfurt School Reader (1978); and David Ingram and Julia Simon-Ingram's
Critical Theory. The Essential Readings (1992).
2 See Ecrits:a selection (1966) and The four fundamental concepts of
psychoanalysis (1977).
3 . See Ofgrammatology (1976), Writing and difference (1978) and
Margins of Philosophy (1982) .
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Foucault" and Lyotard," and developed by feminists such as [ulia Kristeva" and
Luce Irigaray.' While both address issues of power and discourse they occupy
significantly different spaces within the contemporary controversies around
modernity and postmodernity.
In what follows I will outline each of these clusters of discourse, followed by
specifically feminist examples of them in the work of Schiissler Fiorenza and
Kristeva. I will then introduce the idea of the call of the Other found in the
work of Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricoeur. I conclude by asking what this
says about the status of our theological discourse.
The end of neutrality
The important contribution of critical theory, as developed by the Frankfurt
School, is to make us aware of the relations of interest and power inherent in
discourse that might otherwise have been taken for granted. They have shown
us that not only is there no such thing as presuppositionless understanding, but
that our presuppositions are rarely neutral or innocent. (Schneiders 1991b:20)
Critical theorists see their work as a continuation of the Enlightenment's project
4 . See Power/Knowledge (1972), The Order of Things (1977) and The
Archaeology of Knowledge (1978).
5 See The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge (1984), The
differend; phrases in dispute (1988) and The Lyotard Reader (1989) .
6 See Desire in Language. A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art
(1980), Revolution in Poetic Language (1984) and The Kristeva Reader (1986) .
7 See Speculum of the other woman (1985), This sex which is not one
(1985) and The Irigaray Reader (1991).
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of emancipation. Using classical and enlightenment concepts of rationality and
humanity they seek to uncover and undermine human captivity to formations
of power that, under the guise of science and rationality, present themselves as
necessary and normal. In the words of Theodore Adorno: "The task before
philosophy is to break up the seemingly obvious and the apparently
incomprehensible." (Adorno in Ingram and Simon-Ingram 1992:26)
Working in this context [urgen.Habermas (b. 1929) has shown how the
ideological interests of the dominant have served to systematically distortour
communicative competence. While the dominant in society have entrenched
their own interests through the guise of rationalisation, especially in the fields
of science and technology, Habermas argues that rationalisation can also enable
the development of productive forces that can be a potential for liberation if
they help to remove restrictions on communication. (Habermas in Ingram and
Simon-Ingram 1992:142) Thus he seeks to develop a theory of communicative
competence that would analyze the conditions of non-repressive
communicative competence. (Ieanrond 1991:68)
Central to this work of criticism of ideologies is Habermas' critical stance in
relation to tradition. In his critical interaction with Hans-Georg Gadamer he
argued that Gadamer's model of understanding cannot work when our
understanding is systematically distorted. While Gadamer had rehabilitated
the concept of tradition that had been discredited by the enlightenment and
argued that we cannot understand without consenting to the tradition that
constitutes us , Habermas protested that this is a betrayal of enlightenment's
demands for critical reflection and emancipation. As a result Gadamer's work,
according to Habermas, has resulted in an imperialism that is not critical of
tradition. (Ceffre 1987:23)
50
Thus critical theory seeks to remind us of the interests implicated in and
sustained by any discourse, and, conversely, of those who have been excluded
from the formation of discourse. If our theological tradition has been
articulated by the powerful in church and society, it has done so at the expense
of "the other" -- an other that I argue needs to be given a privileged place in the
development of a theology of tradition.
Ideology criticism in feminist perspective:
the work of Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza
In this context the gender base of the creation of religious knowledge becomes
an important consideration. It is by now a truism to say, following Simone de
Beauvoir, that women have always been defined as the other and that our
reality has therefore found no place in accepted discourse. (Ackermann
1991:93) Indeed, a central feature of much feminist theology has involved an
analysis of how Christian tradition has been distorted by androcentric and
patriarchal interests. (Ruether 1983a:211)
Utilising Gramsci's work on hegemony and Habermas" work on ideology
Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza (b. 1938) argues that the function of feminist
ideology criticism is to disrupt this "common sense" assumption and show it up
for what it is, namely a kyriarchal construct. (1994:26-27) By questioning "how
things are" and seeking to undermine what is apparently taken for granted,
feminist scholarship enables new possibilities to emerge.
In this Schiissler Fiorenza is determined to situate theological discourse in its
broader social, political and ecclesiastical context. Just as "women'" is not
Schiissler Fiorenza uses the term "wo j men" to show the
politically constituted nature of the category "woman" j"women" and to
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an ideal category, neither is an eternal nor universal one. Our identities are
constituted not only by our biological gender, fundamental though this may
be, but also by our race, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity and access to
ecclesial and political power structures.
Recognising this multiple, and sometimes contradictory, operation of power
relations and oppressions, Schussler Fiorenza has developed the concept of
kyriarchy as a more adequate understanding than that of patriarchy. Whereas
patriarchy -- literally the "rule of the fathers" -- refers to a male power and
property structure in which men are dominant to the detriment of women,
(King 1989:22) kyriarchy refers "to a complex social pyramid of graduated
dominations and subordinations". (Schussler Fiorenza 1994:14) There are, in
other words, both different types and different degrees of oppressions and we
need to take these seriously.
Such an analysis destabilises our received categories of "women" and
"feminine" as eternally "given". Traditional notions of what was and was not
considered "feminine" were impacted by factors such as race and class. What
was considered appropriate "feminine" behaviour for "ladies" was somehow
not necessary for working class women. In the often-quoted words of
Sojourner Truth, a African-American former slave:
That man over there say
a woman needs to be helped into carriages
and lifted over ditches
and to have the best places everywhere.
Nobody ever helped me into carriages
or over mud puddles
or gives me best place ...
indicate that she includes in it not only all women but also oppressed and
marginalised men. (1994:191)
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And ain't I a woman?
(quoted in Schiissler Fiorenza 1994:57f)
By shifting the focus from "the rule of men" to "the rule of the
emperor/master/lord/father/husband" Schiissler Fiorenza seeks the links
between different types of oppressions.
With this term I mean to indicate that not all men dominate and
exploit all women without difference and that elite Western
educated propertied Euro-American men have articulated and
benefitted from women's and other "nonpersons" exploitation.
As a consequence, the hermeneutical center of a critical feminist
theology of liberation cannot simply be women. Rather, it must
be constituted and determined by the interests of women who
live at the bottom of the kyriarchal pyramid and who struggle
against multiplicative forms of oppression. (1994:14)
This focusing on dynamics of power and exclusion, and privileging of those "at
the bottom of the kyriarchal pyramid" has serious consequences for the work
of biblical and theological interpretation that Schilssler Fiorenza is engaged in.
She argues that:
A feminist critical interpretation of the Bible cannot take as its
point of departure the normative authority of the biblical
archetype, but must begin with women's experience in their
struggle for liberation. In doing so this mode of interpretation
subjects the Bible to a critical feminist scrutiny and to the
theological authority of the church of women, an authority that
seeks to assess the oppressive or liberating dynamics of all
biblical texts. (1984:13)
Thus interpretation begins, for Schussler Fiorenza, with a hermeneutics of
suspicion rather than a hermeneutic of consent. (1984:15) She writes:
Because of its allegiance to the "defeated in history," a feminist
critical theology maintains that a "hermeneutics of consent"
which understands itself as the "actualizing continuation of the
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Christian history of interpretation" does not suffice. This
hermeneutics overlooks the fact that Christian Scripture and
tradition are not only a source of truth, but also of untruth,
repression and domination. (1984:57f)
Schussler Fiorenza's concerns are therefore not primarily with the authority of
the biblical text but with the historical struggles of women in biblical and
Christian history. Her focus is on what Gerald West calls a "behind the text"
(1995:135ff) reading which is concerned with the historical and cultural world
that gave rise to the text. Through historical and sociological research she seeks
to uncover the role which women played in the social, economic and religious
affairs of the period and to analyze the ways in which women's roles have been
marginalised by the text. (Schussler Fiorenza 1983:29;West 1995:142ff)Thus
she does not see herself as accountable to the text or tradition itself, but rather
to the community of women whom she seeks to discover behind the text.
Both Habermas and Schussler Fiorenza show us the problem with a theology
that is based on a hermeneutics of consent. For if the texts and traditions that
we have received are those of the historical winners and serve to entrench the
interests of the dominant, will consenting to their message not further enslave
rather than liberate people? And yet, does Christian faith not necessarily
involve an element of consent? These issues will be pursued further in chapter
six.
However, while such concerns are critical of what they would consider too
easy an appropriation of tradition, they are nevertheless concerned with
developing a communicative competence that would enable forgotten voices to
be heard. Thus the possibility exists of a genuine dialogue which, while
critical, would nevertheless seek a historical continuity.
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The irreducible alterity of the Other
If the work of Habermas and the critical theorists poses a fundamental
challenge to tradition in refusing to consent to its authority, then
poststructuralists pose a fundamental challenge not only to tradition but to all
forms of western discourse that assume a totality and sameness in any sense
linked to metaphysical ideas. They bear witness to a rupture in knowledge that
threatens not only traditional metaphysics and hermeneutics but also, and
perhaps especially, the critical traditions of the Enlightenment.
The use ofthe term poststructuralist is an ambiguous label, for the cluster of
discourses that I am referring to grew out of the structuralist movement of the
1960s and it is impossible to find a clear dividing line between the two.
According to Donald Palmer poststructuralism represents a radicalisation and
intensification, but not a rejection, of certain structuralist concerns. (1994:364)
Moreover, it appears to primarily be a term used in certain intellectual circles
outside of France to draw a line of affinity around several French theorists who
are rarely so grouped in France. (Poster 1989:4)
Such discourses emerged in opposition to the humanist traditions represented
by existentialist philosophy. Humanism, in the words of Elizabeth Grosz,
is the belief that all values, meanings, history and culture are the
products of human consciousness and individual activity. It
conflates the subject and consciousness, granting primary value to
consciousness in making choices, and judging, creating and
transforming social relations. (1989:6f)
By contrast, structuralism deposed both the individual subject, human
consciousness and the sign from any privileged position. It criticised the idea of
a pregiven subject and the sign as bearer of a self-constituted meaning.
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Structuralism seeks out the underlying structures or relations
between empirical elements, seeing the empirically given object
merely as a manifestation of this broader system .,. the sign is
dethroned from the centre of meaning and consciousness is
displaced from the centre of subjectivity. (Grosz 1989:10f)
The turn to the unconscious
In this we find a turn to the unconscious and a corresponding interest in
psychoanalysis as a tool for interrogating the unconscious. The work of [acques
Lacan (1901-1981) linked psychoanalysis to questions of textuality, reading and
interpretation and drew attention to the gaps and flaws in conscious
expression. (Grosz 1989:18f) In this context:
psychoanalysis challenges many of the central presuppositions of
post-Cartesian philosophy and literary analysis. Post-Cartesian
philosophy tends to presume a rational, unified self-certain
consciousness. It is undermined more effectively by Freud's
postulate of the unconscious than it is by the Hegelian
assumption of othemess; otherness is the duplication of
consciousness. The unconscious is the displacement of
consciousness from the centre or core of subjectivity. (Grosz
1989:19)
Such an approach highlights our radical inability to know. The subject, for
Lacan, does not know itself; it is not the master of language but rather its result
or product. (Grosz 1989:19) In the same way such an approach undermines a
correspondence approach to truth in which language is seen as an expression of
reality. As Poster says:
Poststructuralists criticise the assumption of much modern
. thought that theoretical discourse is an expression of a truth in
the theorist's mind, that this truth in some way captures historical
reality, and that the question of freedom entails the appropriation
of this truth by historical agents and their subsequent action to
actualize it. (1989:4)
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By contrast, poststructuralists point to the various ways in which the subject
materially affects and is affected by language. In the words of Claude Ceffre:
We have to study the language itself as a system of signs and not
as a sign or expression of a thought. The words used have
meaning in relation to the other words in the sentence, but not in
relation to an external reality. The lateral game of the signifiers
has to be taken seriously without postulating an ultimate
signified. We may say, then, that language as a word, a
manifestation of meaning and the event of an encounter is
absorbed by language as a system. "It speaks before I speak," as
Lacan observed in a frequently quoted sentence. (1987:3)
In this context alterity represents more than simply the opposite of the self. It is
a form of otherness that is irreducible to and unable to be modelled on any
form of projection of or identification with the subject. (Grosz 1989:xiv) The
discourse of the unconscious is quite different from that of consciousness and
yet cannot be expressed independently of consciousness: "it can only speak
through or as consciousness, as that which intervenes into consciousness as
eruption and interruption." (Grosz 1989:23)
Thus the other, in this context, is not simply the excluded, but the unspeakable.
The other is not merely excluded, but silenced; it is denied a voice and the
means with which to acquire a voice.
The destabilisation of logocentric discourses
Emerging from such a position is the insight that exclusion is not simply the
work of political and economic constellations, but of the very structuring of our
thought processes, which are integrally linked to such constellations. In
western tradition this has involved the privileging of the logos and has resulted
in logocentrism. Grosz defines these as follows:
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The logos, logic, reason, knowledge, represents a singular and
unified conceptual order, one which seems to grasp the presence
or immediacy of things. Logocentrism is a system of thought
centred around the dominance of this singular logic of presence.
It is a system which seeks, beyond signs and representation, the
real and the true, the presence of being, of knowing and reality, to
the mind -- an access to concepts and things in their pure,
unmediated form . (1989:xix)
It is Jacques Derrida (b. 1930) who confronts the captivity of western thought to
a metaphysics of presence. He ~rgues that western metaphysics is structured
around a series of binary oppositions which simultaneously value what is
considered positive and devalue what is considered negative. However, the
positive term (presence, good, being) fails to acknowledge the extent to which
it is dependent on the negative (absence, bad, non-being). He argues that to
recognise that identity depends on difference and that presence depends on
absence is to disturb the very structure of knowledge. (Grosz 1989:27)
Derrida shows that the west's obsession with knowledge and with the
possibility of self-certain, unrnediated and guaranteed truth, while an
impossible ideal, is necessary for the functioning of logocentrism. (Grosz
1989:28) By assuming the apparently given nature of concepts such as being
and truth, the western logocentric tradition has been able to avoid their real
materiality and origin in language, and hence their implication in relations of
power.
In problematising and seeking to challenge logocentrism Derrida seeks to
replace metaphysics with grammatology. Whereas logocentric metaphysics
gave priority to the word, grammatology gives priority to writing. Whereas
logocentrism gave priority to a metaphysics of presence, grammatology seeks
out the idea of differance, a term which he introduces to point beyond both
sameness and difference.
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In this Derrida is at pains to point out the end of the sign as signifier of
something other than itself. (1991:34f) Peggy Kamuf comments:
Derrida insists that linguistics remains a metaphysics as long as it
retains the distinction between signified and signifier within the
concept of the sign. This distinction is always ultimately
grounded in a pure intelligibility tied to an absolute logos: the
face of God. The concept of the sign, whose history is coextensive
with the history of logocentrism, is essentially theological.
(Kamuf's introduction in Derrida 1991:32)
Grammatology is thus fundamentally deconstructive. Deconstruction is one of
Derrida's strategies for engaging logocentrism and involves
a series of close readings of particular philosophical and literary
texts, seeking out the traces or remainders of textuality and
materiality that are its central points, hinges in a destabilisation of
the text's explicit ideals. (Grosz 1989:28)
It thus seeks out blindspots and contradictions "where the text spills over its
conceptual boundaries." (Crosz 1989:28) Such points of excess indicate a
movement that "escapes the logic of the self-present subject considered as
rational master of meaning." (Grosz 1989:29)
In pushing the boundaries between sameness and otherness, presence and
absence, being and non-being, Derrida uses the term differance to indicate an
alterity that is more than simply the binary opposite of sameness. The term
differance plays on the double meaning of the French word differer which
means both to differ and to defer. It is, moreover, dependent on writing, being
inaudible when spoken, and thus further prioritises writing over speech.
(Kamuf's introduction in Derrida 1991:59) With it he seeks to indicate an
inevitable (and potentially endless) deferral and displacement of meaning that
escapes the logic of the self-present subject. (Grosz 1989:29)
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Derrida's deconstructive strategies also seek to make apparent the violence
involved in the logocentric production of knowledge. By displacing repressed
terms, and showing that dominant terms are dependent on them, he "makes
explicit the unacknowledged debt the dominant term owes to the secondary
term". (Grosz 1989:30)
The end of master stories and globalising discourses
Similar concerns are present in the work of [ean-Francois Lyotard and Michel
Foucault. By showing that western discourse ,is based on a violence of exclusion
they seek to disrupt the apparent legitimacy of all totalising and globalising
forms of discourse.
Lyotard (b. 1924) draws attention to the conflict inherent in discourse. The
linking of phrases is always done through the victory of one genre of discourse
over and against another. Each phrase is always one out of endless possibilities
which cannot survive, and hence of a plurality that can never be respected.
(Boeve 1995:370) The use of a phrase creates an expectation which is closed off
by the use of the next phrase. However this expectation is never totally closed
off for its expectation is never totally fulfilled. Thus Lyotard points to a
heterogeneity that accompanies all decision-making. He seeks to show that
plurality is a consequence of a fundamental heterogeneity. This unspeakable,
which he calls the differend, "accompanies and provokes each and every uttered
word, yet can never be identified with it." (Boeve 1995:370)
For Lyotard postmodern consciousness is this consciousness of this
inexpressible event and must give witness to this differend. This involves a
discourse which witnesses to the essential openness of the differend and an
opposition to what Lyotard calls modern master stories which involve a
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universalistic, hegemonic, cognitive and exc1usivistic discourse. (Boeve
1995:371)
This is echoed in the work of Foucault (1926-1984) who speaks of the tyranny
held by unitary, globalising discourses. Discourse has consequences for social
relations for,
relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated
not implemented without the production, accumulation,
circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no
possible exercise of power without a certain economy of
discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of
this association. (Foucault 1980:93)
He points to the importance of local criticism which allows for a
non-centralised kind of theoretical production, one that is to say
whose validity is not dependent on the approval of established
regimes of thought ... it seems to me that this local criticism has
proceeded by means of what one might term "a return of
knowledge". (Foucault 1980:81)
This allows for what Foucault terms the insurrection of subjugated
knowledges. This term refers to two types of knowledge. Firstly, it refers to
bodies of historical knowledge that have been buried and disguised within the
knowledge of the dominant. Their rediscovery, which critical scholarship can
aid, allows us
to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the
order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought is
designed to mask. (1980:82)
Secondly, the term subjugated knowledges, refers to something altogether
different, namely popular or naive knowledges which the dominant discourses
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have refused to acknowledge as real knowledge. Such knowledges are based
on
a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge
incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the
harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it.
(1980:82)
Emerging from the insurrection of these subjugated knowledges Foucault sees
the development of what he terms a genealogy
or rather a multiplicity of genealogical researches, a painstaking
rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their
conflicts ... Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite
knowledges and local memories which allows us to establish a
historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this
historical knowledge tactically today. (1980:83)
Thus for Foucault, as for Lyotard, the challenge is to break open totalising
discourses and he seeks to do this through seeking out that which has been
excluded.
Alterity in French feminist thought:
the work of Julia Kristeva
We have seen that in the cluster of discourses associated with poststructuralism
relations of power have functioned not simply to exclude the voices of the
other, but have shaped discourse in ways that have denied the possibility of
such voices even emerging. In this context, the issue, from a feminist
perspective, is not simply that women's voices have not been heard, but that
the very shape of the dominant discourses have excluded them from the start.
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While the feminist movement in the English speaking world has tended to
focus on the struggle for women's subjectivity and has given a privileged place
to the category of women's experience, French feminism (drawing on
poststructuralism and psychoanalysis) has tended to undermine the very
category of women's experience itself . (Moi 1987:5) Thus it becomes
increasingly difficult to locate the existence of the female (or other
marginalised) subject.
While there are significant differences amongst French feminists, I am focusing
here on aspects of the work of Julia Kristeva (b. 1941) as it provides us with
insight into the radical alterity which results from a gendered reading of
poststructuralist (and particularly psychoanalytical) concerns. Working within
an antihumanist tradition, and influenced by Lacan, Kristeva is concerned with
the creation of the subject and its emergence through language. Like Lacan, she
is concerned with decentering the subject so that
What we call significance, then, is precisely this unlimited and
unbounded generating process, this unceasing operation of the
drives toward, in, and through language; toward, in, and through
the exchange system and its protagonists -- the subject and his
institutions. This heterogeneous process, neither anarchic,
fragmented foundation nor schizophrenic blockage, is a
structuring and de-structuring practice, a passage to the outer
boundaries of the subject and society. Then -- and only then -- can
it be jouissance and revolution. (1984:17)
Kristeva sees a parallel between three realms of social existence, namely, the
speaking subject, signifying practices and the socio-political ensemble. (Grosz
1989:68) By interrogating the speaking subject she is engaging an entity that is
symptomatic of a broader social organisation. (Grosz 1989:41) She is concerned
with the region of overlap between linguistic/literary theory and
psychoanalysis and seeks to link subjectivity and textuality through an
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exploration of terms s~ch as "the semiotic", "the symbolic" and "the thetic".
(Grosz 1989:42)
Kristeva uses the terms "semiotic" and "the symbolic" to denote the two
components of the signifying process. Leon Roudiez notes that
While this division is not identical with that of
unconscious/conscious, id/superego, or nature/culture, there are
analogies here that could be usefully kept in.mind. (Introduction
inKristeva 1984:4)
For Kristeva all signifying practices and social subjects are the effects of the
relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic. She understands the
semiotic to be the fluid, non-differentiated and prior space which is "distinctive
mark, trace, index, precursory sign, proof, engraved or written sign, imprint,
trace, figuration." (1984:25) Borrowing the term from Plato's Timaeus she refers
to it as the maternal chora:
an essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation
constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases ... the chora
as rupture and articulations (rhythm), precedes evidence,
verisimilitude, spatiality and temporality. (1984:25f)
While the semiotic chora is regulated through natural or socio-historical
constraints, it precedes the establishment of the sign and hence of social laws.
(1984:27)The semiotic is composed of non-signifying raw materials and
pre~edesall unities, binary oppositional structures and hierarchical forms of
organisation. It is the symbiotic space shared by the mother and child's
indistinguishable bodies. (Grosz 1989:43)
While the semiotic always accompanies us, it is the realm of the symbolic that
we usually inhabit for through the processes of signification, the symbolic has
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gained precedence and subordinated the semiotic. The symbolic is thus
a social effect of the relation to the other, established through the
objective constraints of biological (including sexual) differences
and concrete, historical family structures. (1984:29)
While the chora is identified as the domain of the mother, Kristeva identifies the
symbolic with the domain of the father, and argues that, in Grosz's words:
The oedipus complex severs the child from its dependence on the
(m)other by means of the castration threat, which pits the child's
narcissistic investment in the integrity -of its body against its
desire for access to the mother's body. Only then can it gain a
position within the socio-symbolic order, and the privileges
associated with the Name-of-the-Father. (1989:48)
Between the domains of the semiotic and the symbolic Kristeva posits the thetic
threshold which she sees as an anticipation of the symbolic from within the
semiotic. This includes both the mirror stage and the discovery of castration.
(1984:46) In the mirror stage the child discovers a sense of itself as separate
from other objects in space. In the discovery of castration the subject is
detached from dependence on the mother and makes the phallic function the
symbolic function. (1984:47) Such a rupture makes signification possible but it
also impacts the nature of the signification:
Ultimately this signifier/signified transformation, constitutive of
language, is seen as being indebted to, induced and imposed by
the social realm. Dependence on the mother is severed, and
transformed into a symbolic relation to an other; the constitution
of the Other is indispensable for communicating with an other. In
this way the signifier / signified break is synonymous with social
sanction: "the first social censorship." (1984:48)
Thus the founding thesis of all signification is itself dependant on a certain set
of social relations.
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To brand the thetic as the foundation of metaphysics is to risk
serving as an antechamber for metaphysics -- unless, that is, we
specify the way the thetic is produced. In our view, the Freudian
theory of the unconscious and its Lacanian development show,
precisely, that thetic signification is a stage attained under certain
precise conditions during the signifying process, and that it
constitutes the subject without being reduced to this process
precisely because it is the threshold of language. (1984:44f)
What emerges from Kristeva's work then is that the process of signification,
and the emergence of the subject, has involved the victory of the symbolic and
the displacement of the semiotic, which correlate to the masculine and the
feminine respectively. This victory is only provisional, however. The semiotic
continues to accompany the symbolic as "the unspoken, threatening condition
of signification, unable to be signified." (Grosz 1989:52) In times of crisis it
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threatens to overflow its boundaries and transgress the borders of the symbolic
order. The possibility of such transgression will be explored further in chapter
seven.
Modernity versus postmodernity
It should be clear that the two clusters of discourse outlined in this chapter
assume radically different understandings, especially as regards truth, reason
and the nature of human subjectivity and hence agency. While both claim
allegiance to a project of emancipation, they differ fundamentally over what
this means and how it can be achieved. This is illustrated by the debate
between Habermas and the poststructuralists which has focused on the nature
of modernity. (Poster 1989:19) For Habermas the French move to
postmodernity, and in particular their attack on rationality, was a retreat from
the challenge of the enlightenment rather than a move beyond it, while for the
poststructuralists, especially Lyotard, Habermas' insistence on a search for
consensual truth is an oppressive totalisation that prevents the celebration of
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plurality and difference.
In feminist perspective it should also be clear that there are distinct differences
between the work of Schussler Fiorenza and the work of Kristeva. While
Schussler Fiorenza focuses on the exclusion of women from biblical and
historical texts and seeks to reclaim their subjecthood and historical agency,
Kristeva's work can be seen to undermine the very idea of female subjectivity."
While Schussler Fiorenza acknowledges that gender is socially constructed, she
is concerned with finding strategies for reclaiming the subjectivity of the
marginalised. By contrast Kristeva's work has been criticised for an ambiguous
relationship to feminist struggles and an uncritical acceptance of
psychoanalytical conceptions of women and femininity. (Grosz 1989:63ff)
It is not my concern here to mediate between these opposing positions. Rather,
I have outlined each of these clusters of discourse because both clusters both
present a challenge for theology and provide us with possible resources for
theological work. They show us that certain voices have been excluded from
the formulation of the church's tradition and that there are dynamics that
encourage this exclusion. But they also show us that we are always
accompanied by that which is unsaid -- and unsayable.
9 Grosz criticises Kristeva not only for an ambiguous relation to
feminist struggles, but also because in focusing on and seeking to undermine
specific male and female identities she undermines female subjectivity while
privileging the male avant-garde. (1989:91£f)
67
The call of the Other
Before ending this chapter I would like to allow an interjection from two
thinkers not easily identifiable with either of the above clusters of discourse
but whose work engages the question of alterity in compelling, if conflicting ,
ways.
The face of the Other: Emmariuel Levinas
Like the poststructuralists Levinas (b. 1905) is critical of the totalising agenda
of western philosophical thought. He rejects a concern with being and essences
arguing that such an ontological approach is rooted in violence to the Other.
(1989:83f)
By contrast Levinas argues for the priority of ethics as a first philosophy. Ethics
for him is rooted in an openness to the face of the Other:
The sense of the human is not to be measured by presence, not
even by self-presence. The meaning of proximity exceeds the
limits of ontology, of the human essence, and of the world. It
signifies by way of transcendence and the relationship-to-God-in-
me (l'a-Dieu-en-moi) which is the putting of myself into question.
The face signifies in the fact of summoning, of summoning me-- in
its nudity or its destitution, in everything that is precarious in
questioning, in all the hazards of mortality -- to the unresolved
alternative between Being and Nothingness, a questioning which,
ipso facto, summons me.
The Infinite in its absolute difference withholds itself from
presence in me; the Infinite does not come to meet me in a
contemporaneousness like that in which noesis and noema meet
simultaneously together, nor the way in which interlocutors
responding to one another may meet. The Infinite is not
indifferent to me. It is in calling me to other men that
transcendence concerns me. In this unique intrigue of
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transcendence, non-absence of the Infinite is neither presence, nor
re-presentation. Instead, the Idea of the Infinite is to be found in
my responsibility for the Other. (1989:5)
Rooted in the Hasidic tradition Levinas refers to God and the Infinite. God,
however, is always encountered and witnessed to:
Nobody can really say I believe -- or I do not believe for that
matter -- that God exists. The existence of God is not a question of
an individual soul's uttering logical syllogisms. It cannot be
proved. The existence of God, the Sein Gottes, is sacred history
itself, the sacredness of man's relation to man through which God
may pass. God's existence is the story of his revelation in biblical
history. (quoted in Grosz 1989:157)
The response to alterity, for Levinas, is the biblical response of "Here I am!" It
is not a response to a being but rather to a face, which signifies beyond any
epistemological level and is conceptually uncontainable. But the face, in its
nakedness and poverty, speaks and "it is in this that it renders possible and
begins all discourse." (1985:87) And when the face speaks its first word is
"Thou shalt not kill. " (1985:89)
Thus Levinas is concerned with an ethical and a sacred history rather than an
epistemological one. This history points beyond ontology in affirming being-
for-itself to the unconditional responsibility of being-for-the-other. (Hand in
1989:7)
Oneself as Another: Paul Ricoeur
While Levinas highlights the absolute exteriority of the Other which precludes
any relation between Same and Other, as a way of protecting the Other from
being reduced to a totalising ontology of the Same, Ricoeur (b. 1913) argues
that it is possible for the Other to be in relation to the self and that the Other
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actually serves to constitute the self.
Ricoeur argues that while, with Levinas, "Each face is a Sinai that prohibits
murder" he continues to ask:
And me? It is in me that the movement coming from the other
completes its trajectory: the other constitutes me as responsible,
that is, as capable of responding. In this way the word of the
other comes to be placed at the origin of my acts. (1992:336)
For Ricoeur the relationship between the self and the Other is central. It is in
seeing myself in the Other that the command "Thou shalt not kill" becomes my
own to the point of becoming a conviction that enables me to say "Here I
stand!" (1992:339) Thus testimony enables the emergence of the self, who is
nevertheless intimately related to the Other. (1992:340) One can therefore speak
both of a movement from the Same to the Other and of a movement from the
Other to the Same. (1992:340)
Such an engagement with alterity necessarily has ontological implications for
Ricoeur for he sees otherness as "being enjoined as the structure ofselfhood".
(1992:354) He objects, to Levinas, that
the injunction is primordially attestation, or the injunction risks
not being heard and the self not being affected in the mode of
being-enjoined. (1992:355)
However, while the Other is the necessary path of injunction, one needs to
maintain "a certain equivocalness of the status of the Other on the strictly
philosophical plane". (1992:355)
Perhaps the philosopher as philosopher has to admit that one has
to say that one does not know and cannot say whether this Other,
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the source of the injunction, is another person whom I can look in
the face or who can stare at me, or my ancestors for whom there
is no representation, to so great an extent does my debt to them
constitute my very self, or God -- living God, absent God -- or an
empty place. With this aporia of the Other, philosophical
discourse comes to an end. (1992:355)
Conclusion
Engaging with the discourse of alterity shows something of the gulf between
the concerns raised by both the critical theorists and the poststructuralists, on
the one hand, and the predominant forms of Christian theologising, on the
other hand. Both the critical theorists and the poststructuralists challenge us to
listen to and for the voices of the excluded and the silenced, a call that is
poignantly echoed by both Levinas and Ricoeur.
Such a challenge appears at first sight to be foreign to - indeed antithetical to--
our theological tradition, for both scholastic and hermeneutical forms of
theologising are based on concepts of presence and being (whether in itself or
historically mediated). However, it is my contention that this is not necessarily
the case. In the next chapter I hope to present a reading of the Christian
apophatic tradition that indicates that alterity is at the very heart of Christian
faith. How, and whether, this negativity can be held together with other
theological expressions will be considered in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Five
Beyond affirmation or negation:
the self-subverting nature of theological discourse
as seen in the Christian "mystical"tradition
God, then, is infinite and incomprehensible, and all that is
comprehensible about him is his infinity and incomprehensibility.
John Damascene (Lossky 1976:36)
It is on the other side of both our affirmations and our denials that
the silence of the transcendent is glimpsed, seen through the
fissures opened up in our language by the dialectical strategy of
self-subversion.
Denys Turner (1995:45)
God is a word, a word unspoken.
Meister Eckhart (1981:203)
All theologians agree that, in the words of Thomas Aquinas, recently echoed in
The Catechism ofthe Catholic Church, "we cannot grasp what God is, but only
what He is not". (SCC, 1, 30; cf Catechism 1994:42) The ultimate unknowability
of God was affirmed by both the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and the First
Vatican Council in 1870.1 While the church has continued to say much about
1 The Fourth Lateran Council stated that
For between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity




God, it has done so against the backdrop of this acknowledgement and with
the admission that we can only speak of God by way of analogy?
While the apophatic or negative way has a long theological history, a stress on
God 's unknowability has, in recent times,come to be seen not so much as a
theological emphasis or strategy, but as the theme for a type of spirituality or
mysticism. This apophatic or negative way
stresses that because God is the ever-greater God, so radically
different from any creature, God is best known by negation,
elimination, forgetting, unknowing, without images and symbols,
and in darkness. (Egan 1978:403)
Such a way is in distinction to, but nevertheless dependant on, the cataphatic
or positive way. This way
emphasizes a definite similarity between God and creatures, that
God can be reached by creatures, images, and symbols, because
He has manifested Himself in creation and salvation history.
(Egan 1978:403)
The two different paths to God are seen as represented by different great
mystics in the church's tradition: Dionysius, Eckhart and John of the Cross are
seen, among others, as examples of apophatic mysticism, while Francis of
The First Vatican Council tells us that:
For the divine mysteries, by their very nature, so far surpass the
created understanding that, even when a revelation has been
given and accepted by faith, they remain covered by the veil of
that same faith and wrapped, as it were, in a certain obscurity, as
long as in this mortal life we are away from the Lord, for we
walk by faith and not by sight. (DF:4)
For a discussion of analogy in the thought of Thomas Aquinas,
see Klubertanz (1960). For discussion of the use of analogy and metaphor in
speech about God see McFague, (1983) chapter one.
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Assisi, Julian of Norwich and Ignatiusof Loyola are seen, among others, as
examples of cataphatic mysticism.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how the Christian apophatic
tradition can be a resource in developing a theology of tradition that takes
seriously the fundamental alterity that accompanies all human discourse.
However, to do this we need to challenge both the gulf that separates theology
from spirituality and/or mysticism and much of the contemporary
understanding of mysticism. I begin then by addressing this question. I then
consider aspects of the apophatic theology of Gregory, Dionysius, Eckhart and
the author of The Cloud of Unknowing. I then turn to a consideration of key
themes that emerge and conclude by arguing that the apophatic theologians
would welcome the destabilisation of discourse brought on by our
contemporary context, although their strategies for engaging it would provide
a challenge to our postmodern world.
Mysticism and its problematisation
Mysticism is generally understood as a religious phenomenon that -refers to
immediate experience of, or union with, Ultimate Reality. Ellwood defines it as
follows :
Mystical experience is experience in a religious context which is
immediately or subsequently interpreted by the experiencer as
encounter with ultimate divine reality in a direct nonrational way
which engenders a deep sense of unity, and of living during the
experience on a level of being other than the ordinary. (1980:29)
Thus, while it is possible to argue for a non-religious mysticism, it is usually
seen as a particular form of religious experience -- one that, because of its
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intense nature and undescribable character, necessarily involves direct
personal participation.
The last century has seen the development of an academic discourse of
mysticism that has been concerned with questions of experience, knowledge,
language and interpretation.' It has moreover sought to define what it
understands by the term mysticism and has usually related this to a particular
type of experience which William [ames' classic work The Varieties ofReligious
Experience (1905) defined as ineffable, noetic, transient, passive and unitive.
This approach to mysticism as an experiential phenomena has been criticised
by two recent works. While coming from different directions Grace [antzen's
Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (1995) and Denys Turner's The Darkness of
God (1995) seek to disrupt this discourse by showing it up as socially
constructed (Jantzen) and a form of positivism (Turner) that is inevitably
bound up with the enlightenment's perceptions of truth and verifiability.
[antzen has pointed out that
it is plain that the preoccupations of most modern philosophical
interpreters of mysticism were not the preoccupations of the
mystics themselves. (1995:10)
Indeed, she argues that the modern discourse of mysticism needs to be
understood as carried out "under the long shadow of Kant''. (1995:8) By this
she means that mysticism is seen as a way of rescuing the possibility of
3 For a discussion of these, see Robert Ellwood's Mysticism and
Religion (1980), Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism (1974), Steven Katz' (ed) Mysticism
and Philosophical Analysis (1978), Richard Wood's Understanding Mysticism
(1980) and the General Introduction and Appendix in Bernard McGinn's The
Foundations ofMysticism, Vol. 1 (1991).
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religious knowledge from the Kantian strictures which foreclosed the
possibility of transcendent knowledge. It is this interest that determines
modern mystical discourse, even though the mystics themselves had never
heard of Kant and were not informed by the enlightenment concerns, much
less what properly pertains to mystical states according to [ames and his
followers. In the words of Bernard McGinn
No mystics (at least before the present century) believed in or .
practised "mysticism." They believed in and practised
Christianity (or [udaism, or Islam, or Hinduism), that is, religions
that contained mystical elements as parts of a wider historical
whole. (1991:xvi)
[antzen argues that we need to understand mysticism as a social construct and
that "the delimiting of mysticism through the centuries was crucial to
maintaining male hierarchical control in church and society". (1995:3)
Following Foucault she seeks a genealogy of mysticism that will enable us to
"uncover the power struggles which were inherent in the emergence of
particular concepts." (1995:14)
Like Jantzen, Turner has pointed out the difference between the concerns of the
current discourse of mysticism and the concerns of those that this discourse
considers mystics, noting that
the idea that there is a "mysticism" or that there are practitioners
of it, "mystics", is an idea of very recent provenance, perhaps as
recently as our century itself. (1995:260)
Turner is particularly concerned with the association of mysticism with
experientialism in modern mystical discourse, an association that implies a
theological positivism "not without its parallels in the philosophical
positivisms of our own century". (1995:262) Such a trend identifies immediate
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mystical experience as foundational and free from theoretical presuppositions,
and as providing grounds for verifying or falsifying theological truth.
(1995:261)
When the texts of those considered mystics, and especially supposedly
apophatic texts, are read in terms of such concerns, we achieve a reading that is
diametrically opposed to their own concerns.
Put very bluntly, the difference seemed to be this: that whereas
our employment of the metaphors of "inwardness" and "ascent"
appears to be tied in with the achievement and the cultivation of
a certain kind of experience ... the medieval employment of them
was tied in with a "critique" of such religious experiences and
practices. (1995:4) .
Thus by creating a category called mysticism and by identifying it with
experience the modem discourse of mysticism has missed the point of what
might more properly be called mystical theology. In particular, by identifying
the apophatic with experiences of negativity and with negative metaphors, it
has, ironically, turned the apophatic into a type of positivism and has stripped
it of its proper power as a critical moment in all theological tasks. We shall
return to a consideration of the real importance of the apophatic moment in
theology after seeing how it functions in certain selected theologians/mystics
in the church's tradition.
77
The apophatic critique as seen in selected theologians
In looking at the concerns of Gregory, Dionysius, Eckhart and the author of the
Cloud, I have selected four of the best known representatives of the apophatic
tradition. However, as should be apparent below, it is not so much the
apophatic images they use that are important for our task, as the dynamic that
they develop, a dynamic that is proper to all theology, and not simply that
labelled apophatic.
Gregory of Nyssa: knowledge beyond all knowing
The patristic era, as the age of the great councils, was a key period in the
church's self-definition and increasing understanding of what it believed,
especially regarding the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth. It would be a
mistake, however, to see such beliefs as merely beliefs: this was an era for
whom truth about God was lived truth. Vladimir Lossky's words reflect this
when he says:
Unlike gnosticism, in which knowledge for its own sake
constitutes the aim of the gnostic, Christian theology is always in
the last resort a means: a unity of knowledge subserving an end
which transcends all knowledge. (1976:9)
Like other church Fathers Gregory of Nyssa, a fourth century monk and bishop
from Cappadocia.' attempts to bring together the neoplatonism of his Greek
4 Born into an illustrious Christian family Gregory (c.335 - c. 395)
joined his brother Basil's monastery and was made bishop of Nyssa about
371/2. He played a prominent role in the Council of Constantinople in 381.
Together with his brother Basil and their friend Gregory of Nazianzus he is
known for opposing Arianism and promoting trinitarian teaching. In his later
years Gregory turned his attention to the spiritual life and the Life ofMoses was
his chief work of spiritual theology. Other related works are On the Titles ofthe
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intellectual background with the Jewish narrative of historical encounter with
God. He sees humanity as being positioned on the frontier between two
worlds, that of the spiritual and that of the material. Through his incarnation
Christ has opened this frontier for us and directs our nature towards God.
(Kannengiesser 1985:72)
In The Life ofMoses Gregory sets forth his doctrine of the spiritual life. This
allegorical commentary provides an example of the.spiritual life in which, after
outlining the life of Moses, "we shall seek out the spiritual understanding
which corresponds to the history in order to obtain suggestions of virtue."
(1978:33)
After portraying Moses' departure from Egypt, crossing of the Red Sea, and
being fed with manna, which are related to rites of initiation, we come to
Moses' experience on "The Mountain of Divine Knowledge" where "the higher
levels of virtue" are encountered and "the ineffable knowledge of God"
discovered. (1978:9lff) On this mountain God is discovered in darkness and
unknowing:
What does it mean that Moses entered the darkness and then saw
God in it? What is now recounted seems somehow to be
contradictory to the first epiphany, for then the Divine was
beheld in light but now he is seen in darkness. Let us not think
that this is at variance with the sequence of things we have
contemplated spiritually. Scripture teaches by this that religious
knowledge comes first to those who receive it as light. Therefore
what is perceived to be contrary to religion is darkness, and the
escape from darkness comes about when one participates in light.
But as the mind progresses and, through an ever greater and
more perfect diligence, comes to apprehend reality, as it
Psalms, Homilies on Ecclesiastes, On the Lord's Prayer, On the Beatitudes, On the
Canticle ofCanticles, On Perfection and On the Christian Profession. (Introduction
in 1978:2)
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approaches more nearly to contemplation, it sees more clearly
what of the divine nature is uncontemplated.
For leaving behind everything that is observed, not only what
sense comprehends but also what the intelligence thinks it sees, it
keeps on penetrating deeper until by the intelligence 's yearning
for understanding it gains access to the invisible and the
incomprehensible, and there it sees God. This is true knowledge
of what is sought; this is the seeing that consists in not seeing,
because that which is sought transcends all knowledge, being
separated on all sides by incomprehensibility as by a kind of
darkness. Wherefore John the sublime, who penetrated into the
luminous darkness, says, No one has ever seen God, thus asserting
that knowledge of the divine essence is unattainable not only by
men but also by every intelligent creature. (1978:94f)
What is important for our purposes is that Gregory insists on both on our
growing knowledge of God and, simultaneously, on the impossibility of such
knowledge. We are called to knowledge of God. And yet, as we advance in
that knowledge, we become aware of our radical inability to know. We
contemplate what is uncontemplated and see what is unseen. Thus we come to
realise that seeing consists in not seeing.
Such statements are not simply arbitrary contradictions but part of a dialectical
strategy that seeks to transcend the limitations of language. Darkness is not




knowledge beyond assertion and denial
Like Gregory, Dionysius" uses the image of Moses' ascent of Mount Sinai in
order to describe our growing knowledge of God. And,like Gregory, the
further we progress on this path to God, the more we realise that we cannot
speak of God.
Yet, although Dionysius is regarded as a (perhaps the) leading exponent of the
apophatic way, his theology is nevertheless full of names and images for God.
In his work The Divine Names he argues that, as the Cause of all, God "is rightly
nameless and yet has the names of everything that is." (1987:56) Thus
theologians give God many names:
such as "1am being," "life," "light," "God," the "truth." These same
wise writers, when praising the Cause of everything that is, use
names from all the things caused: good, beautiful, wise, beloved,
God of gods, Lord of Lords, Holy of Holies, eternal, existent,
Cause of the ages. They call him source of life, wisdom, mind,
word, know er, possessor beforehand of all the treasures of
knowledge, power, powerful, and King of Kings, ancient of days
... (1987:55)
In addition
For all sorts of reasons and because of all sorts of dynamic
-
5 Variously known as Denys, Dionysius or Pseudo-Dionysius, the
real identity of the person who wrote under the pseudonym of Dionysius the
Areopagite is unknown. Although he was originally thought to be the
Dionysius referred to in Acts 17:34, scholars now date his texts from the fifth or
sixth century and see them as influenced by neoplatonism and especially the
work of Plotinus. His chief works are The Divine Names and The Mystical
Theology, which most concern us here, but he also wrote The Celestial Hierarchy,
The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and various letters.
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energies they have applied to the divine Goodness, which
surpasses every name and every splendor, descriptions of every
sort -- human, fiery, or amber shapes and forms; they praise its
eyes, ears, hair, face, and hands, back, wings, and arms, a
posterior, and feet.... (1987:57)
Dionysius speaks of both affirmative and negative theologies. These are not
simply alternative ways to God, however. Rather they are different moments
in a strategy that is intended to take us beyond both affirmation and denial.
Thus the process of naming ultimately leads to a collapse of language and
allows us to encounter God through a process of unknowing. The via affirmitiva
leads to the via negativa which in turn leads to the via mystica. (Bischoff1976:31)
In this process there is a certain hierarchy and a clear direction to the process of
naming and unnaming. Dionysius begins by outlining the cognitive names and
attributes of God which he considers to be most similar to God before naming
other,less similar attributes. However, in the necessary denial that follows it is
the less similar attributes that are first denied before moving to denying any
likenesseven with the conceptual attributes such as life, being and goodness.
Thus in The Mystical Theology Dionysiusstates that
When we assert what is beyond every assertion, we must proceed
from what is most akin to it, and as we do so we make the
affirmation on which everything else depends. But when we
deny that which is beyond every denial, we have to start by
denying those qualities which differ most from the goal we hope
to attain. Is it not closer to reality to say that God is life and
goodness rather than that he is air and stone'?Is it not more
accurate to deny that drunkenness and rage can be attributed to
him than to deny that we can apply to him the terms of speech
and thought? (1987:139f)
Moreover, while knowledge of God for Dionysius relies on both affirmation
and negation, it is ultimately our negations about God, as much as our
affirmations that need to be denied.
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There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it.
Darkness and light, error and truth -- it is none of these. It is
beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of
what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond every
assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and,
by virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of
every limitation, beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every
denial. (1987:141)
Noting this process of denying even our denials, Turner is at pains to point out
that it is not simply negative language about God that results in an apophatic
theology. Rather he claims that
The apophatic is the linguistic strategy of somehow showing by
means of language that which lies beyond language. It is not
done, and it cannot be done, by means of negative utterances
alone which are no less bits of ordinary intelligible human
discourse than are affirmations. Our negations, therefore, fail of
God as much as do our affirmations. Over and over again Denys
repeats the refrain: "[The Cause of all] is beyond assertion and
deniat'; and again: ItWe make assertions anddenials of what is next
to it, but never of it, for it is beyond every assertion ... [and] also
beyond every deniat'; and yet again: "[The One is] beyond ... the
assertion of all things and the denial of all things, [is] that which
is beyond every assertion anddenial.It (1995:34f)
Thus it is through the breakdown of all discourse that we glimpse something
of the knowledge of God.
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Meister Eckhart: God beyond God
Like Gregory and Dionysius, Eckhart, a German Dominican from the high
middle ages," is concerned with what he terms "the purity of the divine nature"
which is "beyond words". (1981:203) This is closely related to another of his key
themes, namely, the necessity for us to be detached from ourselves and from al~
things. For only if we are free of all created things, and free of God, and of
ourselves, may God find a place in us in which to work. (1981:202)
In emphasising the purity of God Eckhart says:
In scripture God is called by many names. I say that whoever
perceives something in God and attaches thereby some name to
him, that is not God. God is above names and above nature.
(1981:204)
Working within a Platonic framework of emanation and return, Eckhart
distinguishes between all that is said about God, including the relations of the
three persons of the Trinity, and the hidden Godhead or God beyond God, of
whom we can say nothing at all. It is from this hidden abyss or ground that
both "God" and all creatures proceed. And it is to this ground that we return
through the birth of God in the soul and the soul's re-entry into this God
beyond God. (McGinn 1981:31) Of this Eckhart states:
6 Called "Meister" because of his teaching appointment at the
University of Paris, Eckhart (c. 1260-1327) had studied at both Cologne, where
he may have known Albert the Great, and Paris. He served for a time as a
Dominican vicar general provincial as well as serving as spiritual director to
nuns and beguines. In 1326 inquisitorial proceedings were initiated against him
but he did not live to see his work condemned in 1329. Scholars are now re-
evaluating Eckhart's orthodoxy (see Davies 1991:ch 9) and the Dominican
Order is appealing for a recinding of his condemnation. (Fleming's introduction
in 1988:17ff) Eckhart's chief works are the Benedictus, Counsels on Discernment,
On Detachment, various scripture commentaries and sermons in both Latin and
German.
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Even so do all creatures speak God. And why do they not speak
the Godhead? Everything in the Godhead is one, and of that there
is nothing to be said. God works, the Godhead does no work,
there is nothing to do; in it is no activity. It never envisaged any
work. God and Godhead are as different as active and inactive.
On my return to God, where I am formless, my breaking through
will be far nobler than my emanation. I alone take all creatures
out of their sense into my mind and make them one in me. When
I go back into the ground, into the depths, into the wellspring of
the Godhead, no one will ask me whence I came or whither I
went. No one missed me: God passes away. (1988:134)
In order for God to be born in the soul it is necessary that we become totally
detached from all things, from our own selves and even from God Godself.
Eckhart a~gues that detachment is greater than any other virtue as it is free
from all created things. (1981:285) Detachment makes us totally available for
God and compels God to come to us. (1981:286)
This detachment is not simply from material things, or from our own desires. It
is detachment from all desires and ideas. Such detachment "reposes in a naked
nothingness." (1981:291)
And when the heart that has detachment attains to the highest
place, that must be nothingness, for in this is the greatest
receptivity. (1981:292)
We are to be detached even from religious practices and experience and even
from God.
Therefore I pray to God that he may make me free of "God," for
my real being is above God if we take "God" to be the beginning
of all created things. (1981:202)
Thus for Eckhart not only can we not know God but we should actively seek a
practice that enables us to rest in nothingness. Therefore linked to his
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apophatic theology we can see an apophatic anthropology that extends this
subversion of discourse to language about the self. In this Eckhart may be seen
as a precursor to the decentered self of contemporary discourse.
Building on the work of Marguerite Porete,' Eckhart systematically developed
the theme of the "nothingness" of the self in which he explored the soul's
identity with the Godhead. (Turner 1995:139) Using terms such as "light of the
soul" and "spark of the soul" Eckhart explored the idea that there is something
in us that "comprehends God without a medium, uncovered, naked, as he is in
himself." (1981:198) ,
Such ideas are complex and controversial and traverse the dangerous
theological terrain of personalism and impersonalism" and the relationship
between God and creation. It is not my intention to enter the debate over
Eckhart's orthodoxy at this point. What I am concerned with, however, is that
in asserting that there is something in us that is unknowable about our own
being, Eckhart is witnessing to a destabilisation of language that occurs not
only when we speak about God, but also when we speak about God in relation
to the self.
7 A Beguin who was burnt at the stake in Paris in 1310,
Marguerite's mystical treatise The Mirror of Simple Souls was written around the
beginning of the fourteenth century and was published into Latin, English and
Italian. For a discussion of the relationship between Porete's work and
Eckhart's work see Davies. (1991:65ff)
8 A fundamental difference between the religions of the west --
[udaism, Christianity and Islam -- the those of the east -- especially Hinduism
-- centre around the question of whether Ultimate Reality is a personal God or
an impersonal Absolute. While western religions view God as personal, much,
although not all, of Hinduism sees God as ultimately impersonal. In this
context Brahman (God) and Atman (the divine self in people) are seen as
ultimately one. It is easy to see how Eckhart can be seen as holding such a
position, although both Davies (1991) and Smith (1987) argue for his
orthodoxy.
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The Cloud of Unknowing: the blind impulse of love
While the unknown author of The Cloud of Unknowint repeats the theme of our
inability to speak about God which we have seen above, and is particularly
indebted to Dionysius' The Mystical Theology, this work also marks a shift from
what can be termed an intellectualist "mysticism of vision" to a voluntarist
"mysticism of affectivity". (Turner 1995:187)
The author of the Cloud teaches that between us and God there exists a dark
cloud which prevents us from knowing God.
This darkness and cloud is always between you and your God,
no matter what you do, and it prevents you from seeing him
clearly by the light of understanding in your reason, and from
experiencing him in sweetness of love in your affection.
(1981:120f)
If we are to encounter God "it must always be in this cloud and in this
darkness." (1981:121) In order for us to pierce this cloud we are told to "put
beneath you a cloud of forgetting, between you and all the creatures that have
ever been made". (1981:128)
To do this we need to "unknow", to let go of even the most holy of thoughts.
Using a mantra-like word the author encourages all who would seek God to
beat upon this cloud and this darkness above you. With this
9 Originating in late fourteenth century England, The Cloud of
Unknowing is written by a spiritual director to a disciple (possibly a young
monk) who is drawn to contemplative prayer. Its author also wrote a book on
privy counsel (counselling) and paraphrased Dionysius' The Mystical Theology.
Walsh argues that he was most likely a Carthusian priest, although there are
also suggestions that he may have been a Cistercian hermit. (Walsh in 1981:3)
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word you are to strike down every kind of thought under the
cloud of forgetting ... (1981:134)
The Cloud is adamant that knowledge cannot lead us to God. It is rather the
"blind impulse of love" that can pierce the cloud of unknowing. (1981:139) And
It is better for you to experience this spiritually in your affection
than it is to have the eye of your soul opened in contemplation
either in seeing all the angels and the saints in heaven, or in-
hearing all the mirth or the melody of those who are in bliss.
(1981:140)
For, while God is incomprehensible to our "knowing power",
to the second, which is the loving power, he is entirely
comprehensible in each one individually; in so much that one
loving soul of itself, because of love, would be able to
comprehend him who is entirely sufficient, and much more so,
without limit, to fill all the souls of men and angels that could
ever exist . (1981:123)
Thus while for Dionysius and for Eckhart our inability to know God through
intellectual means is seen through the breakdown of our language, for the
author of the Cloud such knowledge is contrasted with a knowledge acquired
through love. This does not produce an alternative language however and
there is ultimately nothing we can say about what happens in the darkness of
the cloud. Where Eckhart plays with language to try and force it, through gaps
and paradoxes, to say the unsayable, the Cloud author merely invokes another
. realm of human experience. However, Turner has pointed out that even the
words that he does invoke, such as "above" and below, and "within" and
"without", also break down as they are dependant on an imagination that also
has to be left behind under the dark cloud of forgetting. (1995:208)
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The apophatic critique as bearer of alterity
What, it may be asked, does an apophatic naming of God have to do with the
theology of tradition? And how can it enable us respond to the challenge of
exclusion of the Other that has been posed to tradition?
The apophatic as strategy rather than imagery
It should be apparent from the above that to view apophatic theology, in
distinction from cataphatic theology, as simply an alternative way of speaking
about God is inadequate. While the apophatic way does invoke distinctive
negative images for speaking about God, I will argue, following Turner, that
this is not its primary concern and that "negative language about God is no
more apophatic in itself than is affirmative language." (1995:34)
Apophatic theology, properly understood, is about strategy rather than
imagery. Turner argues that the apophatic is best understood as "the linguistic
strategy of somehow showing by means of language that which lies beyond
language." (1995:34) It is a second order activity that uses both cataphatic and
apophatic imagery to push language to its limits and thus reveal the inability
of language to speak of that which is beyond language. Thus it seeks to witness
to the Other through exploiting contradiction, paradox and hyperbole.
Turner has pointed out that cataphatic imagery, as much as apophatic imagery,
can aid this breakdown in language. The point of cataphatic language, he
claims, citing Dionysius' The Divine Names as a prime example, is to exploit
language to such an extent that one creates "a kind of verbal riot, an anarchy of
discourse in which anything goes". (1995:20) Such a riot procures a general
linguistic embarrassment that leads to the collapse of language. (1995:23) Such
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a strategy is present even in those theologians generally considered as
cataphatic. For example, he argues that [ulian of Norwich deliberately confuses
the gender of Christ in her references to the Motherhood of Christ in order to
aid this breakdown in language. (1995:34) Thus [ulian can say
our Mother works in mercy on all his beloved children who are
docile and obedient to him ... (1978:294)
In order for such a breakdown to occur, however, it is necessary that we
encourage the full play of divine imagery. Turner argues that
Theological adequacy therefore requires the maximization of our
discourses about God -- and, whatever constraints an apophatic
theology may impose, they cannot justify the restriction of
theological language to just a few, favoured, respectful, "pious",
names ... In a pious vocabulary of unshocking, "appropriate"
names lies the danger of the theologian's being all the more
tempted to suppose that our language about God has succeeded
in capturing divine reality in some ultimately adequate way.
(1995:24)
Of particular relevance here is the question of whose discourses are allowed to
impact our imagery of God. It is common cause in a feminist context to argue
that exclusively masculine imagery for God is both theologically inadequate
and also furthers the oppression of women by not enabling them to see
themselves as created in the image of God. What is less immediately obvious
but equally important is that including feminine imagery in the process of
naming God serves to destabilise our images and hence furthers the
breakdown of language. It is considerably more difficult to hold to a realistic
view of God as both Father and Mother, than it is to simply see God as Father!
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The relationship between the cataphatic and the apophatic in theology
It is common to argue that one cannot see the cataphatic and apophatic
dimensions of Christian spirituality in isolated terms. Harvey Egan expresses
the conventional view that cataphatic and apophatic are merely different sides
of a continuum of ways in which we image God when he says
It must be emphasized that the negative way is inextricably
linked to the affirmative way because the ineffable God has
spoken his word and Word. (1993:703)
Thus we see that even the most apophatic of people use positive imagery for
God, and even the most cataphatic are aware that their language can never
capture the reality of God.
However, according to Turner's reading of the mystical tradition, the
differences of vocabulary and imagery that are usually seen as differences
between cataphatic and apophatic theology, are only differences on the first
order level. And, whether one takes the positive or the negative route in the
use of imagery, one is still led to the breakdown of language which is the
properly apophatic moment:
these qualities of affirmativeness and negativity are first-order
qualities, relating to the concrete imagery of a spiritual style and
practice of prayer, not to be confused with second-order
negations of the negations, which is the truly apophatic dialectic,
and is the common possession of them all. (1995:257)
In this context the real difference between cataphatic and apophatic relates, not
to different types of spiritualities or different imagery, but rather to different
moments in the theological task.
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The apophatic as the critical moment in all theology
Thus the key concern of the Christian mystical tradition, whether
conventionally understood as either cataphatic or apophatic, is that of
seeking the terms with which to state, with a theological
precision which alone can sustain an adequate Christian practice,
the relation between the apophatic and cataphatic "moments"
within the trajectory of the Christian itinerarium in Deum.
(1995:256)
Understood in this way the apophatic becomes that critical moment that needs
to occur in all theology when we realise the collapse of language. We can
therefore see the Christian mystical tradition as bearer of, and witness to, an
alterity that has been too-easily covered over by the positivism brought in
with scholasticism and extended in the modem (and counter-modem) era.
It is worth noting that this apophatic dialectic occurs against the backdrop of a
constant Christian practice. While we find a denial of the importance of
religious experience," this needs to be seen as part of the apophatic strategy
which strenuously resists the temptation to identify faith with experience.
Likewise, while we hear disparaging comments about the efficacy of religious
practices, most of these writers expected their readers to be part of a liturgical
context that was more or less taken for granted." Thus critique happened
10 The author of the Cloud tells us that we need to let go not only of
"worldly" thoughts but also of spiritual ones - "all should be hid under the
cloud of forgetting". (1981:128) Thus we must not expect to be sustained by
spiritual experiences for "if you are to experience him or to see him at all,
insofar as it is possible here, it must always be in this cloud and in this
darkness." (1981:121)
11 Oliver Davies argues that one of the elements responsible for a
misreading of Eckhart's thought is the neglect of the context of much of his
preaching, namely monasteries of nuns and Beguinages which assume a full
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against the backdrop of sustained practice.
Conclusion
I ended the previous chapter by suggesting that alterity may be at the very
heart of Christian faith. Certainly the apophatic dynamic considered in this
chapter would seem to confirm this and witnesses to the need for all that we
say to constantly subvert itself.'
However, the question of the relationship between the cataphatic and
apophatic moments in theology remains and is a dialectic that will be woven
throughout this thesis. The mystical tradition presented in this chapter points
us towards both the need to maximise our theological discourses so as to allow
as many voices as possible to be heard, and also, at the same time, to allow
those voices to collapse into silence. Bybalancing the twin demands of both
hermeneutics and grammatology, I hope, in the following section, to outline a
response to the problematic of tradition that remains faithful to this apophatic
dialectic.




Introduction to Part 11
The previous section has touched on discourses of presence and absence;
hermeneutically orientated forms of understanding that allow revelation to
become present today, and a discourse of alterity that points to the radical
inadequacy of such an approach and to the absolute othemess of the Other that
resists being accounted for in the terms of the same.
In an article entitled "Reconciliation and Rupture: The Challenge and Threat of
Otherness" (1992) Richard Bernstein argues that
we now find ourselves in a new force-field and constellation that
deeply affects our thinking about othemess - not only in
philosophy but in the entire range of the cultural disciplines. In
this context I want to focus on the interplay of attractions and
aversions between hermeneutics and deconstruction -- two
juxtaposed, nonreducible elements in this new constellation.
(1992:300)
Using the metaphors of force-field and constellation from Theodore Adomo
and Walter Benjamin,' Bernstein highlights an unstable and tensed relationship
of changing elements that resist reduction and unification. (1992:300) He
suggests that the contemporary movements of hermeneutics, represented by
Gadamer, and deconstructionism, represented by Derrida, exist in such a
tensed relationship. While each privileges a particular moment in
understanding, it also recognises the need for the other moment.
1 Adomo defines a "force-field" as "a relational interplay of
attractions and aversions that constitute the dynamic, transmutational structure
of a complex phenomenon." He defines a constellation as "a juxtaposed rather
than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common
denominator, essential core, or generative first principle." (Bernstein 1992:299f)
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Thus while Gadamer emphasises the moment of reconciliation which is
achieved through dialogue with the tradition he is also aware of the need for
an encounter with the otherness of the tradition itself. However,
What is lacking in Gadamer is an equally profound sense of the
ruptures, breaks, fissures, gaps -- the dis-ruptions that break out
in our attempts to fuse horizons. (1992:305)
It is this "irreducible othernessof the Other" (1992:305) that Derrida
foregrounds. His language
is not that of dialogue, reconciliation, and fusion. It is the
language of double readings, double gestures, and double binds.
We are always haunted by othemess that can never be
completely mastered, domesticated, or contained. (1992:306)
Bemstein argues that Derrida does not rule out the possibility of dialogue, but
rather emphasises its pitfalls. His call is for us to beware that "our attempted
reconciliations do not mask ruptures, fissures, and differance that cannot be
reconciled." (1992:306f)
Thus Bernstein argues that hermeneutics and deconstruction, although often
seen as antithetical, should be seen as standing in a tensed, unstable
relationship; instead of seeing them as Either/Or we should recognise the need
for Both/And. (1992:305)
In looking for mediating tools which will allow us to speak theologically, I am
deliberately focusing on a dual mediation that follows the basic contours of
Bernstein's argument. The first is the hermeneutical path outlined in chapter
six that allows us to be impacted by the presence of the tradition in ever-new
ways. However, by continuing to probe the discourse of alterity in chapter
96
seven, I point to the need for these two approaches to continue to stand in a
tensed relationship in which both of them interact in order to provide a
theological mediation that can more effectively respond to the needs of our
present context.
It should also be apparent from the argument presented in chapter five, that
this dynamic, while informed by contemporary movements, has a long
theological pedigree. The cataphatic and the apophatic moments in theology
always stand in a tensed relationship that is fundamentally the same as the
tensiveness outlined above. When this tensiveness is lost theology either
degenerates into positivism or completely loses its voice. By choosing this dual
mediation I hope to safeguard the theological (and ethical) adequacy of the
theology of tradition and church that is to be developed in Part Ill.
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Chapter Six
Building a dwelling in time:
Transformative interpretation from within history and language
The ultimate question is not what ideal object the structures of
the text generate, what the authors of the text intended to say
about women, or how the early church thought about or behaved
towards women (although the answers to all of these questions
have instrumental roles to play in interpretation); it is whether
the meaning ofthe Second Testament as it is decontextualized
and recontextualized in successive generations is irredeemably
and necessarily oppressive of women or whether and how it can
offer liberating possibilities to the very people whose oppression
it has legitimated.
Sandra Schneiders (1989:4)
How are we to deal with that which is handed on to us, and which is believed
to be authoritative, by our faith community? Can we give "the obedience of
faith" (DV:5) to a tradition that is not only exclusive of women but actively
patriarchal, androcentric and, at times, decidedly misogynist?
Sandra Schneiders has asked fundamentally the same question of the New
Testament. Her concern is how
an intrinsically oppressive text, one which is actually morally
offensive in some respects, can function normatively in and for
the believing community. In what sense can one regard as word
of God that which, in some respects at least, cannot possibly be
attributed to God without rendering God the enemy and
oppressor of some human beings? (1991a:54)
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In responding to this challenge Schneiders has developed an interpretive
theory and theology of revelation that respects both the challenges of ideology
criticism and the text's privileged role as mediator between God and humanity
and therefore as revelatory. (1991b:178) In this she is dependant on the
hermeneutical theory of Gadamer and Ricoeur which she appropriates for a
particular feminist cause.
In this chapter I seek to outline this hermeneutical path which, I have
suggested, is one contemporary response to the challenge that this thesis is
addressing. In what follows I outline the hermeneutical context from which the
work of Gadamer and Ricoeur has emerged before showing their particular
contributions and the way in which Schneiders has used and built on these.
Mapping hermeneutical terrain:
the return to ontology
. Such a response stands within a particular philosophical tradition which views
the hermeneutical task asdisclosive of being. Palmer points to two different
(and polarized) understandings of hermeneutics today. Firstly, there are those,
represented by Betti, who see hermeneutics as a general body of
methodological principles which underlie interpretation. Secondly, there are
those, represented by Gadamer, "who see hermeneutics as a philosophical
exploration of the character and requisite conditions for all understanding."
(1969:46)
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While hermeneutics, as an interpretive task, is as old as humanity/
Schleiermacher, (1768-1834) who became known as the "father of modern
hermeneutics", was the first thinker to demand a philosophical theory of
understanding which aimed "to understand the text first as well and then
better than its author did". (jeanrond 1991:47) A century later Dilthey
continued his emphasis on viewing hermeneutics as an exact science which
accords the human sciences the same degree of objectivity as the natural
sciences, hence providing a foundational theory for the humanities. (jeanrond
1991:52)
Central to this modern approach to hermeneutics was a concern with method.
Schleiermacher's goal was the precise reproduction of the meaning of a work
as the author intended it and so he was concerned with the proper methods
with which to access such meaning. In this theological hermeneutics must be
subordinated to general hermeneutical methods. (leanrond 1991:49) Thus we
find what Dilthey referred to as the "liberation of interpretation from dogma".
(Wamke 1987:5)
With Heidegger (1889-1976) we see the beginning of a departure from this
concern with methods for objectively accessing meaning. His great
contribution was to show us the necessarily historical nature of all knowledge
and the profound implications of the hermeneutical circle for all interpretive
work. It is, moreover, with Heidegger, that we see the return of ontology to
hermeneutics.
1 Werner Jeanrond points out that, as the human practice of
reflecting on adequate methods of interpreting linguistic, pictorial and other
forms of human expression, hermeneutics is found in all cultural contexts.
Nevertheless, in the west its history is particularly influenced by its Greek
origins, especially Homeric criticism. (1991:12f) For a discussion of Greek,
Jewish, early Christian and medieval hermeneutics, see his Theological
Hermeneutics. Development and Significance (1991), chapter two.
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While Heidegger was concerned with offering an ontological approach to the
meaning of human existence, he was insistent that we cannot understand
outside of the context that impacts us. We cannot speak of an autonomous
subject who can know objectively, for all knowledge is already conditioned.
Heidegger spoke of the fore-structure of understanding which conditions our
"being-in-the-world". (1962:78) Warnke comments:
All understanding is related to self-understanding and self-
understanding is thrown projection; this means that it begins and
ends outside the subject -- in a past it did not create and in a
future over which it has no control. (1987:40)
Thus intelligibility is always structured by the pre-judgements of the
understanding person and meaning cannot be discovered outside of the
human context. (Jeanrond 1991:61) In this context:
what is decisive is not to get out of the [hermeneutical] circle but
to come into it the right way. (Ricoeur 1981:58)
Central to this ''being-in-the-world'', particularly for the later Heidegger, is the
mediating role of language. Heidegger referred to language as the "house of
being" (Schneiders 1991b:34) and argued that
language is neither expression, nor an activity of the human
being. The language speaks. (quoted in [eanrond 1991:63)
Thus language precedes the speaking subject. The human being speaks insofar
as she or he corresponds to language and listening is the key to such
correspondence. Thoughtful listening to language is the key to re-establishing
contact with true or authentic being. (Jeanrond 1991:63)
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This ontological aspect of language precedes other aspects, including the
intentions of the speaking subject . Language itself has a hermeneutical function
. in which speaking is subjected to something other than the power of the person
speaking. Schillebeeckx has pointed out that language is fundamentally
communitarian -- it is the deposit of a common human experience. (1981:46)
Thus for Heidegger language becomes the medium of revelation; what is
manifested must necessarily pass through the filter of human language.
(Schillebeeckx 1974:38f)
What emerges from this shift, then, is the foregrounding of context, especially
that of language, as the necessarily medium through which we come to
knowledge. However, linked with this, we find a new concern with the
manifestation of being itself which takes precedence over the processes by
which any individual subject comes to know.
While Heidegger clearly privileges the role of ontology over epistemology,
questions relating to epistemology remain. How are we to evaluate the ways
by which we come to know? Ricoeur comments:
the question which remains unresolved in Heidegger's work is
this: how can aquestion ofcritique ingeneral be accountedfor within
the framework ofafundamental hermeneutics? (1981:59)
It is this central question of critique that Gadamer addresses.
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Gadamer:
the rehabilitation of prejudice, authority and tradition
Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900) is indebted to this understanding of
hermeneutics as both necessarily contextual and ontological. Like Heidegger
he rejects a purely methodological approach and is concerned instead with the
truth yielded by interpretation. What Dilthey had understood as a liberation
from dogma, Gadamer sees rather as a move from one sense of understanding,
centred on truth-content, to another sense of understanding, centred on an
understanding of the conditions of genesis. 0Narnke 1987:9) Thus his major
work, appropriately entitled Truth and Method, insists on the return of the
question of truth to a discipline dominated by methodology.
Like Heidegger, Gadamer insists on the importance of our own situatedness
within history and points to the implications that this has for the task of
interpretation. His concept of "effective history" shows that no interpretation is
possible outside a historical continuum which both the interpreter and the
object studied share. (Mueller-Vollmer 1985:256) Thus there can be no innocent
interpretation outside of history; the reader is inextricably immersed in
tradition and can never attain a superior vantage point from which to observe
self, text or historical process. (Schneiders 1989:6)
Gadamer argues that the enlightenment's insistence on the replacement of
prejudice by reason is both misplaced and illusory and is itself a form of
prejudice.
The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the
enlightenment, will prove to be itself a prejudice, the removal of
which opens the way to an appropriate understanding of our
finitude, which dominates not only our humanity, but also our
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historical consciousness. (1979:244)
Thus we cannot begin with the rational self. Neither rationality nor the
individual subject can stand alone; rather both are the products of, and are
deeply impacted by, a tradition that is prior to them.
In fact history does not belong to us, but we belong to it. Long
before we understand ourselves through the process of self-
examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in
the family, society and state in which we live.The focus of
subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the
individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical
life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than
his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.
(1979:245)
Gadamer's task, therefore, is the unveiling of this prejudice against prejudice
and also the rehabilitation of authority and tradition that is necessary for any
genuine understanding. Prejudice, in its strict sense, is absolutely necessary for
any understanding. We cannot speak of an absolute reason that is not
influenced by pre-judgements, for all human existence is limited and qualified
in various ways. Thus
Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms, ie it is not
its own master, but remains constantly dependent on the given
circumstances in which it operates. (1979:245)
Thus the enlightenment demand that we subject all authority to reason is
ultimately illusory. Contrary to the beliefs of the enlightenment Gadamer
argues that we need to be prepared to acknowledge that there are legitimate
prejudices. The epistemological question that we should be asking is:
where is the ground of the legitimacy of prejudices? What
distinguishes legitimate prejudices from all the countless ones
which it is the undeniable task of the critical reason to overcome?
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(1979:246)
This leads him to the role and status of authority and tradition and to his
assertion that authority and tradition may indeed be disclosive of truth.
For Gadamer authority is based not on persons but on truth. The
Enlightenment concept of authority, which saw it as diametrically opposed to
reason and freedom and hence as blind obedience, "is not the essence of
authority". (1979:248) Rather,
The authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection
and abdication of reason, but on recognition and knowledge --
knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in
judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes
precedence, ie it has priority over one's own.... authority has
nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge.
(1979:248)
Thus authority is not arbitrary but can be seen in principle to be true. Prejudice
appears to acquire an "objectivity'? that enables one to reclaim the role of
tradition.
That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an
authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is
marked by the fact that always the authority of what has been
transmitted -- and not only what is clearly grounded -- has power
over our attitudes and behaviour. (1979:249)
However, this does not involve submission to "traditionalism" as romanticism
assumed. Gadamer insists that "there is no such unconditional antithesis
2 Gadamer writes that "this makes them, in a sense, objective
prejudices, for they bring about the same bias in favour of something that can
come about through other means, eg through solid grounds offered by reason.
Thus the essence of authority belongs in the context of a theory of prejudices
free from the extremism of the enlightenment." (1979:249)
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between tradition and reason". (1979:250) Tradition itself is in constant process.
The fact is that tradition is constantly an element of freedom and
of history itself. Even the most genuine and solid tradition does
not persist by nature because of the inertia of what once existed. It
needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. (1979:250)
Tradition is therefore part of us and as such we need to allow ourselves to be
addressed by tradition if we are to come to understanding in the human
sciences. (1979:251) Instead of seeing tradition as the polarized antithesis of
historical research, we need to recognise the mutual interdependency of the
two. Indeed historical consciousness is not as radically new as it seems at first
but has always been part of our human relation to our past. (1979:251)
Thus, while we need to reclaim the past and allow ourselves to be addressed by
it, this does not mean the abdication of our own critical reason. For Gadamer, it
is the past itself that has the power to unmask our own prejudices and disclose
new truths. (West 1995:125) For
the horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and
which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion ... Our
own past, and that other past towards which our historical
consciousness is directed, help to shape the moving horizon out
of which human life always lives, and which determines it as
tradition. (1979:271)
What was crucial for Gadamer, therefore, was a dialogue between the horizon
of the past and the horizon of the present. This is a reciprocal process in which
the horizons of past and present are mutually interdependent and
understanding constitutes "a fusion of these horizons which we imagine to
exist by themselves". (1979:273)
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Thus we see that there can be no objective unconditioned knowledge outside of
our context. We are deeply impacted not only by language but also by history
which necessarily shapes the ways through which we come to know. We
cannot escape history. However, our historically conditioned reality
nevertheless bears within itself the possibility of self-criticism and liberation.
The challenge of ideology
It is at this point that we encounter the question of how hermeneutics can be
critical and liberatory. Gadamer believed that understanding will always be
successful as long as people are willing to submit themselves to the claims of a
text and to enter into the tradition which it represents. (Jeanrond 1991:67) As
we saw in chapter four this was questioned by Jiirgen Habermas who pointed
instead to the limits of our understanding and to the extent to which the
consensus achieved in understanding may be "systematically distorted".
(Warnke 1987:111)
By favouring a "hermeneutical consciousness" over a "critical consciousness"
Habermas believed that hermeneutics represented a "linguistic idealism" in
assuming that traditions are self-contained and not influenced by anything
outside of themselves. (Warnke 1987:112) Thus Gadamer's hermeneutics
overlooks the extent to which tradition may be "systematically distorted" by
the influence of ideology. (Warnke 1987:111) He argues:
Hermeneutical consciousness is incomplete so long as it has not
incorporated into itself reflection on the limit of hermeneutical
understanding ... Such hermeneutical consciousness proves
inadequate in the case of a systematically distorted
communication: here the unintelligibility results from a faulty
organization of speech itself ... The self-conception of
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hermeneutics can be shaken only if it becomes apparent that
systematically distorted patterns of communication also occurin
"normal" -- that is to say, in pathologically inconspicuous--
speech ... The limit experience of hermeneutics thus consists in
the discovery of systematically produced misunderstandings--
without at first being able to "comprehend" them. (Habermas
in Mueller-Vollmer 1985: 302f)
Gadamer is aware of some such critiques and makes allowances for
abandoning texts that we cannot learn from. However Habermas' point is not
simply that some texts are oppressive and don't disclose truth, but that even
texts that are disclosive of truth are nevertheless ideological. (Warnke 1987:113)
Therefore he advocates a comprehensive theory of communicative competence
which seeks to discover the conditions necessary for an unrestrained
communicative competence.
explanatory understanding, as a depth-hermeneutical
deciphering of specifically inaccessible expressions, presupposes
not only, as simple hermeneutical understanding does, the
trained application of naturally acquired communicative
competence, but a theory of communicative competence as well.
(Habermas in Mueller-Vollmer 1985:312)
Such a critique of ideology, in the words of Ricoeur, "thinks in terms of




a hermeneutic of the "power-to-be"
It is Paul Ricoeur (b. 1913) who has gone further than Gadamer in proposing a
hermeneutical theory that both responds to Habermas' challenge and yet
allows us to continue to be addressed by tradition. While it assumes much that
Gadamer argued about the importance of tradition, it goes beyond him in the
way in which it allows texts to be freed from their original contexts and take on
new meaning in new contexts.
Moreover, Ricoeur challenges Habermas' own indebtedness to tradition. For
ideology criticism, in taking an ethical option in favour of emancipation,
assumes an implicit interpretation of society. (Schillebeeckx 1974:124) Thus
Ricoeur argues that
Man can project his emancipation and anticipate an unlimited
and unconstrained communication only on the basis of the
creative reinterpretation of cultural heritage ... he who is unable
to reinterpret his past may also be incapable of projecting
concretely his interest in emancipation. (1981:97)
For, he asks, where does one speak from, if not from a point within tradition?
Critique is also a tradition. I would even say that it plunges us
into the most impressive tradition, that of liberating acts, of the
Exodus and Resurrection. Perhaps there would be no more
interest in emancipation, no more anticipation of freedom, if the
Exodus and Resurrection were effaced from the memory of
mankind ..: (1981:99f)
Thus Ricoeur insists that we cannot escape from tradition. The challenge,
however, is to allow it to address us in such a way that it overcomes the
ideological interests always implicit in it. This happens, he claims, through the
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distanciation that occurs in interpretation.
Unlike Gadamer, who held that the distanciation that occurs between the
original formation of a text and its contemporary reception was a scandal
which had to be overcome by a fusion of horizons, Ricoeur argues that such
distanciation is productive and is necessary for any liberatory interpretation.
Indeed it is a condition for any interpretation. For Ricoeur the various texts of
tradition assume a certain autonomy with respect to the intention of their
author, their original cultural situation and the social conditions that affected
their production, and their original addressees. (1981:91)
In this way texts become freed from their original context in such a way that
they can take on new meaning as they are interpreted in new contexts. It is in
this process of distanciation, which is the condition of understanding, and
appropriation, which is its dialectical counterpart, that we find the possibility
of a critique of ideologies. (1981:94) For, argues Ricoeur,
An essential characteristic of a literary work, and of a work of art
in general, is that it transcends its own psycho-sociological
conditions of production and thereby opens itself to an unlimited
series of readings, themselves situated in different socio-cultural
conditions. (1981:139)
Thus, for him,
A hermeneutics of the power-to-be thus turns itself towards a
critique of ideology, of which it constitutes the most fundamental
possibility. Distanciation, at the same time, emerges at the heart
of reference: poetic discourse distances itself from everyday
reality, aiming towards being as power-to-be. (1981:94)
For such a hermeneutic the real referent of the text is located in front of the text
in the world which the text opens up for people. Ricoeur says that "what is
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sought is no longer an intention hidden behind the text, but a world unfolded
in front of it". (1981 :93) It is this world that the text is finally about.
Thus for Ricoeur the properly hermeneutical moment arises when one turns
one's interrogation towards the sort of world opened up by the text. It is in
poetic discourse, in particular, that this subversive power is still alive. He
writes:
The strategy of this discourse involves holding two moments in
equilibrium: suspending the reference of ordinary language and
releasing a second order reference, which is another name for
what we have designated above as the world opened up by the
work. In the case of poetry, fiction is the path of redescription; or
to speak as Aristotle does in his poetics, the creation of a mythos, of
a "fable", is the path of mimesis, of creative imitation. (1981:93)
It is this world, also, that has to be appropriated by the reader. The text which
has been decontextualised in the process of distanciation becomes
recontextualised as it is appropriated by contemporary readers. This
appropriation does not involve the projection of oneself into the text but rather
the receiving of an enlarged self by apprehending the proposed worlds which
are the genuine object of interpretation. (1981:182) Appropriation gives the
reader a new capacity for knowing her or himself through the new modes of
being opened up by the text. (1981:192)
Such a hermeneutic provides us with a way of dealing with tradition that takes
tradition seriously but which is also committed to liberating us from that which
is oppressive within tradition. For Ricoeur, tradition and critique are not
mutually exclusive but exist in a certain dialectical relationship which becomes
the key to the inner life of hermeneutics. (1981:90) Such a position recognises
that the urge towards liberation comes from tradition itself. However it also
recognises that there is much within tradition that is oppressive and so its
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orientation is towards the future, a future which the texts of the past open up
for us and a future whose meaning we need to continue to draw out of those
texts.
In this the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur prepare the
way for a liberating theological hermeneutic such as that developed by Sandra
Schneiders.
Schneiders: the revelatory text
Schneiders is a New Testament scholar who is concerned with how sacred
scripture may function as revelatory for the believing Christian. As we saw at
the beginning of this chapter, the fundamental question that she seeks to
answer is how an intrinsically oppressive text can function normatively in and
for the believing community. (1991a:54)
While acknowledging that the text is a thoroughly human text, she argues that
it can still be the privileged mediator between God and humanity and therefore
the revelatory text. (1991b:178)
Schneiders asks what it means to affirm that scripture is the word of God. She
suggests that this phrase can best be understood as a root metaphor for our
understanding of divine revelation, as "the central and organizing image for
the richly complex reality of divine revelation". (1991b:32) It is important to
realise, however, that a metaphor is a linguistic expression which cannot be
reduced to its literal meaning.
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A metaphor is a predication which involves an unresolved
tension between an "is" and an "is not," an affirmation and a
negation, predicated of the same thing at the same time. At the
literal level what is affirmed must be denied, i.e. it "is not." But at
some other level, some deeper and more important level, the
affirmation is true. (1991a:44)
As a root metaphor, i.e. a metaphor whose tensiveness is ultimately
unresolvable because its tenor is so intrinsically irreducible to its vehicle, and
which draws nourishment from and organises a wide range of experience,
(1991a:45f) the phrase "word of God " is a linguistic phenomenon. Following
Heidegger, Schneiders shows that language is the necessary medium of our
encounter with the real. Moreover,
Human language is so intimately bound up with being that it can
even become transparent to divine being, becoming a medium of
encounter with God. (1991b:34f)
Thus we see that
language is the paradigmatic model for understanding divine
revelation. (1991b:35)
While divine revelation is actually coextensive with reality as it speaks of its
creator, Christian reflection has identified nature, history and humanity as the
three primary spheres of revelation. (1991a:49)3However,
For Christians the ultimate divine self-revelation is not the Bible
but Jesus, the word of God incarnate. (1991a:50)
This is equivalent to calling him the great symbol of God , the
locus of symbolic revelation. The root metaphor "word of God"
See, for example, WaIter Kaspar's Theology and Church (1989),
chapter one. See also Dei Verbum, 2 and 3.
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derives its perennial life and immense power from the fact that it
is the linguistic evocation of the reality of symbolic revelation.
(1991b:39)
What then is the role of scripture? Scripture is neither identical to revelation
nor even the paradigmatic instance of revelation. Neither does scripture
contain revelation the way a dictionary contains definitions. Instead scripture
bears witness to the special revelation that occurred in the history of Israel, in
the early church and especially in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of
Nazareth. (1991a:51)
Schneiders argues that it is more correct to say that the Bible is (potentially)
revelatory, than to say that it is revelation. It is a privileged witness to the
divine self-gift that has been taking place from the moment of creation. But,
it is symbolic witness, and that means that it becomes the actual
locus of divine-human encounter only in the act of interpretation.
This interpretation will always be an arduous task because
symbols are inherently and invincibly ambiguous, simultaneously
revealing and concealing. (1991b:39)
As a witness the biblical text bears testimony to an ultimately significant event.
However witness is always a language event and no matter how faithful it
never delivers the reality of the event as such.
Witness is always at least two removes from the reality in
question. The first remove is the interpreting experience of the
person who is the witness. The second remove is the recounting
of the interpreting experience in the giving of testimony.
(1991a:51)
Thus the biblical witness is always biased. As a human witness ~t is necessarily
linguistic and historical and cannot therefore be free from ideology. Therefore
the receiving of this witness must of necessity also be an essentially
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hermeneutical enterprise. It is in this reception and appropriation of the text
that the properly revelatory moment occurs.
Schneiders uses the hermeneutical theory of Ricoeur to show how the
transformative appropriation of the text by the reader allows the possibility
of the text's exploding the very world out of which it came and
whose prejudices and errors it ineluctably expresses. (1989:7)
According to this hermeneutical understanding, as opposed to a positivist
understanding, meaning is not to be found in the text as something separate
from the reader, but rather in the encounter between the reader and the text.
Thus the text mediates, rather than contains, meaning. (1991a:56)
.Following Ricoeur, Schneiders argues that by the process of inscription the text
has assumed a certain autonomy. It can no longer be limited to the intention of
its author, its address to its original audience, or the situation out of which it
emerged. This
potentially enriches a text by enabling it to transcend the
coordinates of its production and function in very different later
situations. (1991b:144)
The text now refers not merely to the world of the author but to those who
receive it and it has the capacity to create a world which it projects "in front of .
itself'. It clears a space and creates a world into which the reader is invited. .
(1991b:167) According to Schneiders, the world that the New Testament
projects is the world of Christian discipleship.
the real referent of the New Testament text, what the text is
primarily "about," is not the world of first century Christians
which we are expected to reconstitute in the twentieth century
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but the experience of discipleship that is proposed to us and to
each successive generation of readers as it was proposed by Jesus
to the first generation. (1991a:62)
In this context it is the Christian community that becomes the active subject,
rather than the passive object, of revelation. (1991a:70) The biblical text is not
something that is accepted uncritically; one's engagement with the truth claims
of the text remains a critical one, ever suspicious of the distorting influence of
ideology. However, through a~ ongoing dialogue with the text about its subject
matter the text can come to transcend its own conditions of production and
mean something other than what it originally intended." Thus Schneiders
argues that
the theological and moral limitations of the text are no more
ultimately destructive of its revelatory potential than its scientific,
psychological, ethical, historical, or other limitations. (1991b:177)
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the development of current hermeneutical theory and
probed its usefulness for a transformative theology of tradition. We saw how
all understanding and interpretation is necessarily impacted by its linguistic
and historic context. Thus we cannot escape the influence of tradition which, it
has been argued, is itself disclosive of truth.
4 We should note, however, that for both Schneiders and Ricoeur,
while the text can take on endless different meanings, it cannot take on just any
meaning. Schneiders compares the text to a musical score or the script of a
play. (1991b:149f) While such a score or script is open to endless different
performances, it necessarily also limits them.
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However, the hermeneutical path outlined in this chapter has also presented
the possibility of a transformative appropriation of tradition. Acknowledging
the ideological distortions within the texts of tradition, it has developed an
interpretive strategy that both respects the integrity of the texts themselves
and the integrity of contemporary values and suspicions. As a hermeneutical
path it involves the positive, although not positivistic, appropriation of text or
tradition that creates a world which it invites us to enter.
In doing this, however, this path is aware that it always stands against what
Schneiders calls "the background of the vast unsaid". (1991b:138) It is this "vast
unsaid" that will be the focus of the following chapter.
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Chapter Seven
The other side of silence:
Transgressing the boundaries of language
The technology of silence
The rituals, etiquette
The blurring of terms
silence not absence
of words or music or even
raw sounds
Silence can be a plan
rigorously executed
the blueprint to a life
It is a presence
it has a history a form
Do not confuse it
with any kind of absence
Adrienne Rich (1978:17)
If the path outlined in the previous chapter can be relatively easily identified as
hermeneutical, the present path, perhaps by its very nature, is less easy to
define. Who, after all, can speak the unspeakable?
My point of departure in this chapter is based on Schneiders'
acknowledgement that the transformative interpretation of the previous
chapter always stands against lithebackground of the vast unsaid". (1991b:138)
Moreover, as we saw in chapter four, there are contemporary responses to
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issues of oppression and liberation that insist that we pay attention to the
irreducible alterity of the Other. They argue that our dominant western
discourses, be they metaphysical or hermeneutical, in covering over this
otherness of the Other have continued to marginalise and exclude the Other. I
have suggested, following Bernstein, that such a response represents one part
of a tensed relationship that we must necessarily hold together. Moreover I
suggest that such discourses should be seen as an apophatic moment and that
the dynamics that they represent are thus a necessary part of the theological
task.
In this chapter I seek out a mediating path that can respond to the challenge of
alterity and allow us some access to that which has been excluded. In
particular I focus on the work of [ulia Kristeva, especially her work on the
processes of transgression by which that which is excluded is able to find
voice. I then consider how Mary Grey's work on revelation presents an
alternative paradigm which privileges the voices of the excluded.
A return to epistemology:
Kristeva and the possibility of transgression
If hermeneutics represents a transcendence of scholastic concerns with
epistemology and a way of getting beyond the Kantian impasse} then
poststructuralism in general, and French feminism in particular, represent a
return to questions of epistemology, albeit this time a contested epistemology.
For the point that they make is that knowledge and power are inseparably
1 Kant's strictures against applying knowledge of the observable
world to the noumenal world had effectively undermined the possibility of
any metaphysical foundations for religious beliefs.
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linked and that the ways through which we come to know are themselves
deeply impacted by the power relations in society. Thus Michel Foucault
speaks of "a return of knowledge" and of the possibility of the "insurrection of
subjugated knowledges" (1980:81) and Kristeva opens up the possibility of
transgression, whereby our boundaries of knowledge become more fluid and
allow access to a prior knowledge.
In chapter four I outlined Kristeva's views on the relationship between the
semiotic realm of the chora, and the symbolic realm which has attained
dominance at the expense of the semiotic. This process of signification is
necessary for language to function but is both dependent on and reproduces a
certain set of social relations, in particular those of a patriarchal society.
Between these two realms stands the thetic threshold which already begins to
order semiotic drives towards the symbolic, opening a gap between lived
experience and representation. (Grosz 1989:46) The thetic thus "marks a
threshold between two heterogenous realms: the semiotic and the symbolic".
(1984:48)
For Kristeva this semiotic chora represents the excluded domain of the (m)other
which the process of signification has suppressed. It is a "nonexpressive
totality" (1984:25) that
precedes evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality, and temporality.
Our discourse - all discourse -- moves with and against the chora
in the sense that it simultaneously depends upon and refuses it.
(1984:26)
She continues,
Indifferent to language, enigmatic and feminine, this space
underlying the written is rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its
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intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anterior to judgment,
but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax. (1984:29)
While the processes of signification have enabled the victory of the symbolic
and the banishment of the (m)other, namely the semiotic chora, this banishment
is never complete nor stable. Though the thetic is necessary for signification,
the thetic is not exclusive: the semiotic which also precedes it,
constantly tears it open, and this transgression brings about all
the various transformations of the signifying practice that are
called "creation." Whether in the realm of metalanguage
(mathematics, for example) or literature, what remodels the
symbolic order is always the influx of the semiotic. This is
particularly evident in poetic language since, for there to be a
transgression of the symbolic, there must be an irruption of the
drives in the universal signifying order, that of "natural" language
which binds together the social unit. (1984:62)
Thus once signification has occurred the semiotic chora, which was once the
precondition of the symbolic, can only be seen as a negativity introduced into
thesymbolic order and through the transgression of the symbolic order.
(1984:68f)
It is the subversive possibility of such transgression that Kristeva is concerned
with. She refers to a radical trinity of subversion, namely, madness, holiness
and poetry in which the semiotic explodes in an excessive, uncontrolled
jouissance? (Grosz 1989:52) It is, however, in the poetic realm -- and particularly
the poetry of the avant-garde -- that Kristeva appears to see the greatest
possibility of transgression. By transgressing grammatical rules poetic
language -- and especially modem poetic language -- serves to subvert the
2 A deliberately ambiguous term used by French feminists to
denote pleasure understood in orgasmic terms, and a more generally corporeal,
non-genital pleasure. (Grosz 1989:xix)
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positing of the symbolic as possessor of meaning. (1984:57) While not calling
into question the thetic itself,
Mimesis and the poetic language inseparable from it tend, rather,
to prevent the thetic from becoming theological; in other words,
they prevent the imposition of the thetic from hiding the semiotic
process that produces it, and they bar it from inducing the
subject, reified as a transcendental ego, to function solely within
the systems of science and monotheistic religion. (1984:59)
The role of religion
It is at this point that we see the role of religion which, for Kristeva, serves to
contain the rupture of the thetic by the semiotic. By representing the
unspeakable which continues to try and overflow its boundaries, religion
neutralises the subversive demands of the chora by recoding and resymbolising.
Religion thus
arrogates to itself the privilege of representing (i.e. unifying into
the socio-symbolic ensemble the hitherto heterogeneous) and of
speaking the infinite element which the ensemble oppresses and
yet demands to be spoken. Religion here is that discourse
(whether transcendental or not) which knows, as far as is
possible, what is at stake in the relation between socio-symbolic
homogeneity and the heterogeneity of the drives at work within
and it restores their other to them, thus religious discourse
appears not only as the speculative (specular) form of what is
unrepresentable in orgasmic (genital) pleasure and of what is
uncapitalisable in expenditure (of productive power): it is also the
privileged place of speculation and the place from which it
represents its own signifying practice to itself -- theory of
language and of the function of language as communication or
expenditure. (quoted in Grosz 1989:53)
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Religion, for Kristeva, is based on and covers over a sacrifice.' It is
theologisation of the thetic which posits a boundary to the infinite and hence
also to violence. (1984:78f) Religion, for Kristeva, is thus necessary to the
maintenance of the social order.
While we can speak of religion as the symbolization of the semiotic, art,
Kristeva claims, involves the semiotization of the symbolic and thus represents
the flow of jouissance into language. While religion is based on and covers over
murder, it is art, including poetry, that "is not a form of murder": (1984:72)
Whereas sacrifice assigns jouissance its productive limit in the
social and symbolic order, art specifies the means -- the only
means -- that jouissance harbors for infiltrating that order. In
cracking the socio-symbolic order, splitting it open, changing
vocabulary, syntax, the word itself, and releasing from beneath
them the drives borne by vocalic or kinetic differences, jouissance
works its way into the social and symbolic. In contrast to sacrifice,
poetry shows us that language lends itself to the penetration of
the socio-symbolic by jouissance, and that the thetic does not
necessarily imply theological sacrifice. (1984:80)
Kristeva sees sacrifice (which is identified with religion) and art as representing
polar aspects of the thetic function. To put it bluntly: the one regulates and
prohibits while the other challenges and enables breakthrough. Thus poetic
3 Following Freud, Kristeva argues that the regulation of the
semiotic through the symbolic, which is made possible by the thetic break, is
represented in society's signification processes -- hence the ritual role of murder
in archaic societies. Freud held that society is founded on a complicity in a
common crime and Kristeva argues that language serves to divert and confine
this death drive.
The social order, for its part, reveals the confinement of the death
drive, whose endless course conditions and moves through every
stasis and thus every structure, in an act of murder. Religions as
we know, have set themselves up as specialists on the discourse
concerning this radical, unique, thetic event. (1984:70)
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language
reminds us of its eternal function: to introduce through the
symbolic that which works on, moves through and threatens it.
The theory of the unconscious seeks the very thing that poetic
language practices within and against the social order: the
ultimate means of its transformation or subversion, the
precondition for its survival and revolution. (1984:81)
Kristeva's works clearly see religion and theology as identified with the
symbolic, and hence patriarchal, processes that serve to contain and suppress
the semiotic. The question therefore arises as to the legitimacy of using her
work in a theological task. While Kristeva recognises the importance of
religious questions for feminism, her references to religion, and particularly to
Christianity, are almost always critical, seeing it as necessarily patriarchal.
However Kristeva also notes that there is a semiotic residue that, while not
represented in Christianity, necessarily accompanies it. Grosz writes:
Her point is that there is an unrepresented residue in maternity
which has not been adequately taken up in religious discourse, a
residue that refuses to conform, as Christianity requires, to
masculine, oedipal, phallic order. This residue of maternity is
occasionally touched upon by discourses of the sacred ... (1989:84)
It should be possible to argue, moreover, that religious and poetic language are
not necessarily always polar opposites. The liturgical and spiritual traditions
pass on their message through both poetic and ritual language that, I would
suggest, come close to breaching the thetic threshold. Kristeva is aware of this
and writes:
As the place of production for a subject who transgresses the
thetic by using it as a necessary boundary -- but not as an absolute
or as an origin -- poetic language and the mimesis from which it is
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inseparable, are profoundly a-theological. They are not critics of
theology but rather the enemy within and without, recognizing
both its necessity and its pretensions. In other words, poetic
language and mimesis may appear as an argument complicitous
with dogma -- we are familiar with religion's use of them -- but
they may also set in motion what dogma represses. In so doing,
they no longer act as instinctual floodgates within the enclosure
of the sacred and become instead protestors against its posturing.
(1984:61)
Thus, while there are subversive elements within religious discourse, Kristeva
sees these as "the enemy within" which are hostile to the theologisation of the
semiotic and help to subvert it. She continues, however, to view religion and
Christianity in a fundamentally negative light.
While a work such as this thesis necessarily views Christianity from a different
perspective to that of Kristeva, her work is still of value in helping us to probe
that which is excluded from our theological discourse. Whether one views
poetic language as "the enemy within" or as an integral dimension of Christian
theology, it remains a place of possible transgression and can therefore help us
to probe that which is excluded.
Possibilities of eruption
The eruption of the semiotic within the symbolic that Kristeva suggests is
possible is only relative, however. Though the thetic is permeable, it "continues
to ensure the position of the subject in process/on trial". (1984:63) Thus
musicality is not without signification; indeed it is deployed
within it. Logical syntheses and all ideologies are present, but
they are pulverized within their own logic before being displaced
towards something that is no longer within the realm of the idea,
sign, syntax, and thus Logos, but is instead simply semiotic
functioning. (1984:63)
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Thus we cannot seek "pure" semiotic knowledge, but must rather seek its
rupturing effects within the realm of the symbolic. Kristeva therefore seeks
modes of reading that can enable such transgression to become evident. (Grosz
1989:62)
There are, moreover, limited circumstances in which transgression becomes
possible. In particular Kristeva sees the work of avant-garde literary texts" as
"the laboratory of a new discourse". (1980:92) This avant-garde needs to
maintain a fine balance between coherence (with obedience to the symbolic)
and transgression (enabling the overflow of the semiotic) in order to avoid the
twin dangers of fetishism and psychosis." (Grosz 1989:58)
Despite the possibilities of such transgression, Kristeva maintains that the
possibilities of such eruption remain relative. (1984:63) Grosz has pointed out
that while avant-garde practices can lead to transgression of the symbolic and
point to the limits of signification, they do not obliterate them. Kristeva's view
of subversion is ultimately reformist as language and the symbolic can only
accommodate so much change at any given time. (1989:60) Thus, in Grosz's
words,
The avant-garde can only speak through/as the symbolic, just as
the unconscious can only speak through the discourses of
consciousness. In this sense, there can be no "pure" avant-garde,
4 The works to which Kristeva refers most frequently include
Mallarme, Artaud, Lautreamont and [oyce.
5 Kristeva sees fetishism and psychosis as dangers associated with
avant-garde practices. Fetishism affirms the thetic but instead of investing it in
signifying practice instead.turns it back towards the maternal chora thus
disavowing the maternal castration necessary for signification. By contrast
psychosis forecloses such castration, and therefore also the possibility of
representation. (Grosz 1989:57f)
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only a process already mediated by the symbolic, which, at the
same time, problematises it. (1989:60)
Semanalysis
In this context Kristeva argues for a semiotics which
can establish the heterogeneous logic of signifying practices, and
locate them, finally and by way of their subject, in the historically
determined relations of production. Semiotics can lead to a
historical typology of signifying practices by the mere fact of
recognizing the specific status within them of the speaking
subject. In this way we arrive at the possibility of a new
perspective on history ... (1986:32)
Such a semanalysis seeks out the ways in which discourses are put into
question, analysing the confrontation between the unity required by the
symbolic and the heterogeneity of the semiotic drives. (Grosz 1989:60)
Thus semanalysis seeks out
the various deviations from the grammatical rules of the
language: articulatory effects which shift the phonemative system
back towards its articulatory, phonetic base and consequently
towards the drive-governed bases of sound-production; the over-
determination of a lexeme by multiple meanings which it does
not carry in ordinary usage but which accrue to it as a result of its
occurrence in other texts; syntactic irregularities such as ellipses,
non-recoverable deletions, indefinite embeddings, etc, ... (1986:28)
Semanalysis thus seeks out the negativity beneath rationality and language and
seeks to rehabilitate what is heterogeneous to the system of meaning. (1986:31)
Moreover, it seeks what calls into question the transcendental subject.
the subject of the semiotic metalanguage must, however briefly,
call himself in question, must emerge from the protective shell of
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a transcendental ego within a logical system, and so restore his
connection with that negativity -- drive-governed, but also social,
political and historical -- which rends and renews the social code.
(1986:33)
For Kristeva, then, the task is one of seeking out the unspoken which becomes
evident through the gaps, contradictions and hyperbole in the dominant
discourse. We need to seek
By listening; by recognizing the unspoken in all discourse,
however Revolutionary, by emphasizing at each point whatever
remains unsatisfied, repressed, new, eccentric, incomprehensible,
that which disturbs the mutual understanding of the established
powers. (1986:156)
The implications for theology: Mary Grey
While Kristeva's work is not specifically concerned with theology -- indeed, in a
certain sense as we have seen it is antithetical to theology -- it nevertheless has
serious implications for the theological task. By probing the ability of the
semiotic to impact our discourse she points to an interlocutor -- or interlocutory
place -- that it is important for theology to address.
It is Mary Grey who probes the implications of this in her work on revelation."
She points out that the way to come to new understandings that take us
beyond the traditional formulations about revelation is to search for better
understandings of the questions. The fundamental question that she brings to
revelation is:
6 Grey's key work in this area is The Wisdom ofFools? Seeking
Revelation for Today (1993) although her earlier work Redeeming the Dream:
Feminism Redemption andChristian Tradition (1989) works within a similar
framework.
128
How can revelation be understood in such a way as to bring
God's justice to the victims of global oppression? (1993:3)
Like Schneiders, Grey is deeply conscious that the texts of revelation as we
receive them are those of the historical winners and argues that:
the controversy over the "eternal truths of revelation" is
deadlocked, first because the underlying relation between truth
and power structures is disguised; second, because theological
doctrines are enunciated within a framework giving support to
disengaged individualism and, third, that they are underpinned
by a narrow, confrontational logic. (1993:92)
In order to understand revelation as "divine communication for our times",
Grey argues that we need to bring to light the "filter" through which we
understand our culture, identity and relation to the world of the sacred.
(1993:1) To this end she contrasts two mythical figures, and the conceptual
realities that they represent, namely logos and sophia.
The "logos" myth is that of the dominant western world view of nationalistic
individualism and materialistic success." Logos is an expression of western
rationality and has philosophical, theological and economic dimensions which
imposes a tight control on truth and truths. Thus our logocentric culture has
influenced the processes by which we come to know. Grey tells us, quoting
Fiumara, that
7 The noun "logos" derives from the Greek legein and referred, for
the Greek philosophers, to a statement, discussion or argument that provides a
rational account of the world, as opposed to opinion or story-telling. Heraclitus
saw the logos as that law which governs the changes of the world. In later
Judaism, as God came to be seen as remote and transcendent, God was seen as
communicating with the world through agencies such as God's word and
wisdom, that came to be separately personified. Philo of Alexandria, for
example, saw the logos as the intelligible element in God's mysterious being
and hence the means of God's self-disclosure to the world. John's gospel picks
up this language and speaks of Christ as the logos. (Stead 1983:339f)
129
Logos has become for us a means of "epistemic control", or
epistemic prejudice, which "prevents us from seeing any different
logical tradition because it is believed that it cannot be 'logical'."
Another tradition may be "primitive", "intuitive", animistic, but
not logical. (1993:90)
Grey argues that "the dominant understanding of Christian revelation is too
controlled by the logos myth" (1993:2) and that this has had disastrous
consequences for our planet. She points to and problematises a confrontational
logic that is both dualist and sexist.
From Plato to Peter Abelard, from Abelard to Locke, right
through to the clear-cut demands of the verificationists, western
logic has developed as adversarial, patriarchal and hierarchical.
Being learned, being a scholar, has been bound up with being
able to destroy the position of another. In ecclesiastical terms this
has meant an over use of Abelard's tool of Sic etNon ("Yes and
No"). (1993:88)
However, the world of logos is increasingly being called into question today.
The clear certainties that built the culture of modernity are no more. Rather the
foundations of philosophy, psychology, science and language are being
brought into question by the "quagmire of post-modernism". The "Europe of
Christendom" exists no longer and we now acknowledge a pluralistic world
with a matrix of overlapping cultures and discourses. The previously
dominant culture is not only disintegrating but also becoming aware of its
complicity in a system of imperial exploitation. (1993:10)
Moreover, our world with its clear divides between heaven and earth, divine
and human, body and soul, has given way to a more integrated understanding
of holiness. Instead of seeing salvation as a reward to earthly behaviour, we




In addition, our understanding of human subjectivity is being called into
question by the realisation that women have never been considered subjects of
history but always "other" to the masculine norm. (1993:10f) At the same time
as modernity itself is crumbling, there is a realisation that women were never
really part of the project of modernity. (1995:349) .
The problem we must face before we can speak of revelation, is the problem of
epistemology. Grey points to .
the dominant pattern of western logic as dualist, sexist and
intrinsically linked to the power discourse of the particular
political regime. (1993:88)
She shows that our philosophical, theological and ethical discourses, as well as
our political and economic systems, are built around a "structured
separateness" which (following Kristeva) has involved a "sacrificed
subjectivity" in which women become anonymous in order to pass on the social
norm. (1993:39) Thus the establishment of monotheism in the Old Testament is
linked not only with the suppression of -- and separation from -- paganism but
also the female and maternal images of agrarian civilisations. (1993:40) Grey
writes, following Kristeva,
It was necessary to maintain the separation of the sexes because,
in the realm of the symbolic, for society to guarantee order,law,
unity, uniquely symbolized by the transcendent God the Father,
the One, this entailed the exclusion of the "polymorphic,
orgasmic body, desiring and laughing of the other sex". (1993:40)
The second mythical figure which Grey uses, namely Sophia, is more difficult
to define as it is almost submerged under the dominant culture." She writes:
Recent feminist theological work has been concerned with the
retrieval of theologies of Sophia or Wisdom, seeing her as a feminine counter-
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It is more a question of intuiting another story beneath the
dominant culture, a story which has been pushed to the margins
of consciousness and public responsibility. It is the myth of
connectedness, which conveys a sense of rootedness in the earth,
with its changing seasons and rhytluns, and a sense of
interdependence, which sees human beings as vulnerable parts of
a wider, interlocking whole, not as "masters of the universe". This
story has philosophical, theological, political and ethical
implications ... (1993:6)
In contrast to traditional metaphysical systems based on separation, Grey
argues for a metaphysic of connection as the dominant metaphor for the way in
which we receive the world. Such a restructuring of our root metaphors gives
us new eyes for reading our sacred texts.
Thus the revelation of God, I am arguing, is communicated
through these epiphanies of connection -- which have ethical,
epistemological and doctrinal dimensions. (1995:357)
Grey therefore argues that, while we need to build relationships around the
notion of mutuality, this cannot happen without a recognition of the
epistemological and theological issues at stake. We need to restructure our
discourse on the basis of connection and discover lithe connected self" in a
connected world. (1993:67)
part to the masculine logos, especially as it is used to speak of Christ. In the
wisdom literature of the Old Testament, the feminine divine Wisdom is
presented (hokmah in Hebrew and Sophia in Greek). She is feminine not only
grammatically but also in the way she is depicted, for example, as Lady
Wisdom. (Swidler 1979:36ff) One loves Wisdom and seeks her as a woman
(Eccles. 14:22f); she is spouse and mother (14:26f; 15:2f). Thus Wisdom appears
as a female personification of God, as God's daughter and as the second person
in God's creative work. (Moltmann 1986:242) Behind this concept of Wisdom
may well have been Ancient Near Eastern Goddesses of Wisdom such as Isis
(Egyptian) and Ishtar (Babylonian). Biblically, however, she is pictured as an
agent of God in creation, continually ordering the world and bringing people
back to God. (Edwards 1981:27f) Ruether, furthermore, sees her as an
expression of God's immanence in creation. (1983:58) For cl discussion of
Sophia as a feminine personification of God, see [ohnson (1992:86ff).
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Such a metaphysic of connection recognises the limitations of anyone
perspective. It is attentive, moreover, to the voices from the margins that have
not been heard. Grey writes:
Thus the key question now is, whether we are prepared to give
attention to the silences, gaps, discontinuities in the proclamation
of the Word. Are we prepared to ask awkward questions about
whose voice is excluded from official discourse? We would hope
then for a Church able to respond in terms of a listening
metanoia, a developing consciousness of the link between word
and power. (1993:27f)
Such a "metaphysic of connection" requires a: "listening logic" which seeks to
rediscover listening as a fundamental part of logos. (1993:89) It is conscious of
the difficulties of getting in touch with "authentic experience" which is only
accessible through the dominant interpreting discourses. However, quoting
Kristeva, she argues that truth is to be found by listening to the unspoken,
unsatisfied, repressed, new, eccentric and incomprehensible. (1993:43f)
This is essential for any feminist praxis that views discourse as a "hearing into
speech". Indeed such discourse is necessary for the rediscovery of subjecthood.
Whereas listening has been accepted as a tool of liberation
theology, as a means of giving marginalized groups access to
discourse, Plato [in his reference to bringing ideas to birth as
midwifery] shows us that listening, intuiting another logic, is
actually the very heart of the whole process of reasoning. Where
a listening culture is absent, what other alternative is there but to
fall into the adversariallogic of Yes or No? When such a logic is
controlled by those who hold the reigns of power, small wonder
that the logic of domination seems inevitable and decreed by the
"nature of things" . (1993:91)
Grey argues that in the context of the truths of faith and revelation, a listening
logic highlights the very fragility of our doctrines. It also acknowledges the
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wounded condition from which we start and, in the words of Adrienne Rich,
the world as it is
not as her users boast
damaged beyond reclamation by their using. (1995:356)
Such a starting point allows other ways of knowing their full space. Here Grey
argues that we need to allow the shock of what Chung Hyun Kyung calls the
"epistemology of the broken body" - the acknowledgement of suffering as an
epistemological starting point -- to reach our consciousness. (1993:91)9 Kyung
writes:
Pain and suffering are the epistemological starting point for
Asian women in their search for the meaning of full humanity.
The Asian woman knows the depth of humanity and the aching
hearts of other women because she has suffered and lived in
pain. (1990:39)
This is in striking contrast to the epistemology that emerges from privileged
situations. Grey comments
it should spark off in western theology not only a "metanoia'' of
listening, but a praxis of turning away from the past and a
transformation of the future. Above all, this epistemological
instability reveals to us the sheer vulnerability of God to our
conceptual inadequacies. (1993:92)
This listening for the "other" enables "another mysticism" which is necessarily
political. In the context in which the power of old images and concepts have
been shaken off, an empty space has been created for the birthing of new
images.
9 For a similar perspective see Albert Nolan's God in South Africa
(1988), chapter three; and Dorothee Soelle's Suffering (1975).
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Mysticism is at home in the Dark Night, in the empty spaces, in
the chasms and fissures which the Spirit has cracked open for us.
(1993:136)
Yet, while the feminist mystic yearns for wholeness, she "refuses to wallpaper
the cracks, to fill them with pseudo-meanings", (1993:136) We need to listen to
the message of the mystic to let go...
Be not afraid of vulnerability, of powerlessness, of the body's
mortality, of impotence in the face of the raging storm. Stay with
the emptiness. Look at the faces of the suffering. And what will
emerge? Like the child who puts a sea shell to her ear and hears
the roar of the ocean, you will become attentive to the silent
music. Sophia, God as wisdom, will reveal the hidden
connections to your own Christian story. (1993:136)
It is, I suggest, at this point that Grey's theology converges with Kristeva's
work. By listening to that which is unsaid,and by paying attention to the
silences, gaps and discontinuities in our discourse, we approach a situation in
which transgression and eruption may occur.
Conclusion
By probing the absent presence of the m/o/Other in discourse, the path
presented in this chapter has highlighted both the fragility of all discourse and
the rupture and exclusion on which it is based. Such a rupture stands at the
beginning of all discourse. When we ignore it and cover over the cracks that
begin to appear in.our knowledge, we further perpetuate the process of
excluding the o/Other that disturbs our knowledge. This chapter has argued
that we need to pay attention to this o /Dthemess and see it as a key
interlocutor/ interlocutory place in the theological task.
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There is no unmediated access to such knowledge, however. The unsaid can
.only be glimpsed through the said, although we need to broaden our
understanding of what constitutes discourse. We cannot banish either our
traditions or our discourse. But we need to hold it in a tensed relationship with
an awareness of and a commitment to seeking out that which is absent yet






Introduction to Part III
Having probed the possibility of a dual mediation that involves a tensed
relationship between transformative interpretation and the seeking out of the
alterity that accompanies discourse, we move, in this section, to the strictly
theological task of identifying how this may be expressed in a theological
understanding of tradition and the ecclesiology that follows from it.
In the discussion of tradition that emerges in chapter eight we see that it is
possible to identify tradition as both the whole totality of the church's life and
as the absolutely Other that this witnesses to but cannot capture. While '
tradition, as the whole of the church's life, is expressed in discourse and is
therefore implicated in power relations, the Tradition, as ultimately Other, is
unable to be captured by any discourse.
However, this Other is nevertheless witnessed to in the church. And, as the
discussion in chapter nine reveals, the means by which the church witnesses to
the Tradition are necessarily historical and therefore limited, partial and
incomplete. Such witnessing happens from within the wounded nature of all
speech.
Thus the wounded nature of the church and of its witness to the Tradition
becomes of key importance -- for it both enables witnessing and impairs it.
This speech cannot happen without wounding and yet speech that happens in
and through the wounded bearer of revelation that is the church is necessarily
also limited and partial.
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Theological adequacy and integrity, I conclude by arguing, must continue to
hold together the tensiveness that has run throughout this thesis. The witness
of the church is both immensely privileged and profoundly wounded. And it
is only by faithfully listening to it -- aware of both of these limitations, that a
viable and life-giving theology will be able to emerge.
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Chapter Eight
Tradition and the Other:
Locating tradition in the life of the church
Tradition is not a book which records a certain moment in the
development of the Church and stops itself, but a book always
being written by the Church's life. Tradition continues always
and now not less than before; we live in tradition and create it.
And nevertheless the sacred tradition of the past exists for us as
present; it lives in our own life and consciousness.
Sergius Bulgakov (1988:27)
He who has made the words of Jesus really his own is able also to
hear His silence.
Ignatius of Antioch
(To the Ephesians, 14,2)
Tradition is an ambiguous and often confusing theological term, being used to
refer to several different although related realities. In Christian theology it is
closely linked to speech about revelation, and, as such, has been problematised
in this thesis. The term has nevertheless so far been used in a general sense and
one of the tasks of this chapter must be to clarify the different senses in which
we speak of tradition in order to develop a viable theology of tradition.1
In this chapter I propose to begin with an account of tradition as a human
phenomenon which is contrasted to a specifically theological understanding of
1 Congar notes that "Even in its restricted dogmatic sense,
'tradition' designates a reality which is too large, a concept too dense, to be
formulable in a concise definition." (1966:234)
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tradition. This highlights the problematic of tradition that this thesis is focusing
on. I then move into an historical overview of the church's understanding of
tradition. This is followed by highlighting the thought of Congar and Lossky
which leads to my juxtaposition of tradition with alterity arguing that the
othemess of tradition is fundamental to our understanding of it.
Tradition as a human phenomenon
As should be apparentfrom the discussion of Gadamer's work in chapter six,
tradition is a broadly human phenomenon that is necessary for both life and
understanding. Coming from the Latin traditio, and corresponding to the Greek
paradosis, tradition means "transmission" and is usually understood as opinion,
belief or custom that is handed down through history, and which is assumed
to be both reliable and normative.
Tradition, moreover, is necessary for religion. Valliere claims that "A sense of
tradition as normative is a basic element in all religious systems, whether or
not formal concepts of tradition exist." (1987:2) Religion, as a social
phenomenon, owes its continuation to being handed over from one generation
to the next. (Geiselmann 1966:81) However, Geiselmann argues that the
continuation of religion through tradition cannot only be explained by its
social character of meeting and assembly, but must also be seen in terms of its
ability to provide access to the "holy". (1966:83) It is its ability to bring about a
"new mode of being" (1966:88) that really gives power to a tradition.
Geiselmann argues that religious tradition is mediated through ritual, myth,
fixed formulas and an authority that ensures that these elements become fixed
in language. (1966:84ff) The purpose of such mediations, however, is to ensure
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the living link between the generations establishing a community
between them and it brings powerfully effective religious rites
into line with those that have preceded them. (1966:93)
Thus tradition is not simply about the preservation of rites or myths but
necessarily involves rendering present today the original event that gave rise
to the rites or myths.
The significance of religious tradition in general is seen from this
evocation of living tradition in the ritual of every religion.
(1966:93)
Religious tradition is therefore determined by two opposites according to
Geiselmann. These are continuity and actuality. It is continuity that determines
religious tradition and ensures perpetuity. (1966:93ff) However, if this were the
only point of view "an impoverishment of tradition would ensue" and one
would have only a "superficial view". (1966:95)
For tradition is not only the transmission of a legacy of
knowledge; it gives access to a new mode of being. (1966:95)
Thus the transmission of tradition involves actualization as much as it involves
continuity and it lives in the tension created by these two poles. Tradition,
according to Geiselmann,
has not merely a function of preserving but also an active
purpose. For tradition, in the form of rites, which place the
initiate in direct contact with the original event, becomes for him
the principle both of transformation and of rebirth. Thus tradition
in its receptive aspect can be a stabilizing and conservative force
and in its active aspect a factor of progress by impelling and
summoning the homo religiosus to positive undertakings. That is
the reason for the ambivalence of tradition which exactly reflects
that of religion ... (1966:97f)
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While this is true of religious tradition as a human phenomenon, and while the
Christian tradition of revelation has much in common with.it, Geiselmann
argues that with Christian revelation we are speaking about something
completely new. While revelation is also a historical tradition,
It alone is based on genuine human freedom, because that
freedom, as bearer of tradition, is supported by the operation of
the Holy Spirit and a teaching ministry endowed with the gift of
infallibility. Alone among traditions, therefore, it is not a
revolution that has reached an equilibrium; it puts an end to all
revolutions. With it, revolution is replaced by development from
the absolutely new historical beginning posited by Jesus Christ.
Of Jesus Christ it is really true to say what a pope once said of
himself I am tradition."(1966:112)
. Tradition in theological terms
Here we come to the crux of the matter: tradition, in Christian theology, is seen
as more than simply a human phenomena but is intimately linked with ideas
about revealed truth that is ultimately infallible. The Council of Trent spoke of
the traditions concerning both faith and conduct, as either
directly spoken by Christ or dictated by the Holy Spirit, which
have been preserved in unbroken sequence in the catholic church.
(Session 4, first decree)
In similar fashion we saw in chapter one the extraordinary assertion of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith that we cannot discuss the topic of
the ordination of women because to do so would be to contradict divine
revelation.
2 These words are alleged to have been spoken by Pius IX on 19
June 1870. (Geiselmann 1966:16)
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In feminist perspective this is obviously problematic. Like other forms of
theologising that take a commitment to those on the margins of church and
society seriously, feminist theologies have pointed out that tradition has
emerged out of a patriarchal paradigm of reality that
places everything in a hierarchy of domination and
subordination, accepting the marginalization of the powerless as
a given. This paradigm is a manifestation of a social system that
changes form but continues to define women as marginal to the
male center ... (Russe111993:35)
Thus feminist and other critical theologies of solidarity bring into question the
authenticity of what is claimed to be tradition. For the Fathers of the church for
Christian tradition to be binding it needed to have the three marks of
"antiquity, universality and consensus".' If such a criterion is brought into
dialogue with feminist and other critical theologies, then it is possible to argue
that much of what is accepted as binding tradition is based neither on antiquity
(for scholars are pointing to earlier traditions tha~ were suppressed'), nor
universality (for how can a tradition be universal if half of humanity had no
voice in its formulation?), nor consensus (for the apparent agreement of those
who have been deprived of a voice is an agreement forced through violence).
Moreover, we come up against the question of exactly what constitutes
tradition. How much of the general phenomenon of tradition is divinely
revealed? And what of tradition that clearly does change and cannot therefore,
3 This definition of what "has been believed everywhere, always,
by everyone" comes from Vincent of Lerins (A Commonitory, 2,6) and became
influential in the western church. Constantine Scouteris has pointed out that is
less influential in the eastern church where the criteria for tradition relate more
to that which promotes koinonia. (discussion, 6 August 1996)
4 See, for example, the work of Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza (1983).
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presumably, be claimed to be divinely revealed, or belong to the very deposit
of faith? And in what sense is tradition separate from, or the same as,
scripture? What of the distinction between the Tradition (with a capital"t") and
the many human traditions (with a small"t")? It is these distinctions that will
hopefully emerge as we consider the history of the theology of tradition.
Tradition in the history of the church
As is to be expected of such a vital topic, the church's understandings of
. tradition has undergone developments and changes in different eras and
contexts. The following outline provides a rough overview of these.
The Jewish context
The [udaism from which Christianity arose was not simply a religion of the
written word, but also a religion that was dependent on unwritten tradition.
Arising prior to the written law, the early Hebrew tradition was originally the
only source of Jewish faith. (Malaty 1979:34) Long before it was written down,
the Mosaic law regulated Israel's life and the psalms expressed its prayer.
(Congar 1966:2) Congar has commented:
Begotten in tradition, or even from tradition, the biblical writings
come to us borne on a living religious reality -- the community of
God's chosen people, and this religious reality itself existed
before these writings, either as the whole community, or as its
most genuine and representative elements. (1966:2)
Even after receiving the written law, tradition was still seen as necessary in
order to interpret it and, indeed, added to it. The establishment of schools for
the interpretation of the Law provided disciples called talmid who became
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links in a chain of transmission that passed on this accumulated wisdom.
While originally completely dependent on scripture, this tradition acquired a
value of its own and eventually found its way into a book -- the Talmud -- by
the second century." (Congar 1966:4f;Nichols 1991:166)
The early Christians clearly accepted the reality of Jewish tradition and
assumed knowledge based on tradition. At the same time, like Jesus, they were
prepared to reject traditions that contradicted what they believed to be the
Word of God and refused to adopt a literal attitude towards tradition. (Malaty
1979:38f)For example, following the apostle Peter's vision, reported in Acts 10,
they made a bold move in allowing Gentiles into their community of faith. In
this they universalised what had previously been an ethnically based salvation
community and made the message of salvation available for all people.
The early Christians
For the earliest Christians tradition was the only source of Christian faith.
Specifically Christian revelation was necessarily in oral form until the writing
(or more strictly the canonization) of the New Testament. According to Congar,
such
"tradition" implies an activity of the Church living its belief, and
consequently elaborating it, rather as Israel had done ... Before
the written gospels, there had only been the Gospel: a gospel
preached and transmitted orally. (1966:5)
Aware of the possibility of a misuse of tradition, the gospels present Jesus as
promising the disciples the help of the Holy Spirit. (Nichols 1991:167) Such a
5 [udith Plaskow, writing from a Jewish feminist perspective,
points to the partiality of this Jewish record of wrestling with God. (1990:ch 2) .
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Spirit-guided authority stands behind Paul's appeal to tradition as what is
handed on, received and conserved. For, for Paul it is Jesus Christ himself who
is both the content and the principle of tradition. (Congar 1966:9) Thus,
speaking of the eucharist, he says:
For I received from the Lord what I also handed on to you, that
the Lord Jesus on the night when he was betrayed took a loaf of
bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and said, "This
is my body that is for you. Do this in remembrance of me." In the
same way he took the cup also, after supper, saying, "This cup is
the new covenant in my blood. Do this as often as you drink it, in
remembrance of me." For as often as you eat this bread and drink
the cup, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes. (1 Cor
11:23-26)
Thus the tradition that the first Christians received and passed on was not
simply a human or historical tradition, but was Christ himself.
This is the "tradition", i.e., "the faith once delivered to the saints"
(Jude 3), or the "Gospel" written in our lives and engraved within
our hearts. It is a living thing, received by the apostles who
delivered it to their disciples by the Holy Spirit, who bears
witness to Christ within the life of the Church, and unites her
with the Saviour. (Malaty 1979:8)
In a word, then, the tradition is the Christian religion itself, a
reality larger than that of the scriptural text ... Concretely,
Tradition is the Church's life; abstractly or reflectively, it is the
Church's faith. (Nichols 1991:169)
The Patristic era
It is with the Patristic church of the first three centuries that the key theological
and Christological controversies force the church to work out and define its
criteria for judging theological adequacy and hence the role of tradition.
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In this era we see an emphasis on the strong link between the church and
tradition. In contrast to the gnostics who argued for a private interpretation of
the scriptures, the Fathers insisted that Christian truth can only be properly
understood within the church. Saint Irenaeus, often called the "father of the
Ecclesiastical Tradition", insisted that the validity of the church's tradition
comes from the fact that it originates from the Apostles and has been passed
down by an unbroken succession of bishops. This tradition is not something
secret, but is manifested in every church throughout the whole world. (Malaty
1979:22)
It is within the power of all, therefore, in every Church, who may
wish to see the truth, to contemplate clearly the tradition of the
apostles manifested throughout the whole world; and we are in a
position to reckon up those who were by the apostles instituted
bishops in the Churches, and [to demonstrate] the succession of
those men to our own times; those who neither taught nor knew
of anything like what these [heretics] rave about. (Against
Heresies, 3, 3, 1)
Hence the authority of the church's tradition derives from its apostilicity and
apostilicity came to be seen as the test for determining whether or not
something belonged to the church's faith. (Gaybba 1971:2) The test of
apostilicity, however, was unanimity. It was the church as a whole that
possessed the Spirit and could therefore not be in error. (Gaybba 1971:3)
However, within the universal church, those churches that were believed to
have been founded by the apostles held a special place. Irenaeus wrote:
Suppose there arises a dispute relative to some important
question among us, should we not have recourse to the most
ancient Churches with which the apostles held constant
intercourse, and learn from them what is certain and clear in
regard to the present question? For how should it be if the
apostles themselves had not left us writings? Would it not be
necessary, [in that case,] to follow the course of tradition which
they handed down to those to whom they did commit the
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Churches? (Against Heresies, 3, 4, 1)
The same view is echoed by Tertullian who held that the surest test of
authenticity of doctrine or practice lies in the fact that the churches had been
founded by and were continually linked with the apostles.
Now, what that was that they [the apostles] preached -- in other
words, what it was which Christ revealed to them - can, as-I
must here likewise prescribe, properly be proved in no other way
than by those very churches which the apostles founded in
person, by declaring the gospel to them directly themselves, both
viva voca, as the phrase is, and subsequently by their epistles. If,
then, these things are so, it is in the same degree manifest that all
doctrine that agrees with the apostolic churches -- those moulds
and original sources of the faith - must be reckoned for truth, as
undoubtedly containing that which the (said) churches received
from the apostles, the apostles from Christ, Christ from God....
We hold communion with the apostolic churches because our
doctrine is in no respect different from theirs. This is our witness
of truth. (The Prescription Against Heretics, 21)
Similar views were expressed by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyprian,
Gregory of Nyssa, Basil, John Chrysostom and Augustine."
At issue sometimes was the relationship between scripture and tradition.
Initially little distinction was made between oral and written tradition.
However, in their interchanges with heretics, we see the affirmation of a
specifically oral tradition and the insistence that the scriptures belong to the
church and can only properly be read in the context of the church. In the words
of Origen,
6 For Clement, see Stromata, 7,17; for Origen, De Principiis, Pref. 2;
for Cyprian, Epistle 73, 11; for Gregory, Against Eunomius, 2, 1; for Basil, On the
Spirit, 10, 25; 27,66-67; for John Chrysostom, Homilies on Thessalonians,4, 15;
and for Augustine, On Baptism, Against the Donatists, 2,6-7.
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The true disciple of Jesus is he who enters the house, that is to
say, the Church. He enters it by thinking as the Church does, and
living as she does; this is how he understands the Word. The key
of the Scriptures must be received from the tradition of the
Church, as from the Lord Himself. (quoted in Congar 1964:83)
However, scripture and tradition remain integrally related. Just as one cannot
have scripture without the church, so too one cannot have the church without
scripture. They are reciprocally conditioned and, while distinguishable, cannot
be separated. (Congar 1966:33ff,44)
It is in this era also that we find the beginning of church councils which
became central in determining what belongs to tradition. While the roots of the
conciliar idea lie in the New Testament, in the fourth to the eighth centuries,
we find a shift of emphasis from the apostolic authority of the
deposit of faith to the authority of doctrine as taught and
believed by the Church, because of the action within her of the
Spirit - the belief and teaching of the Church, which now
contains not merely the apostolic deposit of but also an unfolding
of the meaning of that deposit, is considered normative precisely
because it is the belief and teaching of the whole Church.
(Gaybba 1971:4)
Hence ecumenicity came to be seen as key to determining what belongs to the
tradition and the dogmatic teachings of the ecumenical councils became
binding on all the churches. However, this development retained a connection
with the apostolic church by insisting that for a council to be truly ecumenical
it had to be attended by the patriarchs of the apostolic sees. (Nichols 1991:212)
The patristic era is thus characterised by a close connection between scripture,
tradition and the life of the Spirit in the church which work together to
constitute the church's life. However, Gaybba has noted that while this bond
was regarded as a close one, "the precise relationships between these various
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entities had not been worked out". (1971:5) This was to lead to major ruptions
for parts of the church at a later date.
Moreover, in the later Fathers, notably Augustine and Vincent of Lerins, we
find the emergence of ideas regarding dogmatic development." Such ideas
were to be particularly influential in the later development of the western
church.
The Second Council of Nicaea and the eastern church
The Second Council of Nicaea in 787, while commonly considered as the last
ecumenical council of the undivided church," was nevertheless more influential
in the east than in the west. Iconoclasm was a fundamentally eastern problem;
while the western church had disapproved of iconoclasm from the outset and
had participated in the deliberations of the,council, its decisions were not well
received in the west, particularly among the Franks. (Pheidas 1990:16f) This
was partly due to the poor Latin translation of the council's rulings which was
vague on certain theological points. It was also because, for the west, the role of
images, while valid, was a fundamentally ornamentative one rather than a
guarantee of orthodoxy. (pheidas 1990:17) Thus while Nicaea's teachings were
ultimately received as the teachings of an ecumenical council, its influence on
the western church was limited.
For Augustine, see The Cityof God, 16,2; for Vincent, see A
Commonitory, 23.
B
This would of course be disputed by the non-Calcedonian Orthodox
Churches for whom the last ecumenical council was Council of Ephesus in 431.
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For the east, however, the triumph of orthodoxy at the council was seen as the
triumph of tradition. Congar has commented
The victory of the icononphils was considered to be a victory
both for orthodoxy and for tradition, the two things being more
closely identified than ever before with each other and with the
Church. (1966:102)
The council thus marked a decisive moment for the eastern churches. In
reasserting the authority of tradition it stated:
we declare that we defend free from any innovations all the
written and unwritten ecclesiastical traditions that have been
entrusted to us ... Therefore all those who dare to think or teach
anything different, or who follow the accursed heretics in
rejecting ecclesiastical traditions, or who devise innovations, or
who spurn anything entrusted to the church (whether it be the
gospel or the figure of the cross or any example of
representational art or any martyr's holy relic), or who fabricate
perverted and evil prejudices against cherishing any of the lawful
traditions of the catholic church, or who secularize the sacred
objects and saintly monasteries, we order that they be suspended
if they are bishops or clerics, and excommunicated if they are
monks or lay people! (Definition)
Orthodoxy, or the faith of the eastern churches, thus came to be seen as
a victory over error, and of a conservation of tradition; it is the
Church of the Fathers, the Church of the Seven Ecumenical
Councils. (Congar 1966:103)
However, this conservative view of the eastern church in regard to tradition is
only partly accurate. While the conservation of tradition was seen as centrally
important, this did not stop them from undergoing certain new disciplinary
152
provisions and even doctrinal developments.' (Congar 1966:104) Moreover, in
modem times Orthodox theologians have argued for a much more dynamic
understanding of tradition which is linked to the role of the Holy Spirit in the
church." (Congar 1966:104ff)
The medieval west
While the theology of tradition of the Christian east remained fundamentally
that of the Fathers and saw its dogmatic expression as necessarily limited by
the seven ecumenical councils, the rift that developed between east and west
meant that the western church became increasingly isolated and underwent
doctrinal developments in isolation from the rest of the church.
The initial orientation of the western church was a fundamentally biblical one.
It was generally held that the scriptures contained all the truths necessary for
salvation. While there was some speculation on the idea that there may be
Christian truth that is not contained in scripture, this occupied a comparatively
9 Mackey points out, for example, that fundamental doctrines of
Orthodoxy, such as those concerning the sacraments and justification, were not
fully elaborated until after the Schism. (1962:197) Moreover, the Hesychast
controversy in the fourteenth century gave rise to the development of Gregory
Palamas' distinction between God's essence and God 's energies that became
widely accepted in Orthodox theology.
10 Influential here is the work of A S Khomyakov (1804-1860) who
used ideas of dynamic totality and historical continuity and who "saw in the
Orthodox faithful, the vehicle of the Spirit, and in this vehicle the very
principle of tradition itself." (Congar 1966:104) For him tradition was
more than just continuity, but was rather a dynamic, living continuity that is
not attainable except from within and can only be understood as the work of
the Holy Spirit. (Congar 1966:105) For more on Khomyakov, see O'Leary's The
Triune Church (1982). Such ideas clearly influenced Vladimir Lossky, whose
work we will consider later in this chapter. Their influence can also be seen in
the theology of Sergius Bulgakov, who speaks of "the church as tradition".
(1988)
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limited role for the great medieval theologians. When questions arose about
non-scriptural doctrinal formulations, such as the filioque and the institution of
certain sacraments, attempts were generally made to provide some scriptural
reference, even if this was equivalent or indirect. (Congar 1966:87)
However, Congar has pointed out the lack of an historical consciousness and
the importance of the idea of transcendent causalities for medieval theology.
The concept of auctoritas
indicated the value that some thing or statement derived from its
source, considered less historically as a factor of temporal genesis,
than according to its place in the great hierarchy of the world, and
thus for the part of infallible truth it represented in virtue of its
function or status. (1966:90)
This found application in the idea of the communication to humans of
uncreated divine Truth. While this refers first and foremost to scriptural
revelation, it is nevertheless coextensive with the duration of the church.
(Congar 1966:90) Hence we find a tendency to include the fathers, the councils,
pontifical decrees and occasionally the work of theologians within the Scriptura
sacra. (Congar 1966:92) While Thomas Aquinas was careful to distinguish the
auctoritas of scripture from that of the fathers and doctors, (ST, I, q.l,a.8) this
was far from common practice. (Congar 1966:93)
Moreover, in the last decades of the thirteenth and the first decades of the
fourteenth centuries, we also see a growing need for distinctions and precise
definitions and so one gradually found the dissociation of elements that were
previously closely united. (Gaybba 1971:5; Congar 1966:94) With Duns Scotus
(d. 1308) we find a distinction between metaphysical knowledge and
knowledge by faith, while with Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) we find the beginning
of hypothetical questioning about the relative authority of scripture
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and the church. Henry posed the scenario of all but a few in the church falling
into heresy and asked whether, in that situation, one should believe scripture
or the church. He opted for scripture. (Gaybba 1971:5) Tavard comments:
The Church would then reside among the small group of true
believers standing by the Bible over against the judgement of the
(heretical) Christian society. There is nothing novel in this idea,
insofar as it lies at the root of most medieval sectarian
movements. Yet its introduction into orthodox thinking is
unexpected. As against the views of the older theologians,
Henry's doctrine implies an ethereal conception of the Church.
She is not necessarily identified with the community of believers.
(1959:25)
In a context in which papal power was at its height we thus begin to see a split
developing between scripture and the church as the highest authority. While
curial canonists and theologians exalted papal power to an extreme, supporters
of the emperor such as Dante and Ockham, reaffirmed the primacy of
scripture. (Congar 1966:94f) Thus we find a prefiguring of the reformation
controversies.
Consequently, when the time came for the outbreak of the
Reformation, the question was often posed in terms of this false
alternative, which ought to have been rejected, but which was
seized upon by the Reformers: Is the Church above Scripture, or
Scripture above the Church? (Congar 1966:99)
The reformation, Trent and beyond
That the reformers responded to this alternative with the cry of sola scriptura is
well known. In rejecting "human traditions" Luther insisted that everything
must be judged according to the criterion of scripture. (Congar 1966:140f) He
wrote
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Did I not say that the affairs of the pope and of all papists are
nothing but human teaching and usage, without any Scripture ...
what else am I fighting about but precisely this? I do it so that
everyone may understand the true difference between divine
Scripture and human teaching or usage and so that a Christian
heart does not buy the one for the other -- straw for gold, hay for
silver, and wood for jewels ... (1989:98)
However, Tavard has pointed out that for Luther scripture must nevertheless
be interpreted and judged and the criterion that Luther uses for this is the
doctrine of justification by faith.
That is the true test by which to judge all books, when we see
whether they deal with Christ or not, since all Scriptures show us
Christ and St Paul will know nothing but Christ. Whatever does
not teach Christ is not apostolic/even though St Peter or St Paul
had taught it; again what preaches Christ would be apostolic
even though Judas, Annas, Pilate or Herod did it. (quoted in
Tavard 1959:82)
Commenting on this Tavard states:
When Luther says, "to preach Christ", he understands, "to preach
justification by faith alone". (1959:82f)
A similar dynamic is evident in Calvin. While he rejects the authority of the
church's tradition and states that "Scripture will finally suffice for our saving
knowledge of God", he adds "when its certainty is sponsored by the inner
persuasion of the Holy Spirit." For,
The naked word of God avails nothing without the illumination
of the Holy Spirit. (quoted in Tanner 1959:103)
Thus we see that, for the reformers, the individual interpretation of scripture
becomes of paramount importance. Nevertheless, the principle of sola scriptura
means that:
156
For the Reformation, the only bond -- perhaps not de facto, but the
only certain, normative one, divinely guaranteed at least to a
certain extent -- which links the Church of today, and every
believer in any age, to the unique fact of the apostles, is Holy
Scripture. (Congar 1966:146)
Despite this the reformers did not ignore tradition. They retained the early
councils and referred to the teachings of the fathers recognising "the purity of
the early Church, which represents, for them also, a privileged moment in
history." (Congar 1966:143) Such an acknowledgement was nevertheless
founded on the congruency between the patristic era and the witness of
scripture. The reformers accepted the fathers only "in so far as these are in
accord with the word of God, Scripture". (Congar 1966:144)
In rejecting the principle of sola scriptura Catholic apologists developed a new
synthesis that came to dominate Catholic thinking. This involved the idea,
firstly, that scripture and unwritten traditions formed two distinct sources of
doctrinal truth and, secondly, that the development of such tradition takes
place under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. (Gaybba 1971:7)
The Council of Trent identified "the Gospel" as the single source of saving truth
and moral discipline. (Congar 1966:157) This truth is contained, however, in
both the written books of scripture and in unwritten traditions. (Session 4, first
decree) In this Trent
implicitly reaffirmed the existence of a teaching magisterium, one
that is authoritative thanks to the guidance of the Spirit. In other
words, to the burning question of the day: Scripture? or the
Church? Trent replied: neither by themselves, but the two
together, possessing a similar authority. (Gaybba 1971:9)
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While Trent did not explicitly speak of two sources of revelation, the partim-
partim view" that scripture and tradition are two separate sources of revelation
became the dominant Catholic view after Trent. Moreover, Gaybba has noted
that
Alongside this clear division between Scripture and tradition was
a trend, to become more marked as the 19th century got under
way, to regard tradition not so much as a deposit of revelation
received from the apostles and conserved by the whole Church
but rather as the teachings of the magisterium of the Church,
which magisterium came to be regarded more and more
exclusively as the organ of tradition. (1971:9)
In this period we also find an increasing emphasis on the role of the
magisterium. The logical extension of such thinking was the declaration on
papal infallibility of the First Vatican Council. For Vatican I tradition was a
deposit entrusted to the care of the church, by which it understood the
magisterium and especially the pope. (Congar 1966:198)
For the doctrine of the faith which God has revealed is put
forward not as some philosophical discovery capable of being
perfected by human intelligence, but as a divine deposit
committed to the spouse of Christ to be faithfully protected and
infallibly promulgated. (Session 3, chapter 4)
Beginnings of a renewal
While this view continued into the twentieth century, the nineteenth century
also saw the beginnings of a renewal in the theology of tradition. Theologians
such as Mohler, Newman and Scheeben developed an organic view of the
11 An early draft had spoken of revelation being found partly in
scripture and partly in tradition. (partim ... partim) This was later revised to
read that it is found both in scripture and in tradition. (et ... et) (Nichols
1991:176)
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relationship between the church and tradition and saw tradition as a function
of the whole church. (Gaybba 1971:10)
Mohler rejected the idea of revelation handed on partly through texts and
partly through oral tradition. Rather he saw tradition as a mode of
communication that covers the whole of Christianity and encompasses
scripture. Scripture and tradition are not independent sources but include,
fulfil and condition one another. (Congar 1966:193)
Tradition or the living Gospel, always proclaimed in the Church,
extends to the whole spirit of Christianity and to all its doctrines.
(quoted in Congar 1966:193)
For Mohler, tradition is linked with a theology of communion. Through the
activity of the Holy Spirit and the hierarchical succession, tradition links the
identity of the individual believer with the consciousness of all. It is the
consciousness given to individual believers when they live in the communion
of all, by the Spirit who is given to their unanimous agreement. (Congar
1966:194f)
This vital, spiritual force, which we inherit from our fathers and
which is perpetuated in the Church, is interior tradition. (quoted
in Congar 1966:194)
.Newman is remembered largely for his contributions appropriately entitled
Essay on theDevelopment ofChristian Doctrine and On Consulting the Faithful in
Matters ofDoctrine. In the former he argues that the historical idea of tradition
can be complemented by the idea of the magisteriurn. While the church had
always possessed the faith it had not always possessed a total understanding
of it. With the idea of a developing understanding of faith Newman was able
to hold together both history and the role of the magisterium.
159
if Christianity be an universal religion, suited not to one locality
or period, but to all times and places, it cannot but vary in its
relations and dealings towards the world around it, that is, it will
develope. Principles require a very various application according
to persons and circumstances and must be thrown into new
shapes according to the form of society which they are to
influence. (1846:96)
In the latter essay Newman argues for the importance of the sensus fidelium in
defining doctrine. Using patristic and historical examples he showed the key
role of the laity in events leading up to dogmatic definitions and argued:
Though the laity be but the reflection or echo of the clergy in
matters of faith, yet there is something in the "pastorum ac
fidelium congregatio," which is not in the pastors alone.
(1986:103f)
. These points are more or less echoed by Scheeben who helped to define the
role of the magisterium and also the role of the laity and hierarchy. While the
laity have an important role in conserving and handing on tradition, he saw
the activity of defining its content as belonging to the hierarchy alone. (Congar
1966:213) Laity and hierarchy are, however, closely related.
The members of and organs of the Church form one body of
Christ and assemble around the Eucharist as the source of their
common life, and they are called to image forth the highest unity
of all, that of the Trinity. In the unfolding of their life and
activity, these members and organs constitute a closely knit
whole, in which the unity and harmony of external social life is
the faithful reflection of its true, internal, mysterious unity. This




In our own century we have seen a continuation of this renewal. 12 Tradition is
now seen Iess as a deposit of truths, than as a totality into which one enters and
in which one lives. Schmaus expresses this when he says
In his faith the believer does not merely give his assent to true
propositions. Much more, through his faith he comes in contact
with the one in whom he believes. (Mackey 1962:110)
Thus today we find a wider notion of tradition in which
Tradition is now commonly described as "the life of the Church",
as an activity in which there are handed down not merely truths
(verbal tradition) but also realities, especially the real contact
with God in faith (real tradition), or as the sensus fidei, i.e., "the
living understanding of the faith which manifests itself in the
ensemble of the teaching and hearing Church", [Dillenschneider
as quoted by Mackey 1962:129)] or as a dialogue between the
magisterium and the faithful. (Gaybba 1971:11)
As can be seen from the discussion in chapter three, it is this dynamic view of
tradition that was adopted at Vatican II and which is evident in Dei Verbum
and its other constitutions.
Tradition and scripture make up a single sacred deposit of the
word of God, which is entrusted to the church. By adhering to it
the entire holy people, united to its pastors, remains always
faithful to the teaching of the apostles, to the communion of life,
to the breaking of bread and the prayers (see Acts 2:42). So, in
maintaining, practising and professing the faith that has been
handed on there is a unique interplay between the bishops and
the faithful. (DV:10)
This is associated with the work of Lercher, Zapalena,
Dillenschneider, Balic,Congar, Ternus, Schmaus, Rondet, Rahner, Bacht and
Geiselmann. (Gaybba 1971:11)
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Thus we see that tradition is necessarily linked to the ongoing life of the
church. Like the shift from proposition to relation which we saw with regard to
the theology of revelation in chapter three, there has been a shift from viewing
tradition as a source of cerebral knowledge of theological truth, to viewing it as
providing access to a living encounter with the Christian reality. This
represents in many respects a return to the patristic perspective although it also
allows for later developments such as the ongoing development of doctrine
under the action of the Holy Spirit in the church.
Tradition in the thought of Yves Congar
One of the important contributions to a contemporary Catholic theology of
tradition is that of the recently deceased Yves Congar (1904-1995). In what
follows I will outline key central ideas of his work in order to highlight that
"Other" that I will argue below accompanies and is at the heart of tradition.
Congar describes tradition as a principle of transmissi?n and delivery. It is
something that we receive and, like everything in the church, it comes from
elsewhere. (1966:240f; 1964:144) In baptism faith is transmitted
and it is at once knowledge, the principle of life and salvation,
catechesis and sacrament, and "mystery" in its double meaning of
knowledge and of divine saving action working through sacred
signs understood by faith. (1966:243)
Tradition is also the principle that ensures continuity and identity throughout
successive generations. (1964:8) If faith is transmitted it must also be received
and it is received by a living, active and historical subject who needs to
appropriate it. (1966:253ff) While its principle of identity is unchanging,
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tradition also represents a permanent renewal. (1966:264) Thus tradition is
development as well as transmission.
That which was received and professed in baptism becomes, in
the context of the Christian life, praise, service, witness, response
and decision. (1966:266)
Thus,
The tradition received by each one of us is not the quintessence of
primitive Christianity, but the totality of what has been revealed
about Christ over long ages. (1966:268)
The subjeel of tradition
For Congar the act of transmitting implies an active subject. (1964:48) While
there are many different subjects of tradition -- such as the prophets, Jesus and
the apostles -- he singles out two central ones and distinguishes between a
transcendent subject, namely the Holy Spirit, and a visible and historical
subject, namely the church.
It is the Spirit who is the principle of identity for the church -- a unifying
principle who promotes fellowship. (1964:55) The mission of the Spirit
constitutes a form of sacrament with a visible structure of signs and a kernel
working within. (1966:338) The Spirit's role is one of actualising and
interiorising what Christ said and did. (1966:342)
It is important to note, however, that
There is no "incarnation" of the Holy Ghost in the Church, like
the incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus Christ; there is
simply a covenant between them, guaranteed by God's absolute
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fidelity, as between two persons who do not form a single,
physical, existing reality, but retain their liberty. With the
exception of a final indeflectibility which God has promised it,
the ecclesiastical body whose soul is the Holy Ghost remains fully
human and historical. And so, to speak of the Holy Ghost as the
Church's soul and the transcendent principle of her identity, does
not mean that all that happens in the historical life of this Church
is guaranteed by the Holy Ghost. (1964:55f)
As the visible, historical subject of tradition, the church is a comple-x organic
reality being made up of both hierarchy and laity. However, while all the
"faithful" transmit tradition by the simple practice of faith, (1964:70; 1966:323ff)
it is the task of the magisterium to keep faithfully, judge authentically and
define infallibly the content of the deposit of faith. (1964:63) This it is enabled
to do since it has a special grace that corresponds to the mission entrusted to it.
(1964:65)
However,Congar notes that according to Thomas Aquinas (see ST, I, q.1, a.S)
the church only has a secondary role in relation to tradition which needs to be
measured by the primary rule which is divine revelation. (1964:68) Thus the
magisterium is a witness to revelation and does not have autonomy with
regard to it. (1964:69) While the activity of the magisterium changes material
tradition into formal tradition, as rules of belief for the church,
The deposit alone, the true faith of the Church alone, constitutes
Tradition in the sense whereby it imposes itself upon the faithful
as the actual content of what they should believe. (1964:67)
Tradition and traditions
Here we come to what I believe is a centrally important point in Congar's
theology which is the distinction between the Tradition and various traditions.
For Congar although tradition is witnessed to by various monuments, these
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should not be confused with the Tradition itself.
the monuments of Tradition are not Tradition itself, which
transcends them; they are the concrete expressions of various
aspects of it and thus, for us, a means of reaching this Tradition ...
(1964:139)
Congar distinguishes between the one Tradition (with a capital "T"), which is
ultimately inaccessible, and various traditions (with a small "t"). For him
traditions are customs, rites, practical methods and concrete details which have
been handed down to us and which form a certain system of discipline for the
Christian life. They function as a language or national symbols functions for a
national culture: they are
the concrete carrier of a spirit, that which enables one to become
an actual member of a certain community, by receiving,
effortlessly and almost unconsciously, a certain type of humanity.
(1964:145)
Tradition, on the other hand, Is something much broader and apparently less
tangible. It cannot be captured in writing but is "the very principle of the
whole economy of salvation". (1964:15) Tradition both precedes and exceeds
written communication though it is definitively witnessed to in the scriptures,
the Fathers, the liturgy and the teaching of the church's magisterium. It cannot,
however, be reduced to any of these. (1966:458)
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Tradition in Orthodox perspective: the work of Vladimir Lossky
This ultimate inaccessibility of the Tradition is also expressed in the work of
Vladimir Lossky (1903-1958), a Russian Orthodox theologian. Like Congar he
distinguishes between the Tradition and various traditions and objects to the
confusing use of the term "tradition" without an adjective to qualify it.
(1982:21)
Lossky argues that Tradition is not something that can be juxtaposed with, or
opposed to, scripture, as the polemicists of the counter-reformation attempted
to do. (1982:11) Neither is it, although this comes closer to its true meaning, a
term which refers to the oral teaching of faith, over and against that which is
written. (1982:12) It also does not ultimately refer to mysterious and secret
knowledge, although this also sheds some light on its meaning. (1982:13)
In these definitions, while they shed some light on the meaning of tradition,
we come up against a boundary with Tradition properly so called. "In effect
there is participation in the revealed mystery through the fact of sacramental
initiation." (1982:13) However all of these definitions remain linked to verbal
expression and operate within the economy of the word.
In order to isolate the pure notion of Tradition, in order to strip it
of all that is its projection on the horizontal life of the Church, it
would be necessary to go beyond the opposition of secret words
and words preached aloud, ranging together "the traditions" and
"preaching". These two have this in common that, secret or not,
they are none the less expressed by word. They always imply a
verbal expression, whether it is a question of words properly so-
called, pronounced or written, or whether of the dumb language
which is addressed to the understanding by visual manifestation
(iconography, ritual gestures, etc.). Taken in this general sense,
the word is not uniquely an external sign used to designate a
concept, but above all a content, which is defined intelligibly and
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declared in assuming a body, in becoming incorporated in
articulate discourse or in any other form of external expression.
(1982:14)
While revelation, for Lossky, is intimately connected to the economy of the
Word Incarnate, tradition is something different from this and is linked to the
role of the Holy Spirit in the church. Thus one needs to see his work in the
context of a trinitarian ecclesiology which distinguishes between the
Christological and Pneumatological aspects of the church." For our purposes
here, though, it is important to note that for him Tradition is radically different
from any form of verbal knowledge, whether of scripture or of traditions.
If again we wished to oppose it to all that belongs to the reality of
the Word, it would be necessary to say that the Tradition is
Silence. (1982:14f)
He continues
The words of Revelation have then a margin of silence which
cannot be picked up by the ears of those who are outside ... This
silence of the Scriptures could not be detached from them: it is
transmitted by the Church with the words of Revelation, as the
very condition of their reception. (1982:15)
This silence "implies no kind of insufficiency or lack" but rather indicates that
for revelation to be truly received it "demands a conversion towards the
vertical plane". (1982:15)
13 In chapter nine of his work The Mystical Theology of the Eastern
Church (1976) Lossky sees the church as one in Christ but as multiple through
the Spirit. In the church our nature is recapitulated in Christ and contained in
him. But human beings are still free. The church's nature is both organic and
personal, objective and subjective, a definite reality but also a reality in the
process of becoming.
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While scripture and all that the church has produced by means of words,
symbols and images represent different expressions of the truth, Tradition, for
Lossky, is "the unique mode of receiving it". (1982:15) Tradition
is not the content of Revelation, but the light that reveals it; it is
not the word, but the living breath which makes the word heard
at the same time as the silence from which it came; it is not the
Truth, but a communication of the Spirit of Truth, outside which
the Truth cannot be received. (1982:15)
Tradition is thus "the life of the Holy Spirit in the Church" (1982:15) and is
therefore something separate from the economy of the word:
To preserve the "dogmatic tradition" does not mean to be
attached to doctrinal formulae: to be within the Tradition is to
keep the living truth in the Light of the Holy Spirit, or rather -- it
is to be kept in the Truth by the vivifying power of Tradition. But
this power preserves by a ceaseless renewing, like all that comes
from the Spirit. (1982:19)
This does not mean that Lossky rejects the authority of word-orientated
revelation. However, anything expressed in words is always partial and
doctrines, while necessary, become traitors to Tradition when they seek to take
its place. (1982:19)
As an expression of truth, a dogma of faith belongs to the
Tradition, without all the same constituting one of its "parts". It is
a means, an intelligible instrument, which makes for adherence to
the Tradition of the Church: it is a witness of Tradition, its
extemallimit, or rather the narrow door which leads to
knowledge of Truth in the Tradition. (1982:20)
168
Tradition and the Other
The work of both Congar and Lossky points to Tradition as an ultimately
uncapturable reality that the church lives off and bears witness to. Thus we
may argue that there is an alterity that is at the very heart of the theological
meaning of Tradition. This "Othemess" of Congar and Lossky is at once totally
different from the marginalised "other" of contemporary contextual and
feminist discourses, and yetalso has something in common with them. While
theologians such as Congar and Lossky often seem regrettably ignorant of the
sort of critical challenges to knowledge outlined in chapter four, they
nevertheless point to a reality that is beyond the erislavement of patriarchal and
other forms of word-based discourse, namely the activity of the Holy Spirit
within the church which, while witnessed to in discourse, is not encaptured by
it.
This is not to suggest that problems do not remain; we are still faced with
witnesses to Tradition which Christian theology, whether Catholic or
Orthodox, believes to be authoritative. These will be discussed in the following
chapter.
However, what is asserted here is that despite the problematic nature of such
witnesses, the traditioning process of the church, which includes such
witnesses and, given the power dynamics found in our human history, is
almost necessarily patriarchal, is nevertheless capable of bearing witness to the
absolute Other. While this Other cannot be grasped in words -- even though it
has been definitively revealed in the Word -- it can be encountered in darkness




This chapter has moved from a general description of tradition to a more
precise theological location of the Tradition. In this we moved from a general
idea of tradition as the whole life of the church to the Tradition as silence and
alterity. In this we have seen that tradition is necessarily ecc1esial and also that
it is necessarily "Other". As an ecc1esial reality, it is necessarily expressed in
discourse and therefore implicated a set of power relations. However, as
something :'Other" it is beyond all discourse. As the life of the Spirit in the
church, it is ultimately uncapturable. The following chapter will examine how
we may hold together these two realities and the type of ecc1esiology needed
for such a task.
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Chapter Nine
Bearing witness to the Other:
The church as wounded bearer of revelation
We have seen, then, that Tradition is never accessible in itself, in
its pure form, but only comes to us via some kind of concrete
mediation. .
Aidan Nichols (1991:181)
The church and Tradition are but two aspects for the life of Faith.
We can't know one of them without the other.
Tadros Malaty (1979:51)
If we are to mirror God, to be in God's image, to be like God, to
invite God to indwell us so that we live Christ's life in today's
world and in every day's world, we have to be willing to enter
the wound of history, particularly the wound of [udeo-Christian
history. We have to be willing to enter the wound of God.
Maggie Ross (1987:xvii)
Just as speech about revelation is integrally linked with speech about tradition,
so too, speech about tradition is integrally linked with speech about the church.
If, as the previous chapter argued, the Tradition itself is ultimately Other and
unable to be captured in words, it is nevertheless witnessed to in ways which,
while not capturing it, are nevertheless held to be decisive. Thus, while I
believe that it is important to locate the Tradition as ultimately Other and
uncapturable, we also need to deal with the church's discourse which
surrounds it and, however inadequately, expresses it.
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This chapter therefore focuses on the church's role in witnessing to the
Tradition. I begin by looking at the role of monuments to tradition in Catholic
theology, highlighting both their necessity and importance and also their
limitations. I then move into a consideration of what we can say about the
nature of the church as bearer of revelation, in the light of the problematic that
has run throughout this thesis suggesting that we need to enter into the
wounded nature of the church in order to hold together its role as bearer of
revelation with its own limitations that hinder this role.
Witnessing to the Tradition
While the monuments or witnesses to the Tradition are not the Tradition itself,
they are the concrete forms through which it is mediated to us. They are, to
quote Congar,
expressions in which Tradition is, at least partially, fixed and
contained, and in which as a result it can be grasped and
analysed. Tradition is, logically at least, prior to its monuments,
since they are only expressions of it. (1966:425) .
Congar distinguishes between what he terms constitutive loci which is the
apostolic heritage and declarative loci which help our understanding of the
constitutive loci. The constitutive loci consists of scripture and unwritten
traditions. These unwritten traditions are, however, only accessible in the form
of declarative loci which include the teaching of the magisterium, the liturgy
and the church's practice, the Fathers and Doctors, the Sacred Canons, and the
theologians. (1966:426)
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This is obviously problematic for, if the Tradition itself is inaccessible and
outside the realm of patriarchal language, these "monuments" very clearly
assume a patriarchal discourse. Thus a feminist interaction with them must
necessarily include a hermeneutic of suspicion.
In approaching these realities I suggest that it is more helpful to see them as
witnesses rather than as monuments. Schneiders has developed the category of
a witness which bears testimony in relation to scripture but I suggest that her
observations are also applicable to the other realities that are cited as
"monuments" to the Tradition in Catholic theology.
According to Schneiders, a witness is someone who has experienced a certain
event which is seen as significant. (1991b:133f) The testimony that a witness
gives, however, is not simply a matter of giving an account of what happened.
Testimony is usually accompanied by the taking of an oath which shows that
the testimony given is "self-implicating discourse". (1991b:135)
The witness claims that her or his personhood and integrity are
the guarantee of the truthfulness of the testimony, so much so
that even God is called to witness and invited to exact retribution
if what is said is not true. This accounts for the paradigmatic use
of the term witness for the "martyrs," for those who forfeit their
lives as warranty to the truth of their testimony. The implication
is that the truth of what is being said is so important that one
could not live humanly if one defected from that truth.
(1991b:135)
Testimony is however always limited and the testimony that a witness gives is
always necessarily historical, partial and incomplete.
There is no such thing as totally adequate human testimony, not
because witnesses are incompetent or untruthful but because of
the necessarily limited relationship of human knowing to reality
and to language. (1991b:135)
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Thus we find that there is always the possibility of error or inadequacy in the
witness's interpretation of her or his experience. While such inadequacy could
simply be a matter of incompleteness, it could also distort the account.
(1991b:135) This means that all testimony is partial and biased. One selects
what is integrated into an account of an experience and what is marginalised
and ignored. We experience from a particular standpoint and a particular social
location and history. (1991b:136) Finally, Schneiders claims, testimony is
limited by the necessity for articulation. Not only is language itself limiting, but
the individual witness's limited competence in using language is even more
constricting. (1991b:136)
We therefore see that
testimony is both the most reliable of human communications
because of its highly self-implicating character and yet limited in
so many ways that no adequate claims to inerrancy, infallibility,
or total adequacy of any human testimony can be taken seriously
by anyone who understands the nature of human experience and
language. (1991b:136)
Thus I suggest that the witness that the church bears to the Tradition needs to
hold two elements in tension. In the first place, it arises out of what it
experiences as an absolutely crucial encounter with the Other, an encounter
that has been testified to by the lives of saints and martyrs as well as the work
of theologians and bishops. At the same time, however, this testimony is
limited, partial and necessarily incomplete. The task of a witness is to witness
to a particular experience and not to provide access to objective truth.
This is not the place to engage in an extensive discussion of what are termed
"monuments" to the Tradition. What I do propose to do below, however, is to
highlight the central features of four privileged witnesses to the Tradition,
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namely scripture, the Fathers, the liturgy and the church's magisterium.
The witness of scripture
As we saw in the previous chapter, much of the focus of the western church
from the late middle ages, through the reformation controversies, and into the
contemporary era has been on the relationship between scripture and tradition,
often viewing them as separate sources of revelation. With Dei Verbum, the
Church now speaks of scripture and tradition making up a single deposit of
the word of God, which is entrusted to the church. (DV:10) Nevertheless, it still
speaks of scripture and tradition as separate realities, reflecting one particular
sense of the meaning of tradition, namely as something other than scripture.
(Congar 1964:121)
As has emerged in the foregoing chapters, I prefer to speak of tradition as the
whole life of the church and, at the same time, distinguishing this from the
Tradition, which is ultimately inaccessible. In this context scripture is one
aspect, albeit a primary and foundational aspect, of tradition, or one of the key
witnesses to the Tradition.
In this context then scripture is the "measure and norm" of the various
witnesses to the Tradition. (Congar 1964:120) It is, according to Dei Verbum, "a
pure and unfailing fount of spiritual life" (DV:21) and a "permanent
foundation" for sacred theology. (DV:24)
As we have seen from both the work of Schussler Fiorenza in chapter four and
that of Schneiders in chapter six, while scripture may serve as a "fount of
spiritual life (DV:21) it is also a source of error and oppression. Schneiders
expresses this when she says:
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As feminist biblical scholarship has progressed during the past
two decades it has become virtually impossible to pretend that
the long established tradition of invoking biblical scholarship to
justify the oppression of women in family, society, and church is
based solely on a misreading of scripture. Without doubt there
have been misogynist misinterpretations of scripture in the
course of history, but it is no longer possible to deny that the text
itself is not only androcentric, Le. a male-centred account of male
experience for male purposes with women relegated to the
margins of salvation history, but also patriarchal in its
assumptions and often in its explicit teaching, and at times
deeply sexist, Le. anti-woman. Its God-language and imagery are
overwhelmingly male. When the official church invokes scripture
to justify its discriminatory treatment of women it does not have
to resort to fundamentalist prooftexting or to questionable
exegetical methods. In other words, the problem is in the text.
(1991a:38)
Thus while Catholic theology gives scripture a privileged position as a witness
to the Tradition, feminist scholarship reminds us that, like all witnesses as we
saw above, it is limited, partial and incomplete.
The witness of the Fathers
The term "Fathers of the church" is the traditional title given to the Christian
preachers, writers and theologians of the post-canonical period. (Ramsey
1987:386) Congar argues that their category is a dogmatic one and implies a
doctrinal value judgement on their work making them a privileged witness to
the Tradition. (1964:133;138) Certainly the work of the Fathers has been
accorded a privileged position in the life of the both the eastern and western
churches and, to a lesser degree, the churches of the reformation.
Aidan Nichols has distinguished three ways of arguing for the significance of
the fathers which relate to the historical period in which they lived, the nature
of their theological work, and their role as receivers of biblical revelation.
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In the first place, he points out, following Congar, that the era of the Fathers' --
which also more or less corresponded with the era of the seven ecumenical
councils -- was the key period for working out the church's faith and belief. At
the end of the New Testament era there was no clearly defined creed, no
clearly defined liturgical norms and no clear pattern of church government.
While the Christian religion is present in embryonic form in the New
Testament, it has not yet been worked out in a systematic way. (1991:202) By
contrast,
the patristic period was, then, the crucial period in the
crystallization of Christianity in its confessional, doxological, and
government structure -- as creed, worship and Church order.
(1991:203)
In the second place, Nichols argues for the importance of the fathers on the
basis of their type of theology. While they come from different contexts, their
work shares certain common characteristics. Firstly, it is a unified theology that
concentrates on the fundamental Christian dogmas of God, Christ, the Spirit
and the church. (1991:204) Secondly, it is a pastoral theology that focuses on
the needs of the church. (1991:204f) And, thirdly, as we saw in chapter two, it
is a fundamentally ascetical theology that assumed a deep familiarity with
God, Christ, the Spirit and the church. (1991:205)
The third argument outlined by Nichols for the importance of the patristic era
relates to reception in this era of biblical revelation. Ioseph Ratzinger has
proposed that the fathers have a constitutive role in Christian faith because
1 The patristic age is generally dated from the First Letter afClement
which was composed around 96. Dates for its ending vary. In the east it is seen
as ending with the death of John Damascene (c. 750) and in the west with the
death of either Gregory the Great (604), Isidore of Seville (636) or the Venerable
Bede (735). (Ramsey 1987:387)
177
2
their response to scripture was a constitutive element in the happening of the
Word of God in revelation. Thus, Ratzinger argues, the "moment" of the fathers
was an essential moment in the church's receiving of the Word of God.
(Nichols 1991:206)
It is difficult to deny the foundational role played by the Fathers of the church
in the formulation and mediation of Christian faith. The church is necessarily
indebted to the Fathers. Indeed, the witness of the patristic era is a part of our
heritage and as such is part of what makes us Christian.
This is not without its problems however. The very term "Fathers" should alert
us to a similar problem to that which we saw in relation to scripture. The very
fact that we speak of "Fathers" rather than "Mothers and Fathers" should draw
our attention to the partiality and incompleteness of this theological location.
Moreover, the ecclesial context from which they received their authority was a
fundamentally patriarchal one in which the discipleship of equals and
plurality of ministries of the early Jesus movement had been replaced by a
patriarchal hierarchy. This patriarchy -- and even misogyny -- is reflected in
the teachings of the Fathers.'
Thus we once again find ourselves in a situation of having to hold together two
•
difficult-to-hold-together affirmations. One the one hand, one cannot be
Christian without recognising in the Fathers of this era a particularly
privileged source of theological truth, or, in terms of the theology of tradition,
a particularly privileged witness to the Tradition. On the other hand, however,
their witness is historically situated and therefore contingent and thus limited,
For a discussion of early patristic views on women, see Marie-





The witness of the liturgy
The oft-quoted words of Dom Gueranger sum up the witness to the Tradition
of the liturgy:
It is in the liturgy that the Spirit who inspired the Scriptures
speaks again; the liturgy is Tradition itself at its highest degree of
power and solemnity. (Congar 1964:125)
It is in the liturgy that the maxim lex orandi est lex credendi (the law of praying is
the law of believing) applies most fully. By the liturgy is meant - in a western
context at least -- the official common prayer of the church, Le. the liturgy of
the eucharist and other sacraments, and the Divine Office." The theological
importance of the liturgy is seen in the care which the church takes'with the
various liturgical rites and accords them such a high authority. (Nichols
1991:183) However, while prayers and hymns are full of doctrine,
The liturgy is the poetry of the Church, and just as poetry is
language at its most intensely expressive, so in the liturgy we
hear the Church's voice at its most eloquent. (Nichols 1991:184)
Vatican IT tells us that
the liturgy is the summit towards which the activity of the church
is directed; it is also the source from which all its power flows.
(SC:10)
In the east the term refers more specifically to the eucharistic
liturgy. (Nichols 1991:182)
179
With the liturgy we move away from a merely textual witness to the Tradition
to one that also encompasses various means other than writing and enables a
participation of our whole person. Congar says:
The celebration of the Eucharist communicates the whole reality: the
merest sign of the cross is an entire profession of faith in the
Redemption. (1964:127)
Thus the liturgy, as poetry and ritual, is able to provide access to something
that cannot be expressed in words. Through the fully incamational use of
symbol, music, silence, space, movement and colour, it allows a glimpse of that
which is beyond cerebral expression.
Christian imagery
Nichols includes the category of Christian art as well as architecture with that
of liturgy, (1991:188ff) an inclusion that follows the norm of the Second Vatican
Council which included a chapter on "Sacred Music" and a chapter on "Sacred
Art and Furnishings" in its constitution Sacroeanctum Concilium. Nichols argues
that
the more familiar we are with the art of the Church, the better
grasp we shall have of Tradition. (1991:189)
It is clear that as a non-verbal form of communication Christian art is clearly
related to the liturgy. Both are mediums through which we enter into
something that cannot simply be expressed in words and hence develop a
language of another kind.
What is open to question, however, is whether Christian imagery should
simply form an addendum, as it were, to the category of liturgy or whether it
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should comprise a category of its own. While art and architecture are clearly
crucial to meaningful celebration of the liturgy, according to Second Council of
Nicaea, Christian imagery -- specifically iconography -- is not simply
omamentative, but possesses a dogmatic mediation of its own.' Thus for
Nicaea, according to Ouspensky:
the icon is placed on a level with the Holy Scriptures and with
the Cross, as one of the forms of revelation and knowledge of
God, in which the divine and human will and action become
blended ... Consequently, the meaning both of the word and of
the image, their role and significance are the same ... The Church
evolves an entirely special category of image, in accordance with
its nature, and this special character is conditioned by the
purpose it serves. (Ouspensky 1982:30)
However one views the relationship between liturgy and visual imagery it is
clear that both these realities have a crucial role to play in mediating meaning
and in particular in opening up a communication that is more than purely
verbal. This does not mean, however, that they somehow convey "pure"
meaning, undistorted by the influence of ideology. As Lossky showed us in the
previous chapter, symbolic and visual language is still a form of language that
is addressed to our understanding. (1982:14) It is still a form of discourse and
as such is not a "pure" mediator of meaning.
Like scripture and the Fathers, the categorylies of liturgy and imagery mediate
not simply divine truth but also a certain set of power relations that are clearly
patriarchal. The marginalisation within and alienation from the church felt by
many feminists is clearly related to their liturgical experience. This is not only
a matter of explicitly sexist verbal language, whether for human beings or for
God, but also that of symbols and gestures. For example, the significance given
4 This dogmatic mediation has, admittedly, been much more
influential in the east than in the west.
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to the gender of those who preside at liturgical celebrations reinforces the
teaching that women are not able to image God in Christ as fully as men are.
The same is true of visual imagery which often reinforces the church's
patriarchal understanding of itself. For example, the icon of pentecost shows
the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the twelve (male) apostles. While Mary is
sometimes shown as present, other women are rarely depicted,
Thus, like the other witnesses we have considered, the liturgy and Christian
imagery, are both crucial for Christian faith and yet also limited. As a form of
discourse they are, like all discourse, partial and biased. And yet they are
genuine witnesses to a reality that is beyond all partiality.
Where liturgy and imagery may go beyond the categories of scripture and the
Fathers, however, is in their ability to introduce us to a world that is beyond
language. While this is clearly done from within language -- even if it is a
different type of language -- their use of poetry, symbol and ritual moves us
- .
towards a place where language itself becomes destabilised. Thus I suggest
that they can serve to make us more aware of that "margin of silence" that
accompanies all discourse.
Th~,;~y;ibtess of the church's magisterium
The witnesses considered so far are all witnesses of the church. It is in the
church that we encounter the scriptures, the Fathers, the liturgy and Christian
imagery. However, there is also a more specific way of speaking of the church
as a witness to the Tradition which usually refers to its teaching authority and
its role in defining dogma. Dei Verbum tells us that:
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the task of giving an authentic' interpretation of the word of God,
whether in its written form or in the form of tradition, has been
entrusted to the living teaching office of the church alone. (DV:10)
Here we come, then, to the specific roles -- and charisms -- of particular
institutional manifestations of the church. As we saw in the previous chapter,
for the early church it was the criterion of apostilicity that guaranteed the
validity of church tradition. Here we find the category not just of "witness" but
of "authorized witnesses". Sullivan says:
All Christians agree that the apostles, and the "apostolic men"
who were the authors of the NT, were chosen by God as
authorized witnesses of the Christ event. The teaching of the
apostles was recognized as normative for the faith of the christian
community, for they were the authoritative witnesses to what
God had revealed in Jesus Christ. (Sullivan 1987:618)
This authority, according to the church's self-understanding, did not end with
the death of the apostles but was passed on to their successors. While it is not
clear exactlyhow this development came about, by the end of the second
century there was a clear recognition of the role of the bishops as successors to
the apostles in their pastoral role." Thus the teaching of the bishops was
recognised as normative for the faith of the church. (Sullivan 1987:619)
While an individual bishop was recognised as having responsibility for the
teaching of faith in his diocese, at times the bishops also chose to speak
collectively gathering in synods or councils. With the emergence of the criteria
5 Sullivan points out that the word "authentic" here does not mean
"genuine" but rather "authoritative", i.e. "endowed with pastoral authority,
ultimately derived from Christ". (1987:617)
6 For a discussion of the development of this ordained ministry, see
Kenan Osborne's Priesthood, (1988) chapters three and four.
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of ecumenicity in the 260s, the reception of the council's teaching by the
universal episcopate was seen as giving that teaching a definitive status.
(Nichols 1991:211) Moreover, with the emperor Constantine's action in calling
an ecumenical council at Nicaea in 325 to deal with the Arian controversy we
see the emergence of the most authoritative teaching location within the
church. The dogmatic teaching of these ecumenical councils, if properly
received by the whole church, came to be seen as a necessarily binding witness
to the Tradition. Thus their teaching is a formal expression of the faith of the
whole church.
With the split between east and west the western church centralised this
teaching authority of the episcopate more and more around the papacy.
Western councils came to be considered as ecumenical on the basis of the
presence of the Roman patriarch, over and against the patristic criteria of the
presence, or at least the approval, of the patriarchs of all the ancient sees.7
Moreover, with the development of the doctrine of papal infallibility" solemn
papal declarations came to enjoy the same infallibility as thoseof an
7 Even after the Great Schism, the councils of the western church
were not considered ecumenical. It was only in the late sixteenth century that
Robert Bellarmine introduced the idea that papally approved councils of the
west were also ecumenical and this won virtually instantaneous and universal
acceptance in the west. (Nichols 1991:212)
8 The First Vatican Council, meeting in 1870, declared:
We teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma that when the
Roman pontiff speaks excathedra, that is, when, in the exercise of
his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, in virtue of
his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning
faith and morals to be held by the whole church, he possesses, by
the divine assistance promised to blessed Peter, that infallibility
which the divine Redeemer willed his church to enjoy in defining
doctrine concerning faith or morals. (First dogmatic constitution
on the church of Christ, ch. 4)
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ecumenical council. (Sullivan 1987:620)
Thus for the contemporary Catholic church teaching authority is located in "the
Roman Pontiff, or the body of bishops together with him". (LG:36) They are
nevertheless dependent on the "sacred deposit of the word of God, which is
entrusted to the church". (LG:10) Thus
This magisterium is not superior to the word of God, but is rather
its servant. It teaches only what has been handed on to it. At the
divine command and with the help of the holy Spirit, it listens to
this devoutly, guards it reverently and expounds it faithfully. All
that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed it draws
from this sole deposit of faith. (LG:10)
We find a distinction moreover between the extraordinary and the ordinary
magisterium. The former refers to the definitive teachings of an ecumenical
council or of the pope speaking ex cathedra and are clearly held to be infallible.
What is less clear, as we saw in chapter one, is the status of the ordinary
magisterium, Le. the teaching authority of the pope that is exercised in a non-
definitive way through encyclical letters etc. (Sullivan 1987:622)
Clearly the teaching authority of the church is an area that is being actively
contested in our contemporary church as the discussion in chapter one
indicated. And, like the other witnesses to the Tradition that we have
considered in this chapter, it is a witness that is problematic for feminists and
that can seem to be a counter-witness to the gospel. Like the other witnesses we
considered it is clearly limited and partial. We can view this partiality from
two perspectives. .
Firstly, from a feminist perspective, episcopal and papal authority, emerged
from, reflected and reinforced a clearly patriarchal church. By linking teaching
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authority with an ordained role and by excluding women from ordination, this
development clearly excluded women from teaching authority in the church.
it can, moreover, be argued that feminism calls into question all hierarchical
patterns of leadership seeing them as integrally linked to a patriarchal
understanding of society. Letty Russell says:
In patriarchal styles of leadership, authority is exercised by
standing above and is enhanced through a capitalist model of
power accumulation at the expense of others. (1993:56)
By contrast,
Feminist styles of leadership would draw their model of behavior
from a partnership paradigm. This perspective on reality
establishes norms of language, thought and action in a model of
shared authority in community. (1993:57)
At stake here is the relationship between the magisterium and the rest of the
.church. As we saw in the previous chapter, since the last century there has
been a recovery of the idea of the "sense of the faithful" associated in particular
with the work of Newman. However, while it is now readily acknowledged
that the whole church, including the laity, clearly has a role in passing on the
deposit of faith, Lumen Gentium clearly states that task of giving "authentic
interpretation" belongs to the teaching office alone. (LG:I0)
This tension is indicative of the ecclesial climate in which we live in which we
are hearing increasing calls for democratisation within the church." It is not my
9 A recent popular example of this is the 'We are the church"
petitions that, after beginning in Austria, have been circulating in western
Europe and the D.S.A. For a theological plea for democratisation in the church,
see Schillebeeckx's Church. The Human Story ofGod, (1990) chapter four; Denis'
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purpose to enter these debates here, but merely to show the limitations that
they show us about the church's witness to the Tradition.
Secondly, one can also view the partiality of the church's magisterium from
another perspective, namely its lack of ecumenicity. If one takes the patristic
criteria for ecumenicity seriously, then the disunity of the church since the time
of the Great Schism or even before" greatly impedes the authority of its
teaching, particularly that of what are claimed to be ecumenical councils which
in turn gave rise to present ideas about papal authority. Thus our
contemporary churches live in a state of impaired ecumenicity which will be
discussed below.
Thus, whether we speak of contemporary feminist and democratic discourses,
or the more ancient criteria of the universal church, we see, that the
magisterium, as currently defined, while it clearly does witness to the
Tradition, is nevertheless limited, partial, incomplete and therefore biased.
"The Catholic Church between monarchy and democracy" (1991); and Hill's
Ministry and Authority in the Catholic Church (1988).
10 If one accepts the patristic criterion of being in communion with
the ancient apostolic sees, then one can argue that the split at the Council of
Chalcedon in 451between the church of Alexandria and the rest of the
churches should mark the beginning of real schism.
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The nature of the church's witness to the Tradition
As should be apparent from this discussion of the traditional "monuments" to
the Tradition, there is a fundamental conflict running through the nature of the
church's witness to the Tradition. As our discussion of the phenomenon of
witness above showed, the testimony of a witness is both crucial and limited,
both the strongest possible form of discourse and yet, at one and the same
time, vulnerable to accusations of partiality and bias.
All of the witnesses that we have considered above arise out of the church's
encounter with God in Christian revelation. This absolutely foundational event
necessarily marks those so encountered. Through baptism, the Christian
community bears witness to something beyond itself. Through this encounter
with that which is absolutely Other it discovers that its own identity is
integrally linked with that which is beyond it-Through its participation in the
incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ it testifies to this Christ-event as
ultimately meaningful.
At the same time, however, the church expresses this witness through limited
human means. The cultural context and intellectual milieu out of which it arose
was necessarily particular and therefore limiting. Moreover, the political
systems that influenced its growth were both arbitrary and, it can be argued,
oppressive." The growth and the development of the church was clearly
influenced by the Roman and Hellenistic society out of which it emerged,
especially after th~ conversion of Constantine, and later by the feudal order of
11 Schillebeeckx points out that "in its uniqueness and
distinctiveness as a religion, Christianity is essentially bound up with an
unavoidable 'historical peculiarity' and thus is regional and limited. Therefore
(like all religions), Christianity too is limited: limited in means of expression,
perspective and specific practice ." (1990:165)
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the middle ages. (Schillebeeckx 1990:187)
Thus, as a human phenomenon the church clearly reflected the patriarchal--
and Werarchical-- society out of which it emerged and this clearly impacted
the nature of its witness to the Other. In this, as a human phenomenon, the .
church is clearly a historical reality and the witness that it bears to the
Tradition has to be seen in the context of its historical situatedness and the
importance of historicity for understanding outlined in chapter six.
We cannot, therefore, look for a "pure" church outside of history just as we
cannot look for a "pure" discourse outside of history and language. It is the
church that we have -- with all its contradictions and struggles -- that is witness
to the Tradition. It is however a church that is deeply wounded.
The wounds of the church
By focusing on the partiality and limitation of the church's witness to the
Tradition, I have attempted to show that this witness happens from within
history and discourse while that which is witnessed to is outside of human
discourse. All speech implies a woundedness for all speech happens within
history and the power relations that structure discourse. All speech implies
complicity in a power which allows some a voice and denies it of others.
It is only, I suggest, from within an appreciation of the necessarily wounded
nature of all speech -- and especially speech about God -- that we will be able
develop a sense of the relationship between the absolute Other and that which
manifests it, between the Tradition and the wounded church that witnesses to
it.
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The church's creed has traditionally professed that the church is "one, holy,
catholic and apostolic". The Catechism tells us that:
These four characteristics, inseparably linked with each other,
indicate essential features of the Church and her mission. The
Church does not possess them of herself; it is Christ who, through
the Holy Spirit, makes his Church one, holy, catholic and
apostolic, and it is he who calls her to realise each of these
qualities. (1994:811)
Let us briefly consider these traditional "marks" of the church.
Unity
Unity is the first mark of the church. The letter to the Ephesians tells us that
There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the
one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one
God and Father of all ... (Eph 4:13)
This unity, which is given in baptism, (Gal 3:27-28) is based on the unity of the
Trinity itself and is achieved through the Holy Spirit, Vatican II tells us,
dwelling in those who believe and pervading and ruling over the
entire church, who brings about that wonderful communion of
the faithful and joins them together so intimately in Christ that he
is the principle of the church's unity. (UR:2)
While this unity does not mean uniformity, and has been expressed in a .
diversity of ways~ it has meant a basic communion of faith . This is expressed




Then, strengthened by the body of Christ in the Eucharistic
communion, they manifest in a concrete way that unity of the
people of God which this most holy sacrament aptly signifies and
admirably realizes. (LG:ll)
As we have seen above, the unity of the church is seriously impaired. Since the
time of the Great Schism or before, communion between the ancient apostolic
sees has been broken. Moreover, since the time of the reformation we have
seen not only more breaks in communion, but also the development of
fundamental theological differences. While we must welcome the progress of
the ecumenical movement of this century, the fact remains that we face a
fundamentally divided church.
This disunity of the church is not simply one of confessional and juridical
differences however. The church is also fundamentally divided within itself.
As long as a significant proportion of its members continue to experience
themselves as alienated and not recognised as equal within the church, the
church remains fundamentally divided.
Holiness
Holiness is the second mark of the church. Vatican 11 tells us that the church "is
held, as a matter of faith, to be unfailingly holy". (LG:39) The church's holiness
derives from its relation to Christ.
The followers of Christ, called by God not for what they had
done but by his design and grace, are justified in the Lord Jesus,
have been made sons and daughters of God by the Baptism of
faith and partakers of the divine nature, and so are truly
sanctified. They must therefore hold on to and perfect in their
lives that holiness which they have received from God. (LG:40)
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In ecclesiological terms it is common cause to acknowledge that the church is
both sinful and holy, both human and divine. (Catechism 1994:827) However,
this is not simply a matter of individual sinfulness. Hans Kiing argues that:
All ecclesiology must take as one of its bases, not merely the
historicity of the Church, but the fact that the Church is
historically affected by evil; and this fact must be accepted from
the start without false apologetics and always taken into account.
(1968:28)
As we have seen in this thesis, the church's very historicity means that it is
implicated in relations of power that privilege some and marginalise others. In
this the church is historically affected by evil and its holiness is thereby
necessarily impaired.
Catholicity
Catholicity is the third mark of the church. The word "catholic" means
"universal" in the sense of "according to the totality" or "in keeping with the
whole". (Catechism 1994:830) This catholicity derives from the church's mission
to the whole world (Mt 28:18-20) which necessarily involved taking root in
different nations and contexts. The church should, because of the principle of
catholicity, take to itself the experience of all peoples.
To speak of the "catholic church" is to speak of the "whole church" -- the church
universal throughout the world. Within this whole there are various local
churches. But
This multiplicity of local churches, unified in a common effort,
shows all the more resplendently the catholicity of the undivided
church. (LG:23)
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Catholicity is clearly closely related to unity. And, as we have seen above, the
church is clearly divided. While it is possible to argue that catholicity derives
from being in communion with the bishop of Rome, (Catechism 1994:834) we
have seen that the more ancient criteria for catholicity is that of communion
with all four ancient apostolic sees. And, given the historical divisions of the
churches, the possibility of this no longer exists. Thus the church's catholicity is
necessarily impaired.
As should be clear from the arguments presented in this thesis, the church's
catholicity is also open to question on other grounds. We need to question how
universal the church is when it has not taken at least half of humanity's
experience seriously. Can we really speak of catholicity when male experience
continues to be defined as the norm?
Apostolicity
Apostolicity is the fourth traditional mark of the church. As we have seen in
the previous chapter, the church's foundation on the faith of the apostles is
crucial for its identity and mission.
This divine mission, which was committed by Christ to the
apostles, is destined to last until the end of the world (see Mt
28:20), since the Gospel which they were obliged to hand on is
the principle of the church's life for all time. For that very reason
the apostles were careful to appoint successors ... (LG:20)
However, as with the other marks of the church, this apostolic witness is a
divided witness. Both Catholic and (Calcedonian and non-Calcedonian)
Orthodox churches have apostolic roots and yet are divided from one another.
As we saw above, the patristic criteria of being in communion with the
apostolic sees is no longer possible.
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The apostolic witness is also, from a feminist perspective, a decidedly partial
witness. The mere fact that all the acknowledged apostles are male, should
raise questions for us. Either one accepts this as part of the divine plan, or else
one needs to ask questions about who has been excluded and why. Thus the
feature of apostolicity is a reminder to us of the partiality of the church and of
the power dynamics inherent in it.
Acknowledging woundedness
From the perspective presented in this thesis it should be clear that the church's
unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity are open to serious question. The
church is manifestly divided and sinful, excluding much of humanity's
experience from its theological discourse, and with a divided apostolic witness.
It is difficult to see this identity as a description of the church. And yet I do not
want to deny the existence of these traditional "marks" of the church, for they
clearly refer to a reality which is at least partly hidden from us. Like the
witnesses to the Tradition considered earlier in this chapter, these marks are
clearly historical and therefore necessarily limited, partial and incomplete. It is
therefore perhaps more helpful to see them, as Kiing suggests, as a
responsibility that must be "constantly realized anew". (1968:263)
In this context, however, I would suggest that these traditional "marks" of the
church can best be viewed as "wounds". As manifestly problematic statements
they serve to problematise -- and destabilise -- all that we can say about the
church. And yet they also remind us of an identity that we claim that is beyond
the limitation of human discourse.
By shifting the imagery from limitation and partiality to that of woundedness, I
am suggesting that we view the limitations of the church and of its
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theological discourse not simply as a phenomenon of human discourse, but as
a theological reality that needs to be entered into. It was, Christians believe, in
entering into humanity's wounded condition, assuming it, and accepting to be
wounded that God made Godself known and brought about redemption.
Christian identity necessarily means entering into this pascal mystery
For while we live, we are always being given up to death for
Jesus' sake, so that the life of Jesus may be made visible in our
mortal flesh. So death is at work in us, but life in you. (2 Cor 4:11-
12)
Maggie Ross argues that instead of denying our woundedness, claiming
completeness and immutability, we need rather to be prepared to enter our
wounds.
We have to be willing to enter those wounds, not hide them by
casuistry, not seal them up, not scar them over. They must remain
wounds in order that Christ's resurrection may enter and indwell
us and our wounds be united and glorified with his. This is the
way of transfiguration ... (1987:xvii)
This woundedness means that we neither deny the limitations and partiality of
the church, pretending that all is well with its witness to the Tradition, nor
abandon the church and its integrity as privileged witness on the basis of its
partiality. Rather we need to hold together the reality of the church as
privileged witness of the Tradition and therefore bearer of revelation with an
awareness of the deeply wounded nature of this witness.
195
Conclusion
This chapter has probed what it means to speak about the church as a
privileged witness to the Tradition. After considering the nature of witness as
both self-implicating and partial we saw how this was true of the witness of
the scriptures, the Fathers, the liturgy and the magisteriurn. While that which
is witnessed to was shown to be absolutely Other, the witnesses themselves are
implicated in discourse and therefore partial.
This is necessarily part of the nature of witnessing. However it also has
ecclesiological implications. While the church is the privileged witness of
revelation its witness is necessarily partial and incomplete. I suggested that
this partiality can best be seen as woundedness -- a woundedness that is akin
to that of Christ.
Thus the wounded nature of the church becomes, as I will argue in the






the path of wounded witness
This thesis has addressed the fundamental question of whether and how the
church's tradition can be understood as revelatory given its patriarchal nature and
its implication in relations of power which have given some people a voice and
denied it of others. It has thus asked how feminist Catholics are to be accountable to
tradition as bearer of divine revelation.
Overview of movement
In addressing this issue the thesis has followed three basic movements.
In Part I, I outlined contemporary discourses that have bearing on theologies of
revelation. I juxtaposed hermeneutical developments in thought on revelation with
discourses that point to the irreducible alterity of the Other who is excluded from all
discourse. Thus while the hermeneutical developments of chapter three presented a
discourse of presence, allowing what is received in revelation to be appropriated
today, the approaches presented in chapter four pointed to the absence of all that
has been excluded from our discourse due to the power relations that structure both
society and language.
While these two positions, that may be said to hinge around revelation, on the one
hand, and rupture, on the other hand, were presented as juxtaposed and necessarily
hostile to one another, I also introduced another dynamic into this section. In
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chapter five I presented a reading of the Christian apophatic tradition which argued
that the apophatic moment, which is the moment of breakdown of all language that
thereby seeks to show something beyond language, is the critical moment in all
theology and that this points to a fundamental alterity that is at the heart of the
theological task.
Thus I suggest that the ruptures presented by contemporary discourses are not as
new as they may appear but are in fact akin to a breakdown in language that at least
some sections of the church have always recognised as necessary for theological
adequacy.
In Part Il, I sought out a mediating path with which to respond to this challenge of
rupture and exclusion. I argued, following Bemstein, (1992) for a dual mediation
that holds two moments in a non-reducible tensiveness.
The first of these moments is the hermeneutical path of transformative
appropriation outlined in chapter six. Such a mediating path allows us to be
impacted by the texts of tradition in ever-new ways so that the text is able to
explode the oppressive worlds out of which it arose and instead become a resource
in the critique of ideology.
The second moment continues to probe the alterity that necessarily accompanies
discourse. By seeking out the negativity beneath rationality and language and the
contradictions, gaps and hyperbole within it, it seeks to allow that which is excluded
to transgress the boundaries of knowledge which patriarchal discourse has
established.
In arguing for a dual mediation of both these paths, I suggest that their relationship
is fundamentally that of the cataphatic-apophatic relationship. The cataphatic and
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apophatic, properly understood as we saw in chapter five, are not simply different
types of theologies but are rather different moments in the theological task. Both are
necessary and they stand together in an uncomfortable and necessarily
unreconcilable tensiveness. Thus I suggest that while theological interpretation is
necessary and indeed inevitable it stands against the backdrop of the radical
inability of our language to express that which it necessarily excludes and yet is
accompanied by.
In Part Ill, I looked at how this is expressed in our theological understanding of
tradition and the church. By contrasting tradition as the whole life of the church
with a more specific understanding of the Tradition as ultimately Other and
uncapturable in discourse, I sought in chapter eight to continue this apophatic-
cataphatic thread. This is pursued in chapter nine where I look at the witnesses to
the Tradition.
What emerges from the discussion in Part III is the distinction between that which is
expressed in the church's discourse and which is therefore necessarily implicated in
relations of power that allow some a voice and deny it of others, and that which,
while accompanying this discourse is nevertheless absolutely Other and unable to
be captured by it. As a human institution the church is necessarily implicated in
discourse and yet through its encounter -- that is irreducible to language and yet
necessarily has to be expressed in language -- with that which is absolutely Other,
the church bears witness to that which is beyond any expression in discourse.
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The cataphatic-apophatic dynamic as interpretive key
We thus see that a persistent thread running throughout this thesis is the
relationship between the cataphatic and the apophatic in theology. Rather than
seeing these as different types of theology or spirituality, or different emphases
within them, chapter five argued that they relate to different -- and necessary--
moments in all theology.
Within the context of this thesis, the cataphatic obviously refers to that which is
expressed in language -- to the various texts of our tradition, be they verbal, visual
or ritual texts. The apophatic refers to the breakdown in discourse which occurs
when we problematise these texts and show their radical ability to represent that
which is both unrepresentable and excluded from discourse.
Using the dual mediation outlined in Part Il, and against the backdrop of the
cataphatic-apophatic dynamic outlined in chapter five, I suggest that we approach
the problem of ecclesial tradition in two ways. In the first place, we need to
maximise theological discourse, insuring that as many voices as possible are heard.
Thus a transformative interpretation of tradition allows a plurality of interpretations
as the texts of the tradition take on new meaning in new contexts. At the same time
however, and resulting from this maximisation of discourses, we find a collapse of
language which itself points to the radical inability of our theological discourse to
capture that which is beyond language. Such a strategy therefore needs to be
coupled, in the second place, with a probing of that silence that accompanies all
discourse and the possibilities of transgression of that which has been silenced.
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The wound of knowledge
By probing the limitations of language, we come to see the necessary link between
limitation and language. Not only is language limited, but it is necessarily so. Any
expression necessarily forecloses other expressions. Thus knowledge, insofar as it
can be expressed, involves a wounding process -- an acceptance of the necessarily
limitations of discourse.
We see this process at work in the church's witness to its encounter with God in
Christ. Not only did this encounter occur in historically specific spatial and temporal
contexts, but the witness to it was expressed through specific forms of discourse
which, being human, are necessarily implicated in particular power relationships.
The patriarchal nature of the church's witness to the Tradition, outlined in chapter
nine, is therefore a part of the scandal of particularity from which we cannot escape.
We can look for neither a pure discourse outside of history and language, nor a pure
church outside the historical conditioning processes which are the history of
Christianity.
The fundamental woundedness of the church, which we saw in chapter nine, is
ultimately, neither an abberation of some pure "essence",nor proof of its
irredeemability. It is, rather, the necessary consequence of its implication in history
and language. and, hence, of the possibility of its identity as a witness.
Moreover, in considering the specific wounds of the church in chapter nine we saw
that there was a fundamental ambivalence about all of them. This was apparent both
from the perspective of ancient patristic criteria which points to the fundamentally
divided state of our contemporary church(es) and from the perspective of a critical
and feminist questioning about who was and who was not included in
understandings of unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity. Thus these privileged
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"marks" of the church refer to a fundamentally wounded reality.
This is the context out of which witnessing must necessarily occur. And, I argue, an
adequate theological response needs to be faithful to the ambivalence and
woundedness of this context. This means that we resist two temptations to
completeness and invulnerability.
Firstly, there is the temptation to deny woundedness and pretend that the church
and its witness to the Tradition is somehow immutable and invulnerable. We view
something of this, Isuggest, in the modem Catholic response to broken ecumenicity
that we see in Bellarmine's proposal that was widely accepted in the sixteenth
century. (see page 184) Such an approach, in redefining the criteria for ecumenicity
from the patristic criteria of all the ancient apostolic sees to that of the see of Rome
alone, was an attempt to mask the deeply wounded nature of the church. Coming
from a very different direction we see a similar denial of woundedness in the
assumption that a patriarchal church is somehow normative, for to move away from
a patriarchal church would be to say that something has been very wrong for most
of our history and this, it seems, we cannot do.
Secondly, however, there is also a temptation to escape from this necessarily
wounded witness that is the church. While feminist theologies must necessarily
engage the witness of the church in a critical interaction, they cannot escape them.
Thus for Christians - particularly for Catholic Christians - we need to allow
ourselves to be addressed by these witnesses. For, it is by listening deeply to the
deeply wounded witnesses of scripture, the Fathers, the liturgy and the magisterium
that we encounter that Tradition that is beyond the limitations of its witnesses.
Thus I am arguing, against those feminists who seek to relocate theological authority
to a community outside of the received tradition or to a particular strand in the
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tradition, that it is within the church's historically mediated and therefore partial and
necessarily wounded witness that we encounter the Tradition, and that this is
necessarily authoritative for the theological task.
The challenge remains to find ways of listening to this witness that can enable that
which is beyond all limitation to break through our limited discourses. This thesis
has broadly proposed possible paths along which this can happen.However,
detailed possibilities of how transformative interpretation and a transgressing of
boundaries can occur more concretely will have to be investigated in specific
contexts. One particular area that I would be interested in probing further is the role
of liturgy and, particularly eucharistic liturgy, in providing access to such Tradition.
That, however, is a task for the future.
I conclude with a quote from Maggie Ross:
The revelation of the wounded God has been a scandal throughout
Judeo-Christian history, and perhaps today more than at any other
time. It may help us to remember that in the English language the
word "wound" and the word ''blessing'' have the same root. Our
wounds are ultimately our greatest source of blessing because they
become one with the wounds of our humble God. (1987:xxiv)
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